Jeffrey William Strype

The plaintiffs successfully resisted a motion brought by the defendant to the counterclaim's insurer to remove the plaintiffs' lawyer for an alleged conflict of interest.

The plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale against the insurer and the insurer's lawyer personally.

The court declined to award costs against the lawyer personally, finding his conduct was not unreasonable or derelict.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs directly against the non-party insurer, finding the motion was unnecessary, speculative, and caused needless expense to the plaintiff in preserving her choice of counsel.

Costs were fixed at $13,400 net of setoffs.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action against the defendant lawyers, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should not be awarded due to the lead plaintiff's hardship as a paraplegic, the fact that the defendants were insured by LawPro, and the defendants' failure to make settlement offers.

The court rejected these arguments, holding that hardship does not displace the rule that costs follow the event, and that the presence of insurance is irrelevant to costs awards.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $250,000 for the main action and $7,500 for the abandoned Family Law Act claims.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a motorcycle accident in Jamaica.

She retained the defendant lawyer to investigate potential insurance claims.

The lawyer advised that her family's Ontario automobile insurance policy would not provide accident benefits due to a territorial restriction limiting coverage to North America, and thus did not file an application for benefits before the two-year limitation period expired.

The plaintiff sued the lawyer for professional negligence, arguing he should have filed the application to preserve her rights, especially given subsequent changes in case law.

The court dismissed the action, finding the lawyer met the standard of care of a reasonably competent expert in insurance law at the time, and that an application for benefits would likely have been denied anyway.

The court reviewed a motion record concerning the proposed resolution of a minor’s Family Law Act claim arising from injuries to his mother in a motor vehicle accident.

The record revealed that the adult plaintiffs had settled their claims for $600,000, while the minor’s claim was effectively treated as having no value and no payment had been made by the tortfeasor.

Funds had instead been placed into investment vehicles by the litigation guardian from his own settlement without court approval, and part of the funds were paid to counsel.

The court held that the minor’s claim could not be treated as settled in the absence of full disclosure, expert evidence, and proper court approval.

The matter was referred to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to investigate and advise regarding the proposed arrangement.

The plaintiffs appealed a Rule 21 motion decision determining that where a plaintiff is involved in two motor vehicle accidents and the actions are tried together, the statutory deductible under s. 267.5(7) of the Insurance Act applies to each action individually.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the plain meaning of the provision requires the court to determine general damages for each action and then reduce that amount by the statutory deductible.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal from a master's order, the court was required to determine costs both for the appeal and for the underlying motion before the master.

The parties had agreed that costs of the appeal would be fixed at $5,000 but disputed whether that agreement encompassed the costs of the earlier motion.

The court held that the agreement related only to the appeal and that the master's prior costs disposition had been set aside when the order was reversed on appeal.

Considering the partial indemnity costs outline, the complexity of the motion, and the reasonableness principle governing costs, the court fixed additional costs of $3,000 for the motion before the master.

Following the dismissal of a civil action by another judge of the Superior Court of Justice, the court issued an endorsement raising procedural concerns regarding how the matter had been reassigned.

The judge noted that an earlier endorsement he issued had not been addressed by counsel and questioned whether it had been brought to the attention of the judge who subsequently dismissed the action.

The court directed that the file be sent to the judge who dismissed the action to clarify whether the earlier endorsement had been provided and to determine whether the reassignment may have constituted judge shopping.

The defendant physicians brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action alleged negligent delay in diagnosing breast cancer, which later recurred and became terminal.

The court considered the discoverability principle and the requirement that a claim be based on material facts including causation and actionable damage.

It held that although the cancer was diagnosed in 2007, the plaintiff’s condition went into remission and actionable injury only became apparent when the cancer recurred in 2009.

The court concluded that the defendants failed to establish that the limitation period necessarily began earlier, and that the issue required a trial.

Following a motor vehicle accident jury trial resulting in a modest judgment after statutory deductions and collateral benefit credits, the court addressed liability for costs.

The defendant insurer argued that its Rule 49 offer to settle should trigger cost consequences because the plaintiff recovered significantly less than the offer.

The court held that the offer was ambiguous due to unexplained references to provisions of the Insurance Act and therefore could not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences.

Applying Rule 57.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the recovery fell within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction and determined that neither party should receive costs.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for future loss of income in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to order disclosure of settlement amounts from two subsequent accidents and by failing to deduct those amounts from the damages award.

They also argued the statutory trust for future collateral benefits should extend to future pension benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global assessment method prevented double recovery and the claim regarding pension benefits was speculative.

The appellant, a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle, suffered severe injuries resulting in lymphedema.

At trial, liability was admitted, and a jury awarded her $290,000 in non-pecuniary damages, $30,000 for past income loss, and $43,300 under the Family Law Act, but zero for future income loss.

The appellant appealed the zero award for future income loss, arguing it was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was supported by evidence of the appellant's successful employment and promotions post-accident, and that the jury was entitled to reject the appellant's expert evidence regarding her future loss of competitive advantage.

The appellant appealed an order staying her Ontario action.

On appeal, she raised a new issue regarding whether her claim against the respondents was barred by Quebec limitation periods, which would affect the juridical advantage analysis.

Because there was no evidentiary record on this issue, the Court of Appeal amended the lower court's order to provide for a conditional stay of the Ontario action pending the final determination of the limitation period question under Quebec law.

The Court of Appeal issued supplementary reasons regarding a costs order from a previous appeal decision.

The defendants (appellants) objected to the court's direction that an assessment officer determine whether the trial was prolonged by the defendants' failure to meaningfully respond to a request to admit, which would entitle the plaintiffs to solicitor-and-client costs for the additional time.

The defendants argued the assessment officer lacked the ability to make this determination without further instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the objection, finding that the assessment officer has the authority and experience to perform the task and that no further direction was needed.

The 14-year-old deceased was killed when a handball net toppled onto him during a physical education class.

His parents and sister successfully sued the school board.

The jury awarded $100,000 to each parent and $50,000 to the sister for loss of guidance, care, and companionship under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge also awarded the plaintiffs solicitor-and-client costs.

The school board appealed the damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the parents' awards as high but within the accepted range, but reduced the sister's award to $25,000 as inordinately high.

The costs order was varied to party-and-party costs, as the plaintiffs' settlement offers did not comply with Rule 49.10.