Sarah Mae Robinson Clarke

The defendant franchisor brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the franchisees’ action on the basis of a mutual release signed following the failure of the franchised restaurant, and alternatively sought partial summary judgment dismissing a statutory rescission claim under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The plaintiffs argued the release was unenforceable due to unconscionability and statutory invalidity, and that disclosure deficiencies entitled them to rescind within the two‑year period applicable where no compliant disclosure document is provided.

The court held that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the enforceability of the mutual release, including potential unconscionability, lack of legal advice, and imbalance of bargaining power.

The court also found that determining whether the disclosure requirements were satisfied under the statute required a full evidentiary record and could not be resolved on summary judgment.

However, the court struck the plaintiffs’ jury notice based on the contractual waiver and the equitable nature of certain relief sought.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a gas contract dispute, arguing errors in the limitation period, mitigation, contract renewal, and costs.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the limitation period should not run due to fraudulent concealment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal on the substantive issues, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the limitation period, mitigation, or the validity of the renewal contract.

However, the court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award to partial indemnity.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as the issue of fraudulent concealment was not raised at trial.

Following competing summary judgment motions in a civil commercial dispute, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff’s summary judgment motion had previously been dismissed, while the defendant’s cross‑motion was found premature and allowed to be brought again after discoveries.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant should not receive costs because it withdrew one cross‑motion and the remaining motion was premature.

The court found that misleading and contradictory evidence advanced by the plaintiff undermined the litigation process and forced the defendant to bring the cross‑motions.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as statute-barred under both the former and current Limitations Act regimes.

The moving party argued that, even accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its highest, the limitation period had expired.

The court acknowledged that the limitation argument had merit but found that credibility issues and the incomplete evidentiary record made summary determination inappropriate.

The court held that a full trial and discoveries were necessary for the trier of fact to properly assess the evidence and refine the issues.

The motion was adjourned sine die with leave to renew the limitation argument on notice.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of records containing homeowners' addresses and environmental test results.

The Divisional Court set aside the order and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The court found that the information arguably constituted 'personal information' and that procedural fairness, as well as potentially section 28 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, required that the affected homeowners be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before their information could be disclosed.