Rhyan Ahmed

The appellant sought to set aside a default judgment entered seven years earlier after her pleadings were struck for non-compliance with a costs order imposed as a condition of an adjournment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not brought promptly or pursued diligently and disbelieving the explanation offered.

On appeal, the court found no error in the motion judge's application of the test under Rule 19.08 for setting aside a default judgment, including findings of prejudice and tarnishing of the administration of justice.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault and four counts of failing to comply with a condition of a release order.

The offender sexually assaulted his former intimate partner while subject to a release order prohibiting contact with her.

He breached the non-contact condition by contacting her by telephone the day following the assault.

The Crown sought a global sentence of two years jail followed by 12 months probation, along with ancillary orders.

The defence argued that the offender's pre-sentence custody of 310 real days, credited as 465 days, was sufficient time served given mitigating factors including harsh detention conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of approximately 15.5 months jail followed by 12 months probation, taking into account aggravating factors including persistence in sexual advances despite repeated refusals, the statutory aggravation of intimate partner violence, the offender's criminal record, and breach of court orders, balanced against mitigating factors including remorse, family support, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of sexual assault entered by a military judge, arguing that the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively and assessed the evidence on the wrong legal principles.

The Court Martial Appeal Court majority dismissed the Crown's appeal and upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court Martial Appeal Court majority, finding that the military judge's assessment of the evidence was thorough and cumulative, and that no wrong legal principles were applied.

Although some improper speculation was noted, it did not undermine the military judge's fundamental findings.

O'Bonsawin J. dissented and would have allowed the appeal.

This is a sentencing decision for Iourii Starostin, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the death of his 87-year-old stepfather.

The offender, highly intoxicated at the time, brutally beat the victim.

The court considered the Crown's request for 12-14 years and the defence's request for 8 years.

Aggravating factors included the vulnerability of the victim, the brutality of the attack, and the offender's failure to address his long-standing alcohol use disorder despite previous convictions.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court sentenced the offender to 11 years imprisonment, with 3 years credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 8 years remaining to be served.

A DNA order and a lifetime s. 109 order were also imposed.

The appellants (Molu's corporations) appealed a Master's decision refusing to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against three properties.

The CPL was sought in the context of a counterclaim alleging fraudulent conveyance by the respondent (Hassoun) to his wife.

The Master considered both a prima facie fraud test and the three-part Grefford test, finding the appellants failed to meet the onus on either.

The appeal court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error in law or palpable and overriding error, and that the Master's factual conclusions were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The plaintiff sought a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a condominium unit following a failed purchase transaction involving alleged fraud and a forged signature.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found no triable issue regarding the plaintiff's interest in the land, as his interest was lost upon failure to close.

Even if a triable issue existed, the property was not unique, and damages would be an adequate remedy.

The court emphasized that the vendor (Monarch) was an innocent party and should not be unduly prejudiced by holding the unit.

Costs were awarded to the responding defendants.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering the return of $19,656 to the respondent.

The respondent had transferred funds, part of which belonged to her and part to her mother, to the appellant's bank account.

The trial judge found the appellant held the funds as a bare trustee and was liable for the respondent's portion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondents from soliciting customers, alleging breach of a non-solicitation clause in a confidentiality agreement.

The respondents denied signing the agreement.

The court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the agreement's existence but no irreparable harm, as losses were quantifiable in damages.

The motion for injunction was dismissed, and the application was converted to an action for damages.

No costs were awarded.

The appellants obtained judgments in the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its agencies for kidnapping, detention, and torture.

They brought an action in Ontario to enforce those judgments.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that the defendants were immune from jurisdiction under the State Immunity Act.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the acts constituted commercial activity, that a common law exception applied, and that the defendants lost immunity by violating jus cogens norms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the State Immunity Act is a complete code, the acts were not commercial, and customary international law does not recognize a jus cogens exception to state immunity.

Following a successful application by a condominium corporation to enforce compliance with the Condominium Act, 1998 and the corporation’s declaration regarding exclusive use rights to sell fresh meat and poultry, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The corporation sought recovery of its legal costs pursuant to s. 134(5) of the Act, which allows a condominium corporation to recover both court-awarded costs and additional actual costs incurred in obtaining a compliance order.

The respondents argued that they should not bear responsibility for the costs or that liability should fall on the other respondent.

The court held that the policy behind s. 134(5) shifts the financial burden of obtaining compliance orders to the offending unit owner or occupier.

The full amount of the claimed legal costs was found reasonable and awarded, with the owner liable for the total amount but entitled to recover half from the tenant.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order to enforce compliance with its declaration against a commercial unit owner and its tenant, who were selling fresh meat and poultry in violation of another unit's exclusive use rights.

The respondents argued that the application was premature because the dispute had not been mediated pursuant to s. 132 of the Condominium Act, 1998, and claimed a settlement had been reached at a prior meeting.

The court found that no settlement was reached and held that the mandatory mediation provisions under s. 132 do not apply to disputes involving tenants or occupants.

The court ordered the respondents to comply with the declaration and cease selling fresh meat and poultry.

The defendant moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that a prior costs order contained in a consent judgment remained partially unpaid.

The court held that even where the technical requirements of the rule are met, the court retains discretion to refuse security for costs after considering all relevant circumstances, including the merits of the claim.

The court clarified that the role of the merits under Rule 56.01(1)(c) falls on a continuum between the standards applicable under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and Rule 56.01(1)(e).

On the evidence, the plaintiffs demonstrated a good likelihood of success in their action to set aside a consent judgment based on alleged undisclosed liabilities in a share purchase transaction.

In light of the strength of the plaintiffs’ case and the absence of responding evidence from the defendant, ordering security for costs would be unjust.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario following a guilty plea for operating in a net trust deficit position and failing to maintain proper records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was statute-barred as it was filed out of time under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court also addressed the merits, concluding the Committee's decision was reasonable, the brief written reasons were sufficient, and the requirement to file audited financial statements for three years was within the Committee's jurisdiction.