Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants commenced an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and oppression, which an associate justice stayed under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, based on arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements.

The appellants appealed to a Superior Court judge, who dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, noting that under s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, there is no appeal from a court's decision to stay a proceeding under s. 7(1).

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay $338,984.20 in unpaid licence fees for sports fields that were closed or restricted due to COVID-19.

The appellant argued the agreements should be interpreted as 'pay-if-available', while the respondent argued payment was required for bargained-for times regardless of use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable errors of law or palpable and overriding errors in her application of contractual interpretation principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The husband appealed a family law judgment made following an uncontested trial in which he did not participate due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and pleadings.

The wife brought a motion to quash the appeal based on the husband's ongoing non-compliance with support and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding it more appropriate to hear the appeal on the merits.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with an uncontested trial given the husband's repeated breaches of court orders and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The appellant, who was designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence in 1988, appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the original sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction to order a psychiatric remand under the Criminal Code and failed to invoke the Mental Health Act.

Furthermore, the sentencing judge erred by fettering his discretion when he concluded he had no choice but to impose the dangerous offender designation if statutory criteria were met.

The habeas corpus application was granted, the dangerous offender designation was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh sentencing hearing.

Following the dismissal of the appeal, the court received written submissions on costs.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the respondents' costs fixed at $25,000, plus disbursements and applicable HST.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The motion judge found that the appellants failed to file a certification motion record or establish a timetable for steps required to advance the proceeding within one year of commencement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that while a contextual approach applies to determining whether a timetable for required steps was established, the one-year deadline is mandatory and no such timetable existed here.

The court also rejected arguments regarding waiver, the availability of a Phoenix order, and the effect of adding a new plaintiff.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite s. 8 and s. 9 breaches.

Police stopped his vehicle for a Highway Traffic Act violation and arrested him based on an Alberta warrant, which was later found to be geographically restricted.

A firearm was discovered during a search incident to arrest.

The trial judge found the police conduct inadvertent and not in bad faith, and that the seriousness of the charges weighed in favour of inclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, deferring to her assessment of police conduct as being on the less serious end of the spectrum and emphasizing the seriousness of the firearm charges.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a sentence where the Crown and appellant jointly requested a reduction in the custodial sentence.

Due to an inadvertent error, the negotiated joint submission of 26 months was not presented to the sentencing judge, who imposed a 36-month sentence.

The sentencing judge deemed herself functus officio to correct the error.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and substituted the sentence to reflect the original 26-month joint submission, less pre-trial credit, to rectify the procedural unfairness.

The appellant tenant sought to overturn a summary judgment, arguing that commercial landlords have a duty to mitigate damages even when they do not accept a tenant's repudiation of a lease, and that a lease clause capped damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that it was bound by Supreme Court of Canada precedent (Highway Properties v. Kelly, Douglas & Co.) which states no such duty to mitigate exists when the landlord insists on performance of the lease.

The court also upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the lease clause, finding that the two-year rent cap on damages only applied if the landlord had terminated the lease, which it had not.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Paul Blanchard, appealed a trial judgment that found his personal guarantee to JPM Trade Capital Inc. was a continuing guarantee, covering multiple subsequent loans to TEC International Corporation.

The Court of Appeal applied the principles of contractual interpretation from *Sattva* and *Earthco*, affirming that such interpretation is a question of mixed fact and law, subject to palpable and overriding error review.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that the guarantee was continuing, based on the contract's language and surrounding circumstances, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, T.D., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving two complainants, B.S. and B.B. The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility, specifically regarding inconsistencies in B.S.'s testimony about prior disclosure and the location of incidents, and B.B.'s changing evidence and delayed disclosure of an oral sex incident.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, affirming that the judge was entitled to treat certain inconsistencies as peripheral given the complainants' age at the time of the events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants appealed a summary judgment that awarded the plaintiff damages for defamation ($75,000 general, $25,000 punitive).

