Debbie Jorgensen

The applicants and respondent owned adjacent rowhouses.

The applicants' front veranda and a portion of their rear wall encroached onto the respondent's property.

The applicants sought a declaration of possessory title by adverse possession, relying on statutory declarations from the respondent's predecessor in title acknowledging the encroachments and her exclusion from the land between 1975 and 1990.

The court found that the physical layout and the predecessor's acquiescence satisfied the test for adverse possession before the land was converted to the Land Titles system.

The applicants' claim was granted and the respondent's cross-application for removal of the structures was dismissed.

The Buyer (Mt.

Pleasant Roehampton Developments Limited) brought an application seeking a declaration that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) was in full force and an order for specific performance.

The Vendor (Friedrich Christof Haussmann) brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that the APS was null and void and removal of a caution registered against title.

The central dispute concerned the interpretation of the "Investigation Period" deadline in the APS, with the Buyer arguing for March 31, 2017, and the Vendor for March 29, 2017.

The court found the plain wording of the APS established the deadline as March 29, 2017, and that the Buyer failed to waive conditions by that date, rendering the APS null and void.

The Buyer's alternative arguments of estoppel by convention and mutual mistake were rejected due to a lack of shared assumption or clear misrepresentation.

The respondents requested the removal of two personal respondents from an application alleging discrimination based on disability and family status.

The Tribunal applied the factors from Sigrist and Persaud to determine whether a compelling reason existed to continue the proceeding against the individuals.

Although the corporate respondent acknowledged vicarious liability, the Tribunal found that the alleged individual conduct of the personal respondents was a central issue in the proceeding and not merely the following of organizational policies.

The request to remove the personal respondents was denied.

The appellant factor appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of an 'Acceptance of Goods' document.

The appellant argued the document contained a promise by the respondent debtor to pay the amounts in the referenced invoices, characterizing it as an estoppel certificate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the document was merely an acknowledgement that the respondent would direct payments owed to its supplier to the appellant without set-off or deduction, but did not constitute a promise to pay the face amount of the invoices regardless of the actual amount owing.

The applicant, an Educational Manager, took medical leave after being diagnosed with advanced cervical cancer.

Upon her return, she commenced a gradual work-hardening program.

After five months of part-time work with increasing hours, the respondent employer presented her with options that would either terminate her employment immediately or place her on a one-year part-time contract ending in termination, arguing that her inability to work full-time caused undue hardship.

The Tribunal found that the respondent failed to accommodate the applicant to the point of undue hardship, as it improperly restricted its assessment of resources to a single department rather than the entire institution, and prematurely concluded she could not return to full-time work.

The Tribunal awarded $113,300 for lost wages and $25,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding their conduct oppressive under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act and ordering the cancellation of certain shares.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a performance escrow agreement and whether 'cash flow' referred to the parent company or its subsidiary.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding the agreement unambiguous, as an unappealed interlocutory order had already determined it was ambiguous.

Interpreting the agreement in its factual context, the Court concluded 'cash flow' referred to the parent company, meaning the shares were properly released from escrow.

The appeal was allowed and the oppression application dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging reprisal in employment after transferring her complaint from the Commission.

She also commenced a civil action claiming constructive dismissal and discrimination based on the same factual circumstances, but deliberately omitted the reprisal claim from the civil action.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code bars an application where a civil proceeding has been commenced seeking remedies for an alleged infringement of the Code arising out of the same factual context.

The application was dismissed to prevent duplicate proceedings.

The defendants appealed a trial decision finding them liable for breach of contract regarding missing window screens in a real estate transaction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the defendants could not evade performance based on a unilateral mistake of which the plaintiffs were ignorant.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the claim against the real estate agent, finding the agent met the standard of care by reviewing the chattels list with the defendants.