James Greve

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their negligence action against a school board and school officials for failing to protect their child from bullying.

Although the trial judge found that the respondents breached the standard of care by failing to investigate a prior bullying incident and misplacing related documentation, he concluded that none of these breaches caused the subsequent incident in which the child was injured.

The appellants argued that proper investigation of the earlier incident would have prevented the later injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's causation analysis and factual findings.

The plaintiffs brought a negligence claim against the school board, principal, and vice-principal for injuries sustained by the student plaintiff during a schoolyard assault by other students.

The plaintiffs alleged that the school failed to properly supervise the students and investigate prior incidents of bullying, which culminated in an assault that caused permanent tinnitus.

The court found that while the school breached the standard of care in failing to investigate a prior incident and losing an accident report, these breaches did not cause the assault, which was a sudden and unexpected event during a hidden game of tackle football.

The claim was dismissed as the plaintiffs failed to establish cause in fact.

During a trial, the plaintiffs sought to admit a police report for the truth of its contents, citing the unavailability of the drafting officer and the report's reliability as an independent investigation.

Alternatively, they argued for its admission as a business record under the Evidence Act.

The defendants opposed, raising concerns about hearsay reliability and the report's content.

The court ruled the police report admissible as a business record, but with significant limitations: it was admissible for the officer's personal observations, communications, and understanding of events, and for party admissions against interest.

However, it was explicitly ruled inadmissible for the truth of non-party hearsay statements, opinions, impressions, or histories, particularly where sources were unidentified.

The plaintiffs' request for an unredacted report was also denied due to lack of proper motion and jurisdiction.

The applicant sought a death benefit following the death of his mother in a motor vehicle accident, claiming he was her dependant.

At the time of the accident, the 26-year-old applicant lived with his parents but earned over $1,000 per week.

The arbitrator applied the 50% formula for financial dependence, finding that the applicant's needs did not exceed twice his income.

Consequently, the applicant was not principally financially dependent on his parents and was not entitled to the death benefit.

Following a prior ruling determining vehicle ownership and insurance coverage arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident, the court addressed the costs consequences of that decision.

The court had previously found that both spouses were owners of the vehicle and that their respective insurers were each liable for $1,000,000 in coverage rather than sharing a single limit.

In this costs decision, the successful plaintiffs and certain insurers sought partial indemnity costs of the motion and related proceedings.

The court held that the unsuccessful defendants’ denial of coverage necessitated the involvement of multiple insurers and justified costs awards in favour of the successful parties.

Joint and several costs were ordered against the unsuccessful parties in specified all‑inclusive amounts.

Following a jury trial in a personal injury action, the court addressed two outstanding costs issues: whether the plaintiff’s after‑the‑event (ATE) insurance premium was a compensable disbursement and how prejudgment interest should be calculated following amendments to the Insurance Act effective January 1, 2015.

The court held that ATE insurance premiums are discretionary litigation expenses and are not recoverable as taxable disbursements in Ontario, noting the absence of legislative reform comparable to the United Kingdom regime permitting recovery of such premiums.

On the issue of prejudgment interest, the court held that the amendment to s. 258.3(8.1) of the Insurance Act changing the rate of prejudgment interest does not apply retroactively because prejudgment interest is substantive in nature.

The plaintiff was therefore entitled to prejudgment interest on general damages at the pre‑January 2015 rate of five percent per annum.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, seeking declarations that two separated spouses were both owners of the vehicle under s.192 of the Highway Traffic Act and that their respective insurers each provided $1,000,000 in liability coverage.

The court held that indicia of ownership demonstrated that the driver was an owner of the vehicle despite the other spouse being the registered owner.

The court further held that consent between co‑owners was legally irrelevant where one owner operated the vehicle, making both owners liable.

Applying principles of equitable contribution and the Insurance Act, the court concluded that both owner policies were primary and each insurer was liable up to its policy limit, making $2,000,000 potentially available to satisfy the loss.

The plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment was granted and the co‑owner’s motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for various medical treatments, including physiotherapy, acupuncture, and a YMCA membership.

The insurer denied the treatment plans based on independent medical examinations.

At arbitration, the arbitrator found that the insurer and its assessors failed to consider the applicant's physically demanding summer employment, treating him merely as a sedentary student.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's expert reports as lacking sufficient reasoning and preferred the evidence of the applicant's treating practitioners.

The arbitrator concluded that the disputed treatment plans were reasonable and necessary, ordering the insurer to pay the claimed amounts, interest, and the applicant's arbitration expenses.

The appellant police officer appealed three findings of guilt (one count of insubordination and two counts of deceit) and a penalty of a twelve-month reduction in rank.

The charges arose from his investigation of a domestic assault and his subsequent testimony at the accused's trial, as well as his failure to promptly answer questions ordered by a superior during a disciplinary investigation.

The Commission upheld the insubordination conviction, finding that the order to answer questions served a legitimate public purpose and did not violate the appellant's Charter rights.

However, the Commission set aside the two deceit convictions, concluding that the Hearing Officer failed to establish clear and convincing evidence of an intention to deceive regarding the officer's notes and court testimony.

The penalty was varied to a forfeiture of 24 hours' pay for the single remaining count of insubordination.

The appellant police officer appealed three findings of guilt (one count of insubordination and two counts of deceit) and the penalty of a twelve-month reduction in rank imposed by a Hearing Officer.

The charges arose from the officer's investigation of a domestic assault and his subsequent failure to answer questions during an internal investigation.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the insubordination conviction, finding that the order to answer questions served a legitimate public purpose and did not violate the officer's Charter rights.

However, the Commission set aside the two deceit convictions, concluding that the Hearing Officer failed to establish that the officer had an intention to deceive when making his notes or testifying in court.

The penalty was varied to a forfeiture of 24 hours' pay.

The appellant police officer appealed three findings of guilt (one count of insubordination and two counts of deceit) and the penalty of a twelve-month reduction in rank.

The charges arose from his investigation of a domestic assault and his subsequent testimony at the accused's trial, as well as his failure to promptly obey an order to provide a written report during the ensuing disciplinary investigation.

The Commission upheld the insubordination conviction, finding that the order to provide a statement for disciplinary purposes did not violate section 7 of the Charter and that the officer failed to comply in a timely manner even after related criminal proceedings concluded.

However, the Commission set aside both deceit convictions, finding the Hearing Officer failed to establish clear and convincing evidence of an intention to deceive regarding the officer's notes and court testimony.

Consequently, the penalty was varied from a one-year demotion to a forfeiture of 24 hours' pay for the single remaining conviction of insubordination.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The parties settled all substantive issues prior to the arbitration hearing, including the location of a residual earning capacity assessment, but could not agree on the entitlement to arbitration expenses.

The arbitrator found that the application had merit and the applicant achieved some success by obtaining an assessment in her preferred location, even though the insurer did not concede the legal right to that location.

The arbitrator awarded the applicant her expenses of the arbitration proceeding.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for the cost of a multidisciplinary assessment and a subsequent treatment program provided by a rehabilitation facility.

The insurer disputed the necessity of the treatment and the reasonableness of the costs, and argued the arbitration was improperly brought by the facility rather than the insured.

The arbitrator found the arbitration was properly instituted.

On the merits, the arbitrator accepted that the applicant suffered from physical and psychological impairments, making the assessment and treatment plan reasonable in principle.

However, the arbitrator found the facility's billing practices to be highly excessive, redundant, and unreasonable.

The arbitrator significantly reduced the amounts payable for both the assessment and the treatment program, and declined to order a special award against the insurer.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a February 1992 motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the arbitration was barred because the applicant had previously settled the claims and missed the two-year limitation period after benefits were refused.

The arbitrator found that the prior settlement release did not explicitly include the February 1992 accident.

Furthermore, the insurer's notice of refusal was not clear and unequivocal, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

The applicant was permitted to proceed to arbitration.