Reasons for Decision

Court File No.: CR-23-10000047-00AP
Date: 2025-07-18
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King, Respondent
– and –
Laurel Paige, Appellant

Appearances:
T. Monteiro, for the respondent
M.A. Moon, for the appellant

Heard: May 12, 2025

On appeal from the convictions entered on May 2, 2023 by the Honourable Justice J. Freeman of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Schreck J.:

Introduction

[1] Laurel Paige was convicted of sexual interference, sexual assault and committing an indecent act based on the testimony of a young child who was the daughter of a friend of his. The child, who was the sole witness at trial, testified to two incidents that she said had occurred while Mr. Paige was visiting her home.

[2] The central issue at trial was the credibility and reliability of the complainant, who had made false allegations of criminal conduct about another person in the past and whose testimony was, in some respects, inconsistent with a statement she had given to the police. The trial judge ultimately accepted the complainant’s evidence and convicted Mr. Paige. He appeals his convictions and submits that the trial judge’s reasons for accepting the complainant’s evidence were tainted by a number of errors.

[3] It is well established that appellate courts must afford considerable deference to a trial judge’s credibility findings and can only intervene if the reasons disclose palpable and overriding error. With one exception, the trial judge’s reasons do not reflect any of the errors alleged. While the one error disclosed in the reasons was palpable, it was not overriding. As a result, the appeal is dismissed.

I. Evidence

A. Overview

[4] The complainant, R.P., was 13 years old at the time of trial. Her evidence consisted of her testimony at trial as well as a video statement she provided to the police on January 16, 2020, which was admitted pursuant to s. 715.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

[5] In 2019, R.P. lived in an apartment in Toronto with her mother and younger sister. The appellant was a friend of R.P.’s mother and would occasionally visit the apartment. R.P. testified about two incidents of sexual contact between her and the appellant during one such visit in the spring or summer of 2019, when she was eight or nine years old. These incidents were referred to at trial as “the balcony incident” and “the bedroom incident.”

B. The Balcony Incident

[6] R.P. stated that during his visit to the apartment, the appellant went to sit on a chair on the balcony. She decided to join him there, despite her mother having told her not to go onto the balcony while the appellant was there because he smoked. At the time, R.P.’s mother was cooking in the kitchen. According to R.P., the balcony could be seen from the kitchen “if you pop your head out.” R.P. agreed that her sister may have been in the living room at the time, although she was not sure.

[7] In her statement, R.P. said that while she was on the balcony, the appellant took his penis out from his pants and began rubbing it. According to her, the appellant then lifted her up and put her on his lap. He did not say anything. R.P. then ran inside and told her mother, who did not believe her because she had not seen it happen.

[8] During her cross-examination at trial, R.P. testified that after the appellant took his penis out of his pants, he told her to sit on his lap, which she did for “more than 10 seconds.” Her mother did not notice this. R.P. was not asked what happened after she got off the appellant’s lap.

C. The Bedroom Incident

[9] Later the same day, R.P. was lying down in the bed she shared with her sister, who was also in the bed and asleep. According to R.P., the appellant entered the room and laid down on top of her. R.P.’s sister was asleep next to them. The appellant gently turned the sister’s head away so that she faced the window. He then removed R.P.’s pyjama pants. In her statement to the police, R.P. said that he had also removed her shirt.

[10] R.P. stated that after the appellant removed her pants, he kissed her and then left the room. After that, R.P.’s mother came into the room. R.P. ran to her and told her what had occurred. In her statement, she said that she was naked when she ran to her mother, but at trial explained that she had meant naked from the waist down.

[11] R.P.’s mother took her into the bathroom and washed her mouth out with mouthwash. She then told the appellant to leave the apartment.

D. Prior False Allegations by the Complainant

[12] In the summer of 2019, R.P. went to live with N., a close friend of her mother. N. had a daughter, S. While S.’s exact age is unclear from the record, it is evident that she is significantly older than R.P.

[13] In September 2019, R.P. stopped living with N. and began living with S. At some point, the timing of which is unclear in the record, R.P. made a statement to the police alleging that N. had assaulted her. N. was apparently charged and R.P. testified at her trial.

[14] R.P. agreed that her allegations against N., including during her testimony at N.’s trial, were false. She testified at trial that she had lied about N. at the behest of S. In re-examination, R.P. testified that S. had not told her to lie about the appellant.

[15] In 2022, R.P. made allegations of some sort against S. She was not asked whether those allegations were true, and there is no evidence as to whether S. was charged or tried.

