Karl Joseph Jean-Guy Jacques Lacharité

The appellant, a Master Corporal, appealed his sexual assault convictions and 42-month sentence imposed by a Standing Court Martial.

He raised several grounds: breach of language rights during a bilingual trial, unreasonable delay under Jordan following an adjournment caused by his inappropriate comment to the prosecutor, errors in finding lack of consent, and errors in applying the private records regime to exclude text messages he claimed showed a motive to fabricate.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's language rights were met through simultaneous interpretation, the trial delay was properly attributed to the defence, the judge correctly assessed consent, and the judge appropriately excluded text messages that relied on stereotypical reasoning to suggest a motive to fabricate.

The respondent pleaded guilty before a court martial to dangerous driving under the Criminal Code, charged as a military offence.

At sentencing, the prosecution and defence jointly recommended a driving prohibition under the Criminal Code.

The military judge held he lacked jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition.

The prosecution appealed.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the National Defence Act establishes a distinct sentencing regime for military offences, and courts martial do not possess jurisdiction to impose discretionary penalties like driving prohibitions that are set out only in the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a civilian dependant of a Canadian Armed Forces member stationed in Belgium, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of operating a conveyance while impaired.

He appealed, arguing that trying him in the military justice system rather than the civilian system was arbitrary and infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory provisions explicitly apply Canadian law to his conduct abroad.

The Court further held that the decision to prosecute falls squarely within prosecutorial discretion, which can only be interfered with in cases of abuse of process, none of which was established here.

The appellant, Master Corporal Claude Houde, appealed two findings of guilt for sexual assault made by a General Court Martial panel.

The appeal centred on errors in the trial judge's instructions to the panel regarding the complainant's credibility and the assessment of photographic evidence.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found that the judge's instructions improperly focused on the complainant's credibility as the determinative issue, effectively circumventing the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as set out in R. v. W(D).

Furthermore, the judge erred by instructing the panel to decide whether to believe the photographic evidence before considering it as part of the whole evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the two charges.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to file a reply memorandum, which the respondent opposed.

Under Rule 10(2) of the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules, leave is required because there was no cross-appeal.

The Chief Justice granted the motion, noting that the appellant could not have reasonably anticipated some of the respondent's positions, the respondent would suffer no prejudice (and would gain advance notice of arguments), and the reply would assist the Court.

A young reserve force member appealed convictions for sexual assault and behaving in a disgraceful manner, arguing that the military justice system unconstitutionally denied young persons the presumption of diminished moral culpability protected by s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that the presumption applies within the military justice system and was not waived by enlistment with parental consent.

It further held that most discretionary features of the National Defence Act could operate constitutionally, but mandatory long-term consequences such as criminal record consequences, DNA orders, SOIRA registration, and mandatory minimum consequences were inconsistent with the principle and not justified under s. 1.

The Court read down s. 60(1) of the National Defence Act to exclude young military members charged with service offences outside s. 249.27(1)(a), dismissed the Crown cross-appeal, and stayed both charges.

The appellant, Sergeant Meeks, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to 30 days' detention.

Following his sentencing, he was administratively released from the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

On appeal, he sought to admit fresh evidence of his release and argued that his sentence should be suspended or declared inoperative based on prior jurisprudence (Tupper).

The Court admitted the fresh evidence but held that Tupper should be read narrowly, concluding that a sentence of detention remains legally valid despite administrative release.

However, given the change in circumstances and the Crown's consent, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and suspended the remaining period of detention, subject to statutory conditions and a no-contact order.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Standing Court Martial that dismissed his applications for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter in respect of a sexual assault charge.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found no palpable and overriding error in the military judge's calculation and characterization of the delays under the Jordan framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Appellant applied to file a Memorandum of Fact and Law exceeding the 30-page limit by 15 pages in an appeal before the Court Martial Appeal Court.

The Appellant cited the voluminous record, including 29 appeal books and 13 voir dires, as justification.

The Court dismissed the application, holding that the sheer volume of material is insufficient to justify an extension.

The Appellant failed to provide a draft factum or sufficient details about the grounds of appeal to demonstrate why the arguments could not be presented concisely within the standard limits.

The appellant, a Corporal in the Canadian Armed Forces, was convicted by a General Court Martial of sexual assault and sentenced to 42 days detention, with a mandatory 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing his prior consistent statement was improperly excluded, and appealed the SOIRA order, seeking a personal remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter based on R. v. Ndhlovu.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding the military judge correctly excluded the self-serving hearsay statement.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and set aside the SOIRA order, finding the military judge erred in law by focusing exclusively on the risk of reoffending and failing to consider whether the order's impact, particularly travel restrictions affecting his military career, was grossly disproportionate.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault at a court martial, sought an extension of time to file his Memorandum of Fact and Law.

