Jennifer Joanne Epstein

This is an application for bail pending appeal of a prison sentence for manslaughter.

The applicant, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter after initially being charged with murder, was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment for killing his friend with a machine gun.

The Crown conceded leave to appeal and that the applicant was not a flight risk.

However, the court dismissed the application for bail, finding that the appeal lacked sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship, and that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest given the aggravating features of the offence and the slim chances of a substantial sentence reduction on appeal.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted.

The appellant, J.G., appealed verdicts of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, entered in 2005 when he was 16.

The appeal, consented to by the Crown, was based on fresh evidence indicating the appellant, who has significant intellectual disabilities, did not understand the consequences of an NCR verdict at the time.

The Court of Appeal found the process leading to the NCR findings unfair and a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCR verdicts, substituted findings of guilt for the original offences, and imposed a concurrent sentence of one day, with execution stayed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first degree murder of his wife.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving the partial defence of provocation with the jury, and by leaving first degree murder based on planning and deliberation and constructive murder with the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding provocation or planning and deliberation.

However, the Court held the trial judge erred in leaving constructive murder for the jury, as the murder was completed before the subsequent unlawful confinement of a witness, breaking the required causal connection.

A new trial was ordered for the first degree murder charge.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, R.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant testified that she consented to the sexual touching, which occurred due to the appellant's drug-induced paranoid hallucinations about her infidelity.

The trial judge, despite the complainant's testimony of consent and the Crown's argument focusing on the complainant's inconsistent police statement, convicted the appellant on the basis that her consent was vitiated by the history of violence in their relationship.

This theory of vitiated consent was not advanced by either counsel during the trial, nor was it raised by the judge with the parties before the decision.

The Court of Appeal found that convicting the appellant on an unargued and uncanvassed theory constituted a fundamental unfairness and denied the appellant his constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the sexual assault conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a jury trial.

The complainant, who was in a long-term relationship with the appellant, recanted her initial allegations at the preliminary hearing and trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements, the admission of prior disreputable conduct evidence, and the admission of the complainant's police statement for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, particularly regarding the principled exception to hearsay and the use of prior bad acts to understand the relationship.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and breaches of weapons prohibition orders, his designation as a dangerous offender, and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was within the trial judge's discretion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in the application of the totality principle.

However, the dangerous offender designation was set aside due to a legal error: the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's future treatment prospects and intractability at the designation stage, as required by the Criminal Code and clarified by R. v. Boutilier.

The court substituted the dangerous offender designation with a long-term offender designation, while leaving the determinate sentence and long-term supervision order intact.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of domestic violence offences and his dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of two counts of aggravated assault, one count each of sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a death threat, and breach of a probation order, while acquitting him on eight other counts.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's use of cross-count similar fact evidence and the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to the cross-count evidence and confirming that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant appealed his not criminally responsible (NCR) verdict on account of mental disorder, asserting that his guilty pleas were invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial defence counsel, despite the appellant's stated opposition to putting his mental health in issue, unilaterally pursued an NCR disposition by requesting a psychiatric assessment under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The counsel failed to provide effective assistance by stepping outside his role as defence counsel, acting more as a social worker or parent.

The appellant and his parents did not fully understand the implications of an NCR finding on the appellant's liberty interest.

Additionally, the appellant had a potentially viable defence to the arson charge, claiming the fire was accidental, but counsel persuaded him to plead guilty to access the NCR disposition.

The court found the entire process was fundamentally flawed and denied the appellant procedural fairness.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism under s. 162(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for taking still photographs from a live video stream during intimate video chats with the complainant without her knowledge or consent.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the complainant could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy since she willingly appeared nude on camera, and that he did not act "surreptitiously" because the complainant never explicitly objected to screenshots being taken.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and that the appellant acted surreptitiously with the intent that the complainant remain unaware of the recording.

The appellant Crown appealed the acquittal of a high school teacher charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after he used a concealed pen-camera to surreptitiously record female students engaged in ordinary school activities in common areas of the school.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had upheld the acquittal on the basis that the students were not in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, holding that circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 162(1) are circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred, taking into account the entire context.

The majority (Wagner C.J.) adopted a multi-factor contextual test informed by s. 8 Charter jurisprudence, while a concurring minority (Rowe J.) proposed a conjunctive test requiring both loss of control over one's image and infringement of sexual integrity.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after his motorcycle collided with a southbound SUV at an intersection in Toronto, resulting in serious injuries to a pedestrian.

The trial judge sentenced him to 12 months in custody followed by two years' probation, with a five-year prohibition on driving motorcycles.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending the driving prohibition could not be limited to motorcycles and that the driving lessons requirement was improper.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, dismissed the appellant's sentence appeal with modifications, and allowed the Crown's sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking various drugs, challenging the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant and the trial judge's conclusion that the warrant was validly issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding that while the reasons were imprecise, they were sufficient to permit appellate review when considered in context.

The court found no error in refusing cross-examination on the confidential informant's track record or criminal history, and determined that the information provided by the informant met the Debot criteria for reliability and was sufficiently corroborated to justify the warrant's issuance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud under $5,000 and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to obtaining a false driver's licence under a false name, which was subsequently presented to police after two car crashes.

The appellant challenged the validity of his guilty plea, arguing it was uninformed, that the facts did not establish the necessary element of "risk of loss or deprivation" that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance as a self-represented litigant, and that the sentencing was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and dismissed both the appeal and the leave to appeal sentence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated January 26, 2018 (amended February 26, 2018).

The appellant challenged the Board's order regarding his detention and conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision fell within the range of reasonable orders having regard to the totality of evidence and the Board's expertise.

The treating psychiatrist's concerns about the appellant's lack of initiative in addressing medical needs and absence of insight into his condition supported the Board's order to maintain hospital oversight to prevent the appellant from disengaging from treatment and presenting a significant risk of serious harm to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed with leave from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision dismissing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on a charge of driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The respondent was stopped by police who were investigating a report of an impaired driver in a pickup truck.

The respondent was driving a different colored pickup truck but was stopped under the Highway Traffic Act for sobriety purposes.

The trial judge found Charter breaches and excluded the breathalyzer evidence and statements.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the stop as an investigative detention rather than a lawful traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court allowed the appeal and entered a conviction.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge after nearly ten years of detention at a psychiatric hospital, while the hospital sought increased security.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety based on her history of assaultive behavior, substance abuse, and recent violent incidents.

However, the court found the Board erred by failing to make mandatory its recommendation for independent professional review and a customized treatment plan aimed at eventual community reintegration, given the appellant's prolonged detention without progress and the risk that continued hospitalization may be counter-therapeutic.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-daughter.

The sole ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that his trial counsel filed a false affidavit in support of a bail review application, failed to prepare him for trial, made incorrect legal arguments, and failed to effectively cross-examine Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown presented an overwhelming case with strong corroborating evidence, including the appellant's confessions to family members, possession of condoms, and his flight from the country.

The court concluded that even without the alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance, the verdict would not have been different and the trial was not rendered unfair.