The plaintiff cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to grant a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal.

The court found no error in the summary judgment or the assessment of damages, and declined to admit fresh evidence from either party, reiterating that ineffective assistance of counsel in civil matters is typically addressed through a negligence action, not as a ground for appeal.

The appellants sought to appeal an order from the Superior Court of Justice that directed the deletion of their third-party claim registered on title under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative, raised the question of jurisdiction.

After hearing submissions, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act specifies that appeals from orders made by a judge under that Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, Adam West, appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and internet luring.

The appeal focused on the mens rea requirement for these offences, specifically whether recklessness as to the complainant's age was sufficient or if actual knowledge or wilful blindness was required.

The Court of Appeal, relying on its prior decision in R. v. Fox, affirmed that recklessness suffices for internet luring.

For the possession charge, the court found that the trial judge's findings of fact clearly established wilful blindness on the part of the appellant regarding the complainant's age, which is legally equivalent to actual knowledge.

The appeal was dismissed.

Great American Insurance Company appealed a judgment finding it had a duty to defend the City of Thunder Bay against claims related to property damage from sodium hydroxide in the water supply.

Great American argued a lead exclusion in its policy precluded coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a section of the lead exclusion was ambiguous, thus triggering the duty to defend based on the "mere possibility" of coverage, as per *Progressive Homes Ltd. v. Lombard General Insurance Co. of Canada*.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The moving party, Binance Holdings Limited, sought an order under ss. 6(2) and (3) of the Courts of Justice Act to join two appeals: one to the Divisional Court from an OSC decision and another to the Court of Appeal from a Divisional Court decision.

Binance argued the appeals were "in the same proceeding" and combining them would serve the administration of justice.

The Ontario Securities Commission opposed, arguing the appeals were distinct and combining them would cause delay and bypass appellate hierarchy.

The court granted the motion, finding the appeals were in the same proceeding due to identical parties, facts, legal issues, and legal origin (investigation order and summons).

The court also found that combining the appeals would allow for a full and final resolution of the jurisdictional issue, mitigate the risk of inconsistent findings, and secure a just, expeditious, and least expensive determination of the issues.

The appellant, B.B., appealed his conviction for multiple counts of assault and sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a general propensity instruction to the jury regarding uncharged conduct and cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that while such an instruction is generally required for morally outrageous behaviour, in this specific case, the defence had strategically utilized the bad character evidence to challenge the complainant's credibility.

The court reasoned that providing a limiting instruction would have risked prejudicing the appellant by needlessly highlighting impermissible reasoning.

The court further noted that the uncharged conduct was less severe than the charged offences and was integral to the narrative of the relationship, diminishing the risk of improper jury reasoning.

The appellant, Nicholas Necan, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge: inadequate anti-bias instruction (specifically regarding the appellant's Indigenous identity and the 'firewater myth'), confusing instructions on intoxication, failure to provide an after-the-fact conduct instruction, and failure to provide a propensity reasoning instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, while not perfect, adequately equipped the jury to judge the case, and that no reversible errors occurred regarding the challenged instructions.

The moving party, Fariborz Tavana, on behalf of Master Tech Inc., sought to set aside an order dismissing his motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The underlying appeal related to a costs order and the dismissal of an action.

The Court of Appeal identified several impediments, including the dissolution of Master Tech Inc., Mr. Tavana's lack of authority to act for the corporation, and the absence of any reviewable error in the prior decision.

The court found no arguable merit to the proposed appeal and a consistent pattern of delay.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

This is an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal was advised that the trial, which addressed equalization, child support, and spousal support, had recently concluded but the trial reasons for decision had not yet been released.

The appellant argued that the appeal should not proceed without these reasons, a position the respondent's counsel acknowledged as arguably premature.

Given the significance of equalization and the issues before the panel, the Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal until after the trial reasons are released.

The parties were ordered to bear their own costs for the attendance.