His new appellate counsel required additional time to review the 29-volume appeal book from the complex trial.

The Court applied the Davies criteria and found that it was in the interests of justice to grant an extension, given the volume of material and the lack of specific prejudice to the Crown.

An extension was granted to September 13, 2024.

Nine members of the Canadian Armed Forces charged with service offences under the Code of Service Discipline challenged the constitutional validity of the statutory requirement that military judges presiding over courts martial must hold officer rank, alleging a breach of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The majority held that the military status of military judges, as presently configured under the National Defence Act, meets the three essential conditions of judicial independence — security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence — and that a reasonable and informed person would not apprehend bias or insufficient independence.

The Court declined to depart from its earlier ruling in R. v. Généreux and upheld the constitutionality of ss. 165.21 and 165.24(2) of the NDA.

Karakatsanis J. dissented, concluding that the disciplinary accountability of military judges to the executive chain of command undermines judicial independence in a manner that cannot be saved under s. 1.

The Crown appealed a military judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings for an alleged abuse of process in a sexual assault trial.

The military judge had ruled that evidence of the complainant's past sexual relations with the accused was admissible and strongly suggested it be introduced via an agreed statement of facts.

When the prosecution declined to seek a statement from the complainant for that purpose, the military judge found this constituted a refusal to accept his decision and an abuse of process, ending the proceedings.

The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding the military judge misapprehended the prosecution's position, which was merely a refusal to follow a suggested procedure, not a refusal to comply with an admissibility ruling.

The military judge also erred in the scope of his trial management powers and in his assessment of the appropriate remedy.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a military physician on four fraud-related charges arising from the writing of illicit prescriptions.

At trial, the military judge granted a directed verdict (no prima facie case) on the basis that the Crown failed to prove actual deprivation.

The Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the military judge misapplied the test for fraud and the no prima facie case standard.

The Court held that only a risk of deprivation is required, and there was some evidence upon which a trier of fact could reasonably convict.

The Canadian Military Prosecution Service moved to have the appellant's appeal dismissed for failure to file a memorandum of fact and law within the extended time limits previously ordered.

The appellant concurrently applied to restart the appeal and for an extension of time.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the prosecution's motion, noting that an earlier order denying an extension could be revisited with compelling new evidence.

Finding that new evidence explained the delay caused by counsel's conflict of interest and that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous, the Court granted the appellant until February 28, 2024, to file his memorandum.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of sexual assault entered by a military judge, arguing that the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively and assessed the evidence on the wrong legal principles.

The Court Martial Appeal Court majority dismissed the Crown's appeal and upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court Martial Appeal Court majority, finding that the military judge's assessment of the evidence was thorough and cumulative, and that no wrong legal principles were applied.

Although some improper speculation was noted, it did not undermine the military judge's fundamental findings.

O'Bonsawin J. dissented and would have allowed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on two counts of indecent acts.

The Crown argued that the military judge erred by admitting evidence that invited impermissible reasoning based on myths and stereotypes regarding the complainant's post-offence conduct, specifically her failure to report immediately and her continued friendly email correspondence with the respondent.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the cross-examination on the emails was conducted for a proper purpose to challenge the complainant's statements and corroborate the defence theory.

While defence counsel's closing address improperly invited the panel to engage in myth-based reasoning, the Court concluded that this single error did not have a material bearing on the verdict, given the military judge's instructions to the panel and the other bases upon which the panel could have found a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault by a General Court Martial, sought a second extension of time to file his memorandum of fact and law for his appeal.

The appellant's new counsel requested an additional 60 days after a previous 90-day extension had expired.

The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada dismissed the motion, finding a complete lack of diligence by the appellant and his counsel in explaining the delays.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to provide any evidence demonstrating the merits of the appeal, and granting another extension would prejudice the prosecution.

The appellant, a corporal in the military, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence of 30 days' imprisonment, demotion, and a $5,000 fine.

The conviction appeal argued the military judge's credibility findings were illogical.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the credibility assessment.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant and the Crown jointly argued the military judge erred by imposing imprisonment instead of the jointly submitted 30 days' detention without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to make further submissions.

The Court applied the framework from Nahanee, holding that a sentencing judge must notify parties before exceeding a sentencing submission, even if the offender was convicted after a trial rather than pleading guilty.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 30 days' detention, with all other orders remaining.

The appellant, a retired corporal, appealed his conviction by a Military Judge for conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline under s. 129 of the National Defence Act.

The sole ground of appeal was a constitutional challenge asserting that military judges lack independence and impartiality because they are also officers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on its recent jurisprudence to hold that the status of military judges as officers does not render them partial or lacking in independence.