Tammy Law

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The mother sought trial costs of $21,919.39 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society.

The court found that while the society's overall conduct did not warrant a full costs award, the society engaged in serious unfair dealing by injecting unsubstantiated risk factors (alcohol and drug abuse, mental illness) into its risk assessment documents regarding the mother.

The court awarded partial costs of $5,000 to the mother, finding that this misrepresentation constituted a "smearing" of the parent that violated principles of fair dealing required under child protection law.

The court emphasized that child protection agencies must maintain proportionate intervention, provide fair disclosure, and avoid manipulating risk calibration through false information.

A temporary care and custody motion concerning a three-month-old child apprehended at birth due to security concerns at the hospital involving the mother's family and the mother's own developmental disabilities.

The mother sought return of the child to her care under a supervision order, with an alternate plan for placement with her godmother.

The court dismissed the mother's primary plan, finding that her functional deficits—including illiteracy, short-term memory challenges, and poor judgment in personal relationships—combined with her demonstrated inability to cooperate with the child protection agency, meant that no supervision order could adequately protect the child from risk of harm.

The court granted the mother's alternate plan, placing the child in the temporary care and custody of the godmother under a supervision order with specified terms and conditions.

The respondent parents sought costs on a full indemnity basis against the children's aid society following an appeal.

The court applied the Family Law Rules, noting that the presumption of costs to the successful party does not apply in child protection cases involving a government agency.

The court found that the society did not act unfairly or unreasonably in pursuing the appeal, as it acted out of concern for the child's best interests and was supported by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

Consequently, no costs were awarded.

The Society appealed a trial judge's order returning a seven-year-old child to her mother's care under supervision.

The Society argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in fact-finding and failed to properly weigh the child's best interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the child's placement, finding no palpable and overriding errors and noting that fresh evidence of the mother's recent alcohol use was insufficient to alter the result.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to quash a term requiring the Society to assign an American Sign Language-familiar worker, as counsel had not been given an opportunity to make submissions on that issue.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order of the lower court in a child protection proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, quashing the paragraph of the order that required the society to assign a family worker familiar with American sign language.

The remainder of the lower court's order was confirmed, and the parties were encouraged to prepare a re-integration plan for the child prior to the resumption of school.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the care of her children, arguing that her trial counsel was incompetent for conceding that her son was in need of protection.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that counsel was not incompetent given the substantial medical evidence, and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court also found no error in the decision not to place the other child in the appellant's care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order finding she wrongfully removed her child from Florida and directing the child's return.

She argued the application judge erred in admitting expert evidence on Florida law, applying the wrong standard of proof, and considering post-removal paternity testing to find the respondent had custody rights.

She also sought to introduce fresh expert evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was unchallenged at the hearing and the application judge correctly determined the respondent had custody rights at the time of removal.

The fresh evidence was not admitted as it failed the due diligence test and would not have affected the outcome.