SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00035391-0000
DATE: 20260227
RE: Aslam Ahmed Patel, Applicant
AND:
Rabiya Aiyub Patel, Respondent
BEFORE: C. Stevenson J.
COUNSEL: Aslam Ahmed Patel, self-represented
Rabiya Aiyub Patel, self-represented
Ruonan Pei, Attorney General for Ontario
Cindy Ramsay, Legal Aid Ontario
HEARD: February 26, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
[ 1 ] Both parties in this family law Application are self-represented. The issues have been bifurcated The first trial on parenting issues has been completed (see the reasons of Justice Presser dated April 24, 2025). The second trial, on financial issues, is scheduled for five days beginning January 25, 2027.
[ 2 ] Two amici curiae were appointed to represent the parties in the first trial in accordance with Justice Shore’s Order dated October 16, 2024. The two amici were appointed specifically to conduct the cross-examinations of the opposite parties. Counsel appeared at that original amicus motion on behalf of both the AG and LAO.
[ 3 ] The concern then, as it is now, is that the parties are self-represented and there are serious issues of intimate partner violence which make it inappropriate, to put it mildly, for each spouse to cross-examine the other.
[ 4 ] Para. 2 c of the October 16, 2024 Order requires that each amicus will take instructions and have a solicitor-client relationship with their respective client.
[ 5 ] Today’s motion arises from the request by the parties, supported by me as case management judge, for the appointment of two amici curiae to conduct cross examination of the parties at the financial issues trial.
[ 6 ] The Attorney General and Legal Aid Ontario were again given notice and counsel for both helpfully appeared on this motion. Neither opposes the appointment of amicus .
[ 7 ] However, the AG asks that the Court appoint only one amicus , for the limited purpose of conducting the cross-examinations of both parties. The AG argues that the appointment of a single amicus would be sufficient to address the concerns of the Court and parties in this case and would also be consistent with the principles set out in the case law on amicus appointments.
[ 8 ] The Supreme Court has held that an amicus is a friend of the court and must not assume the role of counsel for an unrepresented party. Ontario v Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario , 2013 SCC 43 at para 56 (“CLA”). At para. 47 of CLA the court noted that the power to appoint an amicus must be exercised “sparingly and with caution, in response to specific and exceptional circumstances.” The court also stated that the power should only be used where the assistance of an amicus is essential to enable the judge to discharge their judicial functions – that is, to ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings and the availability of relevant submissions.
[ 9 ] In Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides , 2019 ONCA 1023 at paras 27-30 , 33, 38-39 the Court of Appeal for Ontario confirmed that these principles apply to private family law proceedings. The AG relies in particular on paras. 51-52 which state:
-51. If it would be rare in a family law case to appoint one amicus , the circumstances would virtually never justify the appointment of two. In this case, the first appointed amicus could not fairly act as amicus with respect to the father after his counsel was permitted to get off the record. But that is an unusual situation I would not expect to see again.
-52. Third, the decision in CLA does not preclude the possibility of court-appointed defence counsel in a criminal case with amicus -like features, as in Imona-Russel. Appointing a single counsel dedicated to a party might make sense in the context of, for example, a constitutional challenge to a family law provision where the Attorney General is present to represent the other side. Otherwise, a single amicus appointment should almost always be able to satisfy the basic requirements of the court. In the family context, it is hard to imagine a situation in which appointing two counsel as amicus to represent adversarial interests would be appropriate, rather than a single state-funded friend of the court.
[ 10 ] This is not, however, a case like Morvald-Benevides in which the trial court was particularly concerned about the complexity of the issues and requested the assistance of counsel ( amicus ) on issues including the application of the Hague convention and multi-jurisdictional tax implications (para. 44). One counsel may well fulfill such an advisory type of function.
[ 11 ] The financial issues in the forthcoming trial are not complex. They are common or garden variety issues. Amicus is requested solely because of the history of intimate partner violence. The risk of real injustice arises from the anticipated inability of the parties to cross-examine each other without the trial deteriorating into an unsavory confrontation, or one in which a party may be intimidated and unable to respond effectively. This would not only harm one or both parties, it would also harm the fair administration of justice by interfering with the court’s role of ensuring an even “playing field” and potentially damaging the integrity of the court’s process.
[ 12 ] The courtroom must be seen as a fair and safe environment for the dispensation of justice in accordance with facts properly proven in accordance with uniformly applicable rules of procedure and evidence. No party should have to undergo cross-examination by an abuser without appropriate safeguards (e.g. a screen might possibly suffice in some cases but was not proposed here, for good reason given the findings in the first trial), nor should they be expected to share the same lawyer, albeit in a role of a friend of the court, because of the appearance of bias inherent in the same lawyer appearing to act for both parties, even if technically they are not acting for a party.