II. Analysis

A. Overview – Appellate Review of Credibility Findings

(i) The Scope and Standard of Review

[16] This case turned entirely on the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s testimony. There were no issues of admissibility, nor was there any issue that her evidence, if accepted, established the commission of the offences with which the appellant was charged. As a result, the trial judge’s task was to evaluate the complainant’s evidence in order to determine whether it was sufficiently credible and reliable to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

[17] The extent to which an appellate court can review a trial judge’s findings in cases such as this is limited. The reasons for this were recently explained in R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 385, at paras. 82-84:

The governing standard of review applicable to findings of credibility and reliability is well established: absent a recognized error of law, such findings are entitled to deference unless a palpable and overriding error can be shown (Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, at para. 10, citing Schwartz v. Canada, at paras. 32-33; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, at para. 74). Credibility and reliability findings typically do not engage errors of law, as at their core they relate to the extent to which a judge has relied upon a particular factor and how closely that factor is tied to the evidence. Although such findings may be overturned on correctness if errors of law are disclosed, in most cases it is preferable to review them using the nuanced and holistic standard of palpable and overriding error -- which defers to the conclusions of trial judges who have had direct exposure to the witnesses themselves.

Trial judges have expertise in assessing and weighing the facts, and their decisions reflect a familiarity that only comes with having sat through the entire case. The reasons for the deference accorded to a trial judge’s factual and credibility findings include: (1) limiting the cost, number, and length of appeals; (2) promoting the autonomy and integrity of trial proceedings; and (3) recognizing the expertise and advantageous position of the trial judge (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, at paras. 12-18). In light of the practical difficulty of explaining the constellation of impressions that inform them, it is well-established that “particular deference” should be accorded to credibility findings (G.F., 2021 SCC 20, at para. 81). Appellate courts are comparatively ill-suited to credibility and reliability assessment, being restricted to reviewing written transcripts of testimony and often focussing narrowly, even telescopically, on particular issues as opposed to seeing the case and the evidence as a whole (Housen, at para. 14, citing R. D. Gibbens, “Appellate Review of Findings of Fact” (1991-92), 13 Advocates’ Q. 445, at p. 446).

[18] Deference is owed to a trial judge’s credibility findings absent palpable and overriding error because “it is often difficult for trial judges to precisely articulate the reasons why they believed or disbelieved a witness”: Kruk, at para. 81. However, this does not mean that those findings are not subject to meaningful appellate review. As was made clear in Kruk, at para. 85, “appellate courts must determine whether the trial judge’s findings on credibility and reliability are ‘the product of an evidence-based and context-specific assessment’ of the witness’s testimony” (R. v. Pastro, 2021 BCCA 149, at para. 67).

[19] The deferential standard does not mean that an appellate court should not give full and careful consideration to a trial judge’s reasons. Something more than a “once-over-lightly perusal” is required: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, at para. 109, per Brown and Rowe JJ. While due regard must be had for the challenges faced by trial judges in articulating their reasons for believing a witness, they must still do so in a way that discloses “a logical connection between the verdict and the basis for the verdict” so as to allow for meaningful appellate review: R. v. J.C., 2025 ONCA 331, at para. 27; R. v. Leonard, 2025 ONCA 63, at para. 6.

(ii) The Meaning of “Palpable and Overriding”

[20] An error will be “palpable” if it is “plainly seen,” “plainly identified” or “obvious” and will apply to conclusions that are “clearly wrong,” “unsupported by the evidence” or “unreasonable”: Kruk, at para. 97; R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2, at para. 6; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, at paras. 5-6. In considering whether a trial judge’s reasons disclose palpable error, an appellate court must afford deference to the trial judge’s findings, but may nonetheless rely on logic and human experience in evaluating those findings: Kruk, at para. 97.

[21] An error will be “overriding” if it is “shown to have affected the result” or “goes to the very core of the outcome of the case”: Kruk, at para. 98; Clark, at para. 9. As stated by Stratas J.A. in South Yukon Forest Corp. v. Canada, 2012 FCA 165, at para. 46 (cited in Benhaim v. St. Germain, 2016 SCC 48, at para. 38):

“Overriding” means an error that goes to the very core of the outcome of the case. When arguing palpable and overriding error, it is not enough to pull at leaves and branches and leave the tree standing. The entire tree must fall.

[22] With these principles in mind, I turn now to the alleged errors raised by the appellant.

B. Grounds of Appeal

(i) Alleged Reversal of the Burden of Proof

[23] The appellant submits that the trial judge effectively reversed the burden of proof by requiring the defence to establish that the complainant’s account was implausible. This submission is based on the following portion of the trial judge’s reasons:

The defence submits that it would be implausible for Mr. Paige to have exposed his penis for approximately two minutes and had Miss [P.] sit on his lap at a time when Miss [P.] was not supposed to be alone with Mr. Paige, and there was a potential he could be observed. Firstly, I do not have any evidence as to what Miss Pyke’s mother observed, if anything. I do not know where she was in the kitchen, nor if she was ever looking out to the balcony. She was not called as a witness.

