Nate Jackson

The defendants, Tal Amdurski and Thomas Graff, jointly charged with sexual services, sexual assault, and human trafficking, brought s. 11(b) Charter applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating net delay and considering defence delay and exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found 8 months and 19 days of defence delay attributable to Amdurski, but not to Graff due to his objections and the Crown's concession.

After accounting for 14 months and 4 days of exceptional circumstances (primarily COVID-related), Amdurski's net delay was 25 months and 22 days (below the 30-month ceiling), while Graff's net delay was 31 months and 5 days (exceeding the ceiling).

The court dismissed Amdurski's application and granted Graff's, staying the charges against him.

The appellant, Roger Mercury, appealed his convictions for several drug and firearm related offences and his nine-year sentence.

He argued that the trial judge's findings were unreasonable, misapprehended material facts, and failed to consider other reasonable possibilities inconsistent with guilt, specifically regarding his presence in the apartment and evidence from a car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the trial judge's verdicts were reasonable and based on a careful assessment of formidable evidence, including video surveillance and key fob records, which supported the appellant's control over the car and unit.

The court concluded that the trial judge correctly applied the law on constructive possession and circumstantial evidence and adequately addressed the appellant's submissions.

The accused, Tal Amdurski, brought a Charter application to exclude text messages found on a 13-year-old complainant's phone, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights (unreasonable search and seizure).

The complainant's mother discovered the messages, photographed them, and voluntarily provided them to the police, along with the phone, with the complainant's consent.

The court dismissed the application, finding no s. 8 Charter breach because the evidence was voluntarily provided by a private citizen (the mother) and the complainant, not seized by state action.

Alternatively, even if s. 8 was engaged, the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages, particularly given the complainant's age and vulnerability.

Further, even if there was a breach, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the minor nature of the state conduct, minimal impact on the accused's rights, and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious charges involving child sexual exploitation on their merits.

The accused was charged with trafficking fentanyl and possession of proceeds of crime.

During the trial, the accused brought a s. 8 Charter motion seeking to exclude drugs, money, and cell phones seized incident to arrest, arguing that a subsequent warrantless search of a co-accused's cell phone at the police station violated his rights.

The accused also brought a mistrial application alleging the trial judge improperly intervened during witness examination.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the interventions were merely to clarify evidence.

Assuming a technical s. 8 breach occurred when police used the co-accused's phone to call the accused's phone, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the breach was minor, had little impact on privacy interests, and the evidence was reliable and essential to the prosecution.

The appellant appealed his sentence for robbery, specifically challenging the calculation of presentence custody and credit for restrictive bail terms (Downes credit).

The parties jointly agreed that the sentencing judge was misinformed about the actual time spent in presentence custody and on restrictive bail conditions, leading to an incorrect credit calculation.

The Court of Appeal granted an additional 37 days of credit to remedy the error.

The appellant, S.F., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in making impermissible use of prior consistent statements, misapprehending evidence concerning disclosure to a high school counsellor, and applying an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly articulated and applied the principles governing prior consistent statements, did not misapprehend the evidence, and properly assessed witness credibility without uneven scrutiny.

The case concerns an entrapment application brought by Joshua Hill following his conviction for drug trafficking.

Hill argued that police entrapped him during a dial-a-dope investigation.

Applying the principles from R. v. Ahmad and R. v. Williams, the court assessed whether the police had reasonable suspicion before offering the opportunity to commit an offence.

The court found that the detailed information received by the undercover officer, combined with Hill's responses during the initial call, established reasonable suspicion, thereby dismissing the entrapment application.

The accused, A.M., charged with non-consensual distribution of intimate images under s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code, brought a motion for direction regarding the admissibility of the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The defence argued that neither the statutory regime under s. 276 nor the common law regime from R. v. Seaboyer applied.

The Crown contended that s. 276 applied, or alternatively, Seaboyer.

The court ruled that s. 276 did not apply in the particular circumstances of this case, as the images depicted consensual activity and thus did not implicate an enumerated offence.

However, the court found that the common law Seaboyer regime did apply to the offence of distributing intimate images, requiring the defence to file a written application, supported by affidavit or testimony, detailing and justifying the proposed evidence.

Following conviction for drug trafficking offences, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment.

The Crown sought to rely on confidential informant information to establish that the officer had reasonable suspicion prior to offering the accused an opportunity to commit the offence, as required under Ahmad.

The Crown sought to use the Step Six procedure from Garofoli to present redacted information to the defence while allowing the court to review unredacted materials.

The court ruled that Step Six is available in the entrapment context, extending its application beyond the traditional warrant review setting.

The appellant, P.G., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed suspended sentence with probation.

The trial judge had found P.G. sexually assaulted a Walmart employee, relying significantly on after-the-fact conduct evidence (following other women and masturbating in the store shortly after the incident) to establish sexual intent.

P.G. argued the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence, failed to consider alternative inferences, and imposed an overly harsh sentence.

The appeal court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the after-the-fact conduct evidence was properly admitted as probative of intent, the alternative inferences proposed by the appellant were speculative and not reasonable possibilities, and the suspended sentence was not demonstrably unfit or based on an error in principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought an application to stay criminal charges on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights (sections 7 and 12) arising from an incident at Central North Correctional Centre where he was pepper sprayed by correctional officers during a meal service.

The accused had been convicted of seven offences related to a home invasion and was awaiting sentencing.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, finding that a stay was not appropriate given the serious nature of the underlying offences and the accused's extensive criminal record.

The court also found that the evidence did not establish that excessive force was used by the correctional officers.

During a trial for second-degree murder and manslaughter, the Crown sought to introduce twenty-two post-mortem photographs of the deceased through a forensic pathologist.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly prejudicial and of limited probative value.

The court balanced the probative value against the risk of reasoning prejudice, finding the photographs were relevant to the nature of the injuries and corroboration of eyewitnesses.

The court admitted twenty-one of the photographs, directing that three be presented in black and white to minimize any potential prejudice.