[ 13 ] Another difficulty with the AG’s position is that the draft Order submitted by the AG would have required the one and only amicus to maintain in confidence what each party had told them about the issues. That would have put the lawyer in a very difficult, if not impossible, position. That lawyer would have to separate what they had learned from each party and to identify exactly what was confidential and what could be shared. That is too high a burden to place on any one lawyer in this case.
[ 14 ] In the first trial two lawyers were appointed. That part of the original order should be repeated here. Each party shall have their own amicus . One will not suffice.
[ 15 ] I will, however, not impose that part of the original order declaring a solicitor-client relationship between amicus and the respective party. An amicus is not the party’s lawyer. The respective amicus is assisting the court, in this case in a limited way, by conducting only the cross-examination of the other party. This reflects the role of amicus as defined in CLA: to enable the judge to discharge their judicial functions – that is, to ensure the orderly conduct of proceedings and the availability of relevant [evidence].
[ 16 ] I will impose instead a confidentiality requirement on the part of each counsel, now that two lawyers are to be appointed.
[ 17 ] I accept the terms of the draft Order proposed by the AG in all other respects (even though it is quite different from the terms of Justice Shore’s October 16, 2024 Order), other than para. 2a of the original draft which would have provided that “ Amicus will not act in a manner akin to counsel for any party”. This is a vague and confusing clause which does not add any meaning to the remainder of the clauses which delineate in detail the limits of Amicus ’ role.
[ 18 ] The Order which I make is set out below. It differs from the draft proposed by the AG only in that two amicus are appointed (with consequential changes) and the deletion of the subparagraph about amicus not acting in a manner akin to counsel for a party. I leave it to counsel whether they want to use the words, Amicus or Amici , as long as they recognize that two lawyers are to be appointed. There shall be no costs of this motion.
The Order
Two Amicus curiae shall be appointed to assist the Court in its role of ensuring the trial is orderly and fair to all parties.
Subject to the terms herein, amicus is hereby appointed to assist the Court in this proceeding, as follows:
A. Amicus will be appointed solely to conduct the cross-examinations of the applicant, Aslam Patel, and the respondent, Rabiya Patel. One amicus will cross-examine one party, and the other amicus will cross-examine the other party. Amicus will not assist either party in conducting examinations-in-chief or re-examinations of their witnesses, nor in conducting cross-examination of any witness other than the applicant and the respondent.
B. Amicus shall not take instructions from, or give strategic advice to, either party, but shall consider their views and preferences on any relevant matter (each amicus will only deal with the party they are not cross-examining-their “designated party”-in terms of seeking views and preferences).
C. Amicus shall not have a solicitor-client relationship with either party. However, communications between amicus and their designated party for the purpose of conducting the cross-examinations shall be treated as confidential.
D. Both parties shall cooperate and engage with amicus so that the terms of this order may be carried out.
E. Amicus shall be granted full access to all materials previously filed by the parties and the court file on Case Center. Amicus shall also be served with any future materials filed by the parties.
F. Amicus shall be entitled to the complete and continuing file disclosure from the Applicant and Respondent. The Applicant and Respondent shall provide amicus with this disclosure within 10 days of the date of the appointment of amicus or a request by amicus , as applicable.
G. Amicus shall not make closing submissions.
H. Amicus is entitled to order the transcripts of any court appearance for the herein application.
I. Otherwise as directed or ordered by this Court.
The Ministry of the Attorney General shall provide funding for each amicus in accordance with the terms of this Order.
Amicus shall be paid at Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) rates.
Amicus will abide by LAO’s policies and procedures, including authorization for disbursements, monitoring and review of accounts, billing practices, and payment rules.
LAO shall manage funding of amicus in accordance with this order, the Ministry of the Attorney General – Legal Aid Ontario Protocol for Management of Court-Ordered Publicly Funded Counsel, and Legal Aid Ontario’s policies and procedures, including authorization for disbursements, monitoring and review of accounts, billing practices, and payment rules.
Amicus is at liberty to seek directions from the Court, on notice to the parties, the Attorney General of Ontario (AG), and LAO, as may be necessary to carry out their duties.
Amicus and counsel for the AG and LAO shall appear before this Court to address variations of this order, as may be necessary from time to time, or in the event of any noncompliance with this order.
The terms and conditions of the appointment of amicus may only be varied by further order of this Court. Only the Court has the authority to terminate the involvement or vary the role of amicus in this proceeding. No party has the authority to terminate the involvement or change the role of amicus in this proceeding.
LAO shall make best efforts to locate one or more members of the Law Society of Ontario in good standing and with no actual or potential conflict of interest with any of the parties to this proceeding willing to assume the mandate set out in this order and to act at legal aid rates, for the Court’s consideration.
LAO shall provide the Court with a list of available counsel willing to accept the appointment. The Court will advise LAO by email of the Court’s choice of amicus. LAO will then advise amicus , the parties, and counsel for the AG of the appointment.
This order shall bind any amicus who may be appointed by this Court pursuant to this order.
Justice Colin P. Stevenson
Date: February 27, 2026