Stephanie Tadeo

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal of Michael Paul Duffy, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory rather than final.

The order in question enforced a right of first refusal for the sale of the matrimonial home, as previously agreed in a consent order.

The court held that the order did not determine the substantive rights of the parties but merely implemented the final consent order, and thus an appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave, not to the Court of Appeal.

Costs were awarded to Leona Duffy.

The court determined the beneficial ownership of the matrimonial home at 261 Prescott Avenue, Toronto, following the breakdown of the marriage between Elena Reshetnikova and Wayne Rawlins.

Joan Rawlins Singh, Wayne’s mother, claimed a 100% beneficial interest in the property, while Wayne and Elena sought partition and sale.

After extensive review of the evidence, including family history, property transfers, and credibility of witnesses, the court found that Joan and Wayne each hold a 50% beneficial interest in the property.

The court ordered the sale of the property, set out terms for the sale, and awarded costs for an adjournment to the applicant.

The parties separated after a 30-year relationship and have two adult children: one in university and one with a profound developmental disability.

The court determined the parties' respective incomes for child support purposes, imputing corporate pre-tax income and personal expenses to the respondent father.

The court applied a budgetary approach under s. 3(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines to determine child support for the disabled adult child, factoring in his ODSP benefits.

The court also resolved disputes over the control of the children's RESP and RDSP accounts, retrospective and prospective section 7 expenses, and the applicant mother's request for a restraining order and communication protocol, which were dismissed.

The applicant father and respondent mother sought an order for decision-making responsibility for their 6-year-old child.

The parties had resolved parenting time but remained in high conflict over health and education decisions, largely driven by the father's disproportionate anxiety regarding the child's health.

The court ordered that the mother have sole decision-making responsibility for health and education to reduce conflict and ensure stability.

The parties were granted shared decision-making responsibility for culture, language, religion, and significant extracurricular activities, as they demonstrated an ability to cooperate in these areas.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the applicant's claims against his former father-in-law, the respondents sought costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, including the respondents' successful offers to settle and the applicant's aggressive litigation approach.

The court awarded costs of $50,850 to the father-in-law and $10,268 to the former spouse, payable by the applicant.

The applicant in a family law proceeding sought a declaration that his former father-in-law held a half-interest in a condominium in constructive trust for the applicant's former spouse, aiming to increase her net family property for equalization purposes.

The father-in-law brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the trust claim.

The court granted the motion, holding that a person lacks private interest standing to advance a trust claim on behalf of a former spouse because an equalization claim creates only an indirect legal interest, not the direct personal legal interest required for standing.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding retroactive child support and section 7 expenses.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's findings that the parties' daughter remained a 'child of the marriage' while attending college and that the respondent was entitled to retroactive child support.

However, the court found the motion judge failed to adequately analyze the section 7 expenses under the Child Support Guidelines.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the issue of section 7 arrears was remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2009 child support order.

The applicant mother responded and sought retroactive variation of child support and section 7 expenses for their two children.

Applying the D.B.S. framework, the court found the father failed to diligently adjust support to reflect his increased income and ordered retroactive variation effective April 2015.

The court declined to impute income to the father, calculating arrears based on the parties' tax assessments.

The father was ordered to pay $35,872.70 in total arrears for child support and section 7 expenses.