Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant, Wasif Rashidi, appealed a summary judgment order awarding damages to M.T. Johnstone Construction Ltd. for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellant failed to close on a property purchase and argued he was orally promised an assignment, which was not honoured, and that the respondent failed to mitigate damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's findings that the realtor was the appellant's agent, the assignment conditions were not met, and the respondent had reasonably mitigated damages.

The court also rejected arguments of economic frustration and judicial bias.

The appellant, Manjunath C. Kuppa, appealed an order striking his pleadings (and those of two other respondents) due to persistent non-compliance with court orders and non-disclosure in a family law proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that striking pleadings was an appropriate remedy in these exceptional circumstances, consistent with the Family Law Rules' objective of dealing with cases justly, especially when lesser remedies had proven futile.

The court also ordered the appellant to pay costs on a full indemnity basis.

This decision addresses a motion to transfer an appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Divisional Court.

The underlying appeal concerns a final order made solely under the Family Law Act by a Family Court judge, which dismissed a motion to change a separation agreement.

The Court of Appeal determined that appeals from final orders made exclusively under provincial legislation by a Family Court judge fall under the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court, as per s. 19(1)(a.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The argument regarding monetary jurisdiction was dismissed as irrelevant given the specific statutory provisions governing family law appeal routes post-2021 amendments.

This appeal concerned the quantum of class counsel fees and a representative plaintiff honorarium following a $153 million class action settlement for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge had awarded $25 million in fees and denied a $30,000 honorarium.

The appellants sought an increase in fees to $44 million and the honorarium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision on both fees and honorarium, finding no palpable and overriding error or misdirection on law.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning multiple appeals and a motion.

The court ordered that all parties bear their own costs for the appeals and the motion before the lower court, indicating a balanced outcome on the issue of costs.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of two easements: a 15-foot wide right-of-way for ingress and egress, and a right-of-access to a well.

The appellants (servient tenement owners) sought declarations that the right-of-way did not include vehicular turnaround activity and that the well access was null and void.

The respondents (dominant tenement owners) sought declarations affirming their rights, an injunction against obstructions, and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the right-of-way included the turnaround area based on latent ambiguity and ancillary rights, and that the right-of-access to the well had not been extinguished.

This appeal addresses whether limited partners can bring a common law derivative action on behalf of a limited partnership.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that while limited partners have direct causes of action against a general partner for breach of fiduciary duty or contract, negating the need for a derivative action in such cases, a common law derivative action may be available against third parties who have harmed the limited partnership, particularly when the general partner is in a conflict of interest and refuses to act.

The court dismissed the derivative action against the general partner and its director but granted leave for a derivative action against the three third parties, establishing a test for such leave.

The appellant, Narman Abri, appealed a motion judge's decision to grant a nunc pro tunc order, deeming a statement of defence and counterclaim issued on the date of filing, despite not being formally issued before the limitation period expired.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, distinguishing the case from precedents requiring leave to commence an action.

The court found the lack of issuance to be a procedural irregularity under Rule 2.01, not undermining the purposes of limitation periods, as the appellant had notice of the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal from a Divisional Court order.

In the exercise of its discretion, the court ordered that all parties bear their own costs of the appeal.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by not putting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury, failing to correct improper Crown comments, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal found there was an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, which should have been put to the jury.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants, a group of First Nations, appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their application for judicial review.

They argued that Ontario's revocation of a forest management regulation (MNR-75) and amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act (Bill 197) breached the Crown's duty to consult and the honour of the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the duty to consult does not apply to the law-making process (Bill 197) and that the revocation of MNR-75 did not give rise to a duty to consult as the alleged adverse effects were speculative and equivalent protections remained in force through other legally binding instruments.

The appellant, a former police officer, appealed his convictions for bribery, attempting to obstruct justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, as well as his 13-year sentence and a $250,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from a corrupt relationship with a drug trafficker, from whom the appellant accepted bribes for protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility, admission of evidence, or handling of late disclosure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 13-year sentence fit given the gravity of the police corruption.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld, but the time to pay was varied to one year from the date of the appellant's release from custody.

The appellant, a religious organization, appealed a decision affirming that its properties, primarily used for tai chi classes, were not exempt from property tax as "places of worship" under the Assessment Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the tai chi classes, while integral to the organization's religion, were not primarily "worship" from the perspective of the participants, and that a contemplative garden and sales area were also not tax-exempt.

The court emphasized an objective "primary purpose" test for tax exemptions, considering the intentions of participants, not solely the organizers.

The appellant, Timothy Lee, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, manslaughter, and attempting to unlawfully cause bodily harm, stemming from a "Mr. Big" undercover operation.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting his inculpatory "Mr. Big" statements and earlier statements about prior cocaine dealing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Hart test for Mr. Big confessions, balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, and did not err in admitting the cocaine dealing statements.

The court found the Mr. Big statements sufficiently reliable given corroborating evidence and the absence of police misconduct amounting to abuse of process, despite an undercover officer discouraging legal advice.

The appellant, Baba Ouedraogo, appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, sexual assault, robbery, disguise with intent, and failure to comply with a release order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge's inferences of guilt, drawn from overwhelming circumstantial evidence, were the only reasonable inferences available.

The court saw no basis to interfere with the convictions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, Baba Ouedraogo, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately scrutinize certain evidence, including the complainant's injuries, toxicology report, video evidence, and identity evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's arguments primarily sought to re-weigh evidence already considered by the trial judge.

The court noted that the physical evidence strongly contradicted the appellant's account and confirmed key aspects of the complainant's testimony, despite the trial judge having some concerns about her credibility in other areas.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, with the sentence appeal proceeding separately.

The appellant, convicted of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, unauthorized possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, appealed his sentence and alleged breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach to presentence custody credit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

Regarding the Charter claims, the court found the detention and subsequent search lawful due to reasonable suspicion and safety concerns.

The court also determined that exigent circumstances justified the delay in providing the appellant with his right to counsel under s. 10(b), as the encounter was brief and officers observed a firearm.

Even if a breach occurred, the evidence would have been admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the R. v. Grant factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence.

Specifically, the appellant contended that if the trial judge had a reasonable doubt regarding one allegation (kicking the complainant in the ribs), she should have had a reasonable doubt concerning the remaining allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of guilt were based on a reasoned acceptance of the complainant's evidence, a rejection of the appellant's evidence, and consideration of corroborating evidence.

The court affirmed that an appellate court cannot interfere with a trial judge's assessment of credibility unless it is unsupported by any reasonable view of the evidence.

The appellant, Adam Leroy, sought leave to appeal a 164-day concurrent sentence for assault (choking) and uttering threats to cause death, arguing the sentence was excessive and the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his mental health and drug addiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the sentencing judge's decision, noting the serious and premeditated nature of the assault, the appellant's related criminal record involving intimate partner violence, and the consideration of drug issues.

The Court found no errors in principle, failure to consider relevant factors, or erroneous consideration of aggravating/mitigating factors, and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the application of the doctrine of frustration to an employment contract terminated due to the employee's COVID-19 vaccination status.

The appellant, a technician for VuPoint Systems Ltd., was terminated after refusing to comply with a mandatory vaccination policy implemented by Bell Canada, VuPoint's dominant client, which rendered him ineligible to perform his duties.

The motion judge found the contract frustrated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Bell Policy was a supervening event that radically altered the employment contract, was unforeseen at the time of contracting, and was outside VuPoint's control.

The Court clarified that the employee's voluntary refusal to vaccinate did not negate frustration, as the supervening event was the policy itself, not the employee's conduct.