Once again, people do not act predictably. I am not prepared to find that Mr. Paige would not have engaged in the acts alleged by virtue of the proximity of Miss [P.]’s mother.

The defence also submitted that if [N., R.P.’s sister] was in the living room, she would have seen what was happening on the balcony. Again, I do not accept the submission. Miss [P.] did not say [N.] was in the living room. In fact, she did not know where she was. [N.] did not testify. It would be speculation to find that the evidence was implausible because [N.] would have seen any incident had it occurred without there being any evidence at trial as to where [N.] actually was.

[24] Read in isolation, this portion of the trial judge’s reasons could be seen as supporting the appellant’s submission. However, when the reasons are read as a whole, it is clear that the trial judge was addressing one of the central submissions made by the appellant’s counsel (who was not counsel on appeal), which was that the complainant’s account was inherently implausible for a number of reasons. Once those submissions were made, the trial judge was obliged to address them: R. v. Ignacio, 2021 ONCA 69, at para. 35. The impugned portion of the reasons show that she did so and do not reflect any error.

(ii) The Absence of Corroboration

[25] The appellant submits that the circumstances of this case required corroboration of the complainant’s testimony and that the trial judge erred by failing to recognize this. As I understand the appellant’s argument, the failure of the Crown to call the complainant’s mother and sister should have been treated by the trial judge as fatal to the Crown’s case.

[26] The statutory legal requirement that the unsworn evidence of a child be corroborated was repealed over 35 years ago: R. v. W.(R.), at p. 132. The appellant acknowledges this, but relies on McLachlin J.’s (as she then was) statement in W.(R.), at p. 132, that “[t]he repeal of provisions creating a legal requirement that children’s evidence be corroborated does not prevent the judge or jury from a treating a child’s evidence with caution where such caution is merited in the circumstances of the case.”

[27] Determining whether the circumstances of a particular case merit the type of caution described in W.(R.) is part of the assessment that a trial judge must conduct in cases that turn on credibility. There is no fixed formula for determining what degree of caution is required for a child (or any other) witness: R. v.Marquard, at p. 238; Jones v. Niklaus, 2008 ONCA 504, at para. 31. As with other aspects of a credibility assessment, a trial judge’s decision in this regard must be afforded considerable deference absent palpable and overriding error.

[28] The appellant’s argument is in essence a submission that absent corroboration, it was unreasonable for the trial judge to accept the complainant’s testimony. This is not really an allegation of an error of law requiring that the appeal be allowed pursuant to s. 686(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code (which is imported into the summary conviction appeal context by virtue of s. 822(1)), but rather a submission that the verdict was unreasonable and should be set aside pursuant to s. 686(1)(a)(i). Such an argument can only succeed if the verdict was one which “cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence”: R. v. Brunelle, 2022 SCC 5, at para. 8; R. v. R.P., 2012 SCC 22, at para. 10. This is not such a case, nor does the appellant suggest that it is.

(iii) Failure to Consider Inconsistencies

[29] The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by failing to consider three inconsistencies in the complainant’s testimony: (1) the complainant testified that the appellant told her to sit on his lap, but in her statement said that he lifted her onto his lap; (2) in her statement, the complainant said that after the incident on the balcony, she ran inside to tell her mother, but she did not mention telling her mother during her testimony; (3) the complainant testified that the appellant removed her pants during the incident in the bedroom, but in her statement said that he also removed her shirt.

[30] It is well established that there is no obligation on a trial judge to review and resolve every inconsistency in a witness’s evidence: R. v. N.P., 2025 ONCA 110, at para. 23; R. v. J.L., 2024 ONCA 36, at para. 39; R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769, at para. 14. This is especially the case where the witness is a child: R. v. P.B., 2024 ONCA 96, at para. 10; R. v. S.K., 2023 ONCA 733, at para. 28.

[31] In any event, the trial judge did in fact address the inconsistency with respect to how the complainant came to be on the appellant’s lap as well as the inconsistency about what clothing was removed during the bedroom incident and concluded that neither was significant. It was open to her to do so. With respect to whether she told her mother after the balcony incident, the complainant was not asked what she did after she left the balcony, so it is not clear that there was an inconsistency in this regard.

(iv) Treating the Complainant’s Admission to Having Lied as Bolstering her Credibility

[32] As noted earlier, the complainant acknowledged that she had made false allegations against another person, both in a statement to the police and during testimony in court. As the trial judge observed, the complainant would have had to promise to tell the truth before testifying in court. The appellant acknowledges that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant’s evidence despite these lies but submits that the trial judge went further than this and actually treated the existence of the lies as bolstering the complainant’s credibility.

