Kuang v. Young et al., 2026 ONSC 406

CITATION: Kuang v. Young et al., 2026 ONSC 406 COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-00029253-0000 DATE: 2026-01-21

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Hugh Kuang a.k.a. Herman Kuang a.k.a. Xiao Hui Kuang Applicant/Responding Party

– and –

Diana Young, Diana Young Professional Corporation and 2305969 Ontario Inc. Respondents/Moving Parties

COUNSEL: Harold Niman and Chris Mamo, for the Applicant/Responding Party Brian Ludmer, for the Respondents/Moving Parties

HEARD: In Writing

Summary

1This is a motion by the Applicant (Hugh) for an Order re-opening the trial for the purpose of admitting two documents that he says are directly relevant to the amended pleadings, i.e., the amendments I permitted by virtue of my December 12, 2025 Order.

2Hugh’s motion is dismissed for the following reasons.

Background

3The evidentiary portion of the trial took place between October 27, 2025 and November 28, 2025. Final arguments have not yet been made.

4The two documents in question appear to deal with loans that may have been made by Diana Young (Diana) to some of the relevant corporations.

5The documents were in the parties’ possession prior to and throughout the trial.

6Other documents with respect to Diana’s alleged loans were put into evidence. (see e.g., exhibit 45).

7After the evidentiary portion of the trial had been completed, the respondent Diana was given leave to amend her Answer, and specifically to amend her own claim. The permitted amendment was limited to an alternative claim in the following terms:

In the alternative, if this court does not find that Shawn is the sole owner of Shawn's Companies, or if this court finds that Shawn is not an owner or only a partial owner of Shawn’s Companies, an order declaring that Diana and/or Diana’s Companies are the sole or partial or joint with Shawn legal and/or beneficial owner of 217, 239, 982, 269 and 181.

8In my December 12, 2025 reasons for granting leave to make that amendment I refused to permit another of Diana’s proposed amendments (which was in para.41 of the proposed amended reply) alleging that Diana’s advances were gifts to her mother, rather than loans.

9Hugh opposed leave being granted to make all the proposed amendments. In his motion material opposing the amendments he did not refer to the two documents which are the subject of this motion. He did not suggest that if any the proposed amendments were granted, he would need to put the documents into evidence.

10In my reasons for granting leave I stated that:

I do not see how any additional evidence would be required in light of the first part of the proposed amendment. The parties were focused at trial on the ownership of the companies. Now Diana Young wants to make the alternative argument that she owns the companies if I find that her mother does not.

Apart from the possibility of additional evidence (none was particularized by the Applicant), Counsel for Hugh Kuang also argue they have been disadvantaged by not being able to question Diana Young on her new claim prior to trial or to cross- examine her properly on this new claim at trial.

I disagree that there is any disadvantage in this respect. They can make all necessary legal arguments in opposition to the new claim in closing argument. They cross- examined Ms. Young and Shawn Young extensively on the ownership issue. I do not accept they would have done anything differently if they had known this amendment would be permitted.

This point is all the more forceful given that the proposed amendment was known to them prior to the start of trial, although I acknowledge the motion was only brought after the testimony was complete. I accept the explanation of counsel for Ms. Young that they had thought the motion was unnecessary in light of the pretrial endorsement of Justice Diamond.

11I expressly ordered that:

The Applicant may if he considers it necessary, deliver a responsive, amended pleading within 20 days of today. There will be no further trial evidence permitted based on this amendment.

The Amended Reply

12On January 2, 2026 the Applicant delivered his Amended Fresh as Amended Reply. The amendments are at paras. 160-174.

13Although neither side has focussed on Hugh’s amended Reply on this motion, I will briefly discuss it because this may help focus on the significance or insignificance of the two documents in issue on this motion.

14The bulk of Hugh’s amendments in his amended Reply properly focus on the limitations defence to Diana’s new claim of ownership of the subject corporations.

15However, paras. 169-173 also purport to challenge Diana’s alternative claim to ownership on the basis that it is contradicted by her prior sworn admissions and pretrial testimony concerning whether her advances were loans or gifts. These paragraphs do not refer to the two documents in issue here.

