Marty Rabinovitch

The plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful dismissal, including a claim for a bonus and damages for emotional distress.

On a motion to settle a discovery plan, the plaintiff sought extensive financial records from the defendant to calculate his bonus entitlement.

The court found the request disproportionate at the pre-discovery stage and ordered the defendant to produce only its financial statements.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to produce his medical records, as he conceded they were relevant to his claim for emotional distress.

The plaintiff, a former General Manager, brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the defendant employer's counterclaim for damages related to alleged misconduct and breach of contract.

The court found that the plaintiff's statements in his statement of claim, which formed the basis of the motion, did not relate to a matter of public interest, as the dispute was purely private.

Although the counterclaim was found to arise from the plaintiff's expression, the court determined that the public interest in allowing the counterclaim to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, given the private nature of the dispute and the substantial merit of the counterclaim.

The motion was dismissed.

On a summary judgment motion arising from an employee's terminal illness, leave of absence, and subsequent death after an asset sale, the court rejected claims of dismissal, constructive dismissal, bad faith termination, and exemplary damages.

The court held there was no act of termination by the employer and no basis for common law damages.

However, applying the Employment Standards Act and O. Reg. 288/01, the court concluded the contract of employment had been frustrated by illness before death.

The estate was therefore entitled to statutory termination pay and severance pay.

This was a costs endorsement following a Rule 21 motion in which the defendants successfully struck three of four defamation allegations.

The plaintiff argued she had greater success overall or, alternatively, that there should be no costs or costs in the cause.

The court rejected those submissions, finding the defendants had achieved partial but meaningful success and that the reduced amount sought already reflected divided success and some duplication of effort by defence counsel.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $7,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce minutes of settlement reached in a wrongful dismissal action.

After signing the settlement, the defendant discovered evidence suggesting the plaintiff had performed work for competitors during employment using company resources and had attempted to delete related computer files.

The defendant repudiated the settlement and commenced its own action for damages.

The court held that although a settlement existed, it should not be enforced where enforcement would create a real risk of clear injustice.

Given newly discovered evidence of alleged misconduct that was not reasonably discoverable prior to settlement, the motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to deliver a psychiatric expert report outside the timelines set by Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, abridgement of time, an adjournment of a trial scheduled under the simplified procedure, and issuance of an interprovincial summons for a witness.

The delay resulted from counsel failing to promptly secure a psychiatric report after indicating at pre-trial that such evidence would be obtained.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, emphasizing proportionality and prejudice caused by the late request.

The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s non-compliance and lack of diligence but held that the interests of justice favoured allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to present expert evidence.

The trial was adjourned with conditions, including that the plaintiff pay the defendants’ costs thrown away by the adjournment.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a previous decision that dismissed his human rights application alleging employment discrimination based on citizenship by the respondent.

The applicant argued that the respondent's employment advertisements preferring Canadian citizens were discriminatory and not protected by section 16 of the Human Rights Code.

The adjudicator found that the applicant was attempting to re-argue issues already decided and failed to establish any new facts, conflict with established jurisprudence, or matters of general public importance.

The request for reconsideration was denied.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, ethnic origin, and age, later amended to include reprisal.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that the application raised issues of fact and credibility that required a full hearing, and therefore declined to dismiss it.

The Tribunal also denied the applicant's premature request for document production.