[33] The fact that the complainant lied to the police and in court did not bolster her credibility, and treating it as if it did would, in my view, constitute palpable and overriding error: R. v. D.T., 2014 ONCA 44, at paras. 89-90. The issue that must be determined is whether the trial judge did this.

[34] The trial judge acknowledged that the complainant’s prior lies were “very troubling.” She nonetheless concluded that they did not require a rejection of the complainant’s evidence for the following reasons:

To state the obvious, the lies that were told pre-dated this trial. In re-examination, Miss. [P.] stated that that the reason she lied was because [S.] told her to. She further stated that [S.] did not tell her to lie about Mr. Paige, nor did anyone else. In the context of a 10-year-old child, I accept that she would have lied because her friend told her to. While it did raise a red flag as to the credibility of Miss. [P.], having carefully considered this matter, I accept her explanation for why she lied about [N.]. I accept her evidence that she did not lie about Mr. Paige and that no one suggested she lie about Mr. Paige.

In my view, there is nothing in this portion of the reasons that suggests that the trial judge treated the earlier lies as bolstering the complainant’s credibility. Rather, the trial judge acknowledged that the lies raised a “red flag,” but accepted the complainant’s explanation for them and her assertion that the factors that led her to tell the lies did not exist with respect to her allegations against the appellant. It was open to the trial judge to conclude as she did.

[35] However, the trial judge returned to the subject of the earlier lies later in her reasons:

Overall, I found Miss [P.]’s evidence to be internally consistent with few exceptions as noted. Externally, it made sense, it was logical and I cannot find that it was implausible. She admitted to things that showed her in a less favourable light. For example, although she could not recall if her mother had a policy that if Mr. Paige was on the balcony, neither she nor her sister could go out there because he was smoking, she admitted she disobeyed her mother a lot so she most likely did that. She also admitted lying to the police and lying to the court with respect to the allegations concerning [N.]. [Emphasis added].

In this passage, the trial judge did treat the complainant’s admission to having made false allegations against another person as bolstering her credibility. In my view, she erred in doing so. Counsel for the respondent concedes this.

[36] The error committed by the trial judge was, in my view, obvious and therefore “palpable.” The question that remains is whether it was also “overriding.” In my view, it was not. The trial judge provided numerous reasons for why she accepted the complainant’s evidence, which was uncontradicted by other evidence. The erroneous reliance on the complainant’s admission to having lied clearly did not “go the very core of the outcome of the case” and was not “an essential part of the trial judge’s decision to convict”: Kruk, at paras. 98, 126; South Yukon Forest Corp., at para. 46. As a result, while the trial judge erred, the error does not warrant setting aside the verdicts.

(v) Motive to Fabricate

[37] Relying on the earlier portion of the trial judge’s reasons in which she accepted the complainant’s explanation for having made false allegations because her friend had told her to, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred by concluding that the absence of a motive to fabricate her allegations against the appellant meant that she must have been telling the truth.

[38] The appellant is correct that there is a distinction between absence of evidence of a motive on the part of a Crown witness to fabricate and absence of a motive to fabricate: R. v. John, 2017 ONCA 622, at para. 97; Ignacio, at para. 29. The distinction is important for two reasons. First, the fact that a witness does not have an apparent motive to fabricate does not mean that no such motive exists because “[p]eople may accuse others of committing a crime for reasons that may never be known, or for no reason at all”: R. v. Bartholomew, 2019 ONCA 377, at para. 22; R. v. Sanchez, 2017 ONCA 994, at para. 25; Ignacio, at para. 31. Second, a failure to recognize the distinction creates a risk of reversing the burden of proof by placing an onus on the defence to demonstrate why a witness is not being truthful: R. v. Batte, at para. 121; R. v. S.(W.), at p. 519; R. v. Krack, at pp. 561-562.

[39] In this case, the trial judge noted that the motive the complainant had for falsely implicating another person earlier did not exist with respect to the appellant and appears to have relied on this in concluding that the complainant was credible. However, she did so in the context of considering the effect of the complainant’s earlier lies and her acceptance of the complainant’s explanation for them. The trial judge concluded that the earlier lie was due to the influence of the complainant’s friend and did not fatally taint her evidence because the same influence did not exist with respect to the appellant. The trial judge did not make a positive finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate, only that she did not have the motive that had led her to tell lies earlier.

[40] When the impugned portion of the trial judge’s reasons are read in context, I am satisfied that she did not conclude that the complainant was credible because there was a proven absence of any motive to fabricate, nor did she place an onus on the appellant to establish such a motive.

III. Disposition

[41] The appeal is dismissed.

Justice A. Schreck
Released: July 18, 2025