Kaitlyn Mitchell

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision striking down provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020 and its Regulation.

The application judge had found that provisions invalidating consent to enter a farm obtained under false pretences violated the freedom of expression of animal rights activists seeking to conduct undercover exposés.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the activists' claim was a positive rights claim seeking access to private property on their own terms.

The Court found that the legislation did not substantially interfere with freedom of expression and that any limits were justified under section 1 of the Charter.

Following a motion where the respondents were substantially successful and the applicant condominium corporation was denied relief, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the applicant had acted unreasonably and in bad faith by failing to address a breach of the Condominium Act for decades and refusing to enter into a section 98 agreement.

Consequently, the respondents were awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

However, the respondents were ordered to bear the costs of preparing and registering the section 98 agreement, as it was for their exclusive benefit.

A condominium corporation sought removal of a concrete pad installed in the exclusive use common element rear yard of a unit approximately 40 years ago by a predecessor in title without a s. 98 agreement under the Condominium Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding the doctrine of laches applied given the corporation's decades of acquiescence -- the board conducted annual walk-throughs during which the pad was clearly visible, yet took no action until 2024.

The court found the corporation's principal affiant not credible regarding lack of knowledge, held that the board did not act in good faith, and ordered the parties to enter into a s. 98 agreement rather than require removal.

This endorsement addresses seven motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020, and its Regulation 701/20, which were found to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to intervene to Animal Alliance, Centre for Free Expression (CFE), Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), and Labour Issues Coordinating Committee (LICC), finding they offered useful and distinct perspectives without unduly expanding the appeal's scope.

Motions by Justicia for Migrant Workers (J4MW), Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), and Animal Environmental Legal Advocacy (AEL Advocacy) were dismissed, primarily due to concerns about expanding the issues or duplication of arguments.

The applicants, animal rights activists, challenged the constitutionality of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act and its Regulation.

They argued that provisions voiding consent to enter agricultural premises if obtained under false pretences, and provisions prohibiting interaction with farm animals, violated their Charter rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

The court found that the Act's prohibition on interacting with animals did not violate the Charter, as there is no constitutional right to physically interact with another's private property.

However, the court held that Section 9 of the Regulation, which penalized any false statement made to gain access to agricultural premises, unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression.

The court struck down Section 9 and certain limitations within the whistleblower and journalist exemptions, while upholding the rest of the Act.

The applicants sought judicial review of the respondent's alleged decision to allow coyote hunting contests to proceed without written authorization, contrary to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent did not authorize the contests.

Instead, the contests proceeded without authorization, and the respondent's Enforcement Branch exercised its prosecutorial discretion not to lay charges.

The court held that this discretionary decision is immune from judicial review absent bad faith or abuse of process, which were not alleged.

This endorsement addresses four motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a constitutional challenge brought by Animal Justice et al. against the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020.

The applicants in the main case allege violations of Charter rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly, liberty, security of the person, arbitrary detention, and reverse onus.

The court applied the test for intervention, considering the nature of the case, the issues, and the likelihood of a useful contribution without causing injustice or expanding the record.

The motion by Justice for Migrant Workers was dismissed for lack of a substantial interest and for attempting to expand the issues.

The motion by Centre for Free Expression was allowed in part, limited to the existing issues and excluding a proposed s. 2(a) Charter argument due to lack of a developed record and expertise.

The motions by Animal Alliance of Canada and Regan Russell Foundation were fully allowed, as they met the criteria and did not seek to expand the issues.

All successful interventions were granted subject to specific conditions on written and oral submissions.

The plaintiff brought a motion for answers to undertakings and refusals in the context of a construction lien action.

The motion was dismissed, and the parties submitted written arguments regarding costs.

The defendant, having been entirely successful, sought costs of $5,674.94 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reviewed the factors under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, reduced the defendant's attendance fee, and fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $5,074.94.

A motion by Ecojustice for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning environmental contamination liability.

The underlying judgment held the defendant corporation liable in nuisance and under the Environmental Protection Act for approximately $1.8 million in damages.

Ecojustice sought to provide submissions on environmental law implications and the retrospective application of statutory provisions.

The motion judge dismissed the intervention motion, finding that Ecojustice's proposed submissions would not materially assist the court and would cause injustice to the respondents by requiring them to address new arguments without adequate notice.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing its breach of contract action for delay at a status hearing under Rule 48.14(13).

The plaintiff had taken no steps to move the action forward for 26 months and provided no explanation for the delay.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in the application of the conjunctive test for dismissal, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate both an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Ministry of the Environment decision approving an increase in sulphur production at a Suncor refinery, arguing the failure to conduct a cumulative effects assessment violated their Charter rights.

The respondents brought motions to strike the application as a collateral attack on prior approvals and to strike much of the applicants' affidavit evidence.

The applicants brought a cross-motion for a protective costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to strike the application, finding it was not plain and obvious it would fail.

The court allowed the motion to strike evidence in part, striking improper expert opinion and unattributed hearsay, but leaving relevance determinations to the hearing panel.

The motion for a protective costs order was dismissed, as the applicants had pro bono representation and the narrow administrative issue did not meet the exceptional public importance threshold.

In a securities-related class proceeding arising from alleged fraudulent statements about Indonesian gold reserves, the appellants challenged the refusal to certify negligent misrepresentation while conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, and Competition Act claims had been certified.

The court held that there was no principled basis to distinguish fraudulent from negligent misrepresentation at the certification stage, given the overlap in common factual and legal issues and the low threshold for common issues under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court further held that, where three related claims were already proceeding as a class action, it was sensible and efficient to include negligent misrepresentation on the same litigation track.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order amended accordingly.