Alan Pearse

This is an appeal from a conviction for impaired driving, where the appellant argued an infringement of their Section 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 18 months and 16 days.

The trial judge, and subsequently the appeal court, deducted 54 days for defence delay related to counsel's attempts to bypass necessary pre-trial procedures, resulting in a net delay of 17 months, which is within the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The court affirmed the necessity of pre-trials for efficient court scheduling and found the defence's conduct contributed to the delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in finding impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given observations of non-impairment at the police station.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's holistic assessment of the arresting officer's observations of erratic driving and physical indicia of impairment at the scene, which were made under different circumstances than the later observations at the station.

The court reiterated that appellate courts do not re-weigh credibility findings or re-try cases.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit on March 19, 2016.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The central issues were whether the Crown established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle and whether he did so within the relevant time period.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including the location of the vehicle on streetcar tracks in a tunnel, the accused's presence at the scene, his statements and conduct, and the timing of the incident relative to police dispatch.

The court found the accused guilty based on the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence establishing both identity and timing.