16(These allegations obviously cannot be responding to the disallowed para. 41 which was an amendment proposed by Diana dealing with whether her advances were a gift rather than a loan-a proposed allegation which this court rejected on December 12, 2025).

17Hugh’s additional Reply paragraphs (but not this motion) implicitly raise the question whether Diana would need to reattend at trial to be cross-examined on her allegedly inconsistent, prior, statements expressly itemized in the amended Reply, such as sworn pre-trial affidavits which are not part of the trial record.

18This motion does not (wisely) suggest that the trial be reopened to deal with the allegedly inconsistent pretrial statements. This motion is limited to asking that two documents dealing with Diana’s loans be introduced into evidence and that she be cross-examined on them (see para. 2 of the Applicant’s draft Order and para. 27 of his statement of law).

19To avoid any doubt, I am not suggesting that Hugh could have mentioned these documents in his amended Reply and thus have created a reason for reopening the trial. I am pointing out the uncertain and perhaps far reaching ramifications of needlessly reopening the evidence portion of the trial based on the narrow and focussed amendment that Diana was permitted to make.

20It is difficult to see the relevance of this part of Hugh’s amended Reply but that will be a subject for closing argument. There shall be no motion with respect to those paragraphs in the amended Reply. It is time for final argument, on the schedule originally ordered.

Analysis

21The first reason this motion to reopen the trial to deal with these two documents must be dismissed is because I already decided on December 12, 2025 that no further trial evidence was warranted by virtue of the one amendment that Diana was permitted in make to her claim.

22Nothing had changed since then. The two documents were not raised in the course of the amendment motion, at which time I said that no new evidence would be admitted based on the amendment. These documents have not been newly discovered.

23Thus, this motion must be dismissed because it is a collateral attack on my December 12, 2025 Order. Hugh is also precluded from seeking this relief by virtue of issue estoppel. The test in National Industries Inc. v. Kirkwood, 2023 ONCA 63 has been met. See also Buck Estate v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 FC 1515.

24I decline to exercise my discretion not to apply issue estoppel. These documents do not appear to have sufficient probative value beyond that of other evidence concerning Diana’s loans that is already before the court. There are no compelling reasons why they need to be added now, after the close of evidence. There is no good reason to re-open the trial to allow these two documents to be put to any particular witness. They were always available for that purpose and they were not used during the trial.

25The only “new” matter since trial is Diana Young’s concurrent motion to reopen the trial evidence to admit different documents but that motion is not based the pleading amendments, it turns on recently discovered documents. The latter documents are unrelated to the two documents which are the focus of this motion. Contrary to what Hugh alleges, Diana’s motion to reopen the trial in respect to other documents is not related to the December 2025 amended claim of Diana’s ownership.

26Even if I had admitted the documents Diana seeks to put into evidence (I did not) I would not have admitted these two unrelated documents. There has been no material change of circumstances that warrants varying my earlier order and admitting these documents. R. v. Adams, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707; at para. 30.

27The second reason to dismiss the motion is that it is not in the interests of justice to reopen the trial. The apparent probative value of these documents is marginal and is outweighed by the prejudice to the trial process in the form of further delay, expense to the parties and a needless invitation to further unnecessary debate about issues which have already been canvassed at length. Finality itself has a value which should not be ignored.

28Furthermore, unusually, Diana’s proposed (later granted) amendment was known in advance of trial, albeit no motion for leave to amend was brought at that time, for the reasons discussed in my December 12, 2025 reasons granting leave to amend. Hugh knew from Justice Diamond’s pretrial endorsement that Diana’s lawyers were still intending to argue the underlying issue of Diana’s possible ownership (rightly or wrongly on their part).

29Having considered all the factors discussed by the Court of Appeal in Malkov v. Stovichek-Malkov, 2018 ONCA 620 at para. 14 (citing CCAS 2014 ONCJ 762 at para. 17) and having regard to my analysis above I will not reopen the trial to deal with these documents.

30In closing arguments the Applicant Hugh Kuang must argue against Diana Young’s alternative ownership claim based on the existing trial record, but the evidentiary phase will not be reopened for the purpose requested in this motion.

31Costs of this motion are reserved to the final arguments on the costs of the trial.

Justice C. Stevenson

Released: January 21, 2026