Jennifer Joanne Epstein

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple counts of domestic violence offences and his dangerous offender designation with an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of two counts of aggravated assault, one count each of sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering a death threat, and breach of a probation order, while acquitting him on eight other counts.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's use of cross-count similar fact evidence and the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to the cross-count evidence and confirming that the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met.

Four co-accused appealed convictions arising from a large-scale police investigation into criminal gang activity in Toronto (Project Battery and Project Rx).

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The key issues involved: (1) material non-disclosure regarding the use of a Mobile Device Identifier (MDI); (2) warrantless police entries into common areas of condominium buildings; and (3) warrantless installation of hidden surveillance cameras in condominium hallways.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but found that the warrantless installation of hidden cameras violated section 8 rights.

However, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants' convictions were dismissed except for a one-year sentence reduction for one appellant due to the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence regarding drug quantities.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant appealed his not criminally responsible (NCR) verdict on account of mental disorder, asserting that his guilty pleas were invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial defence counsel, despite the appellant's stated opposition to putting his mental health in issue, unilaterally pursued an NCR disposition by requesting a psychiatric assessment under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The counsel failed to provide effective assistance by stepping outside his role as defence counsel, acting more as a social worker or parent.

The appellant and his parents did not fully understand the implications of an NCR finding on the appellant's liberty interest.

Additionally, the appellant had a potentially viable defence to the arson charge, claiming the fire was accidental, but counsel persuaded him to plead guilty to access the NCR disposition.

The court found the entire process was fundamentally flawed and denied the appellant procedural fairness.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism under s. 162(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for taking still photographs from a live video stream during intimate video chats with the complainant without her knowledge or consent.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the complainant could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy since she willingly appeared nude on camera, and that he did not act "surreptitiously" because the complainant never explicitly objected to screenshots being taken.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and that the appellant acted surreptitiously with the intent that the complainant remain unaware of the recording.

The appellant Crown appealed the acquittal of a high school teacher charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after he used a concealed pen-camera to surreptitiously record female students engaged in ordinary school activities in common areas of the school.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had upheld the acquittal on the basis that the students were not in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, holding that circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 162(1) are circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred, taking into account the entire context.

The majority (Wagner C.J.) adopted a multi-factor contextual test informed by s. 8 Charter jurisprudence, while a concurring minority (Rowe J.) proposed a conjunctive test requiring both loss of control over one's image and infringement of sexual integrity.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after his motorcycle collided with a southbound SUV at an intersection in Toronto, resulting in serious injuries to a pedestrian.

The trial judge sentenced him to 12 months in custody followed by two years' probation, with a five-year prohibition on driving motorcycles.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was inadmissible.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, contending the driving prohibition could not be limited to motorcycles and that the driving lessons requirement was improper.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, dismissed the appellant's sentence appeal with modifications, and allowed the Crown's sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking various drugs, challenging the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant and the trial judge's conclusion that the warrant was validly issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding that while the reasons were imprecise, they were sufficient to permit appellate review when considered in context.

The court found no error in refusing cross-examination on the confidential informant's track record or criminal history, and determined that the information provided by the informant met the Debot criteria for reliability and was sufficiently corroborated to justify the warrant's issuance.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud under $5,000 and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to obtaining a false driver's licence under a false name, which was subsequently presented to police after two car crashes.

The appellant challenged the validity of his guilty plea, arguing it was uninformed, that the facts did not establish the necessary element of "risk of loss or deprivation," that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance as a self-represented litigant, and that the sentencing was inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and dismissed both the appeal and the leave to appeal sentence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated January 26, 2018 (amended February 26, 2018).

The appellant challenged the Board's order regarding his detention and conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision fell within the range of reasonable orders having regard to the totality of evidence and the Board's expertise.

The treating psychiatrist's concerns about the appellant's lack of initiative in addressing medical needs and absence of insight into his condition supported the Board's order to maintain hospital oversight to prevent the appellant from disengaging from treatment and presenting a significant risk of serious harm to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed with leave from a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision dismissing the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on a charge of driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The respondent was stopped by police who were investigating a report of an impaired driver in a pickup truck.

The respondent was driving a different colored pickup truck but was stopped under the Highway Traffic Act for sobriety purposes.

The trial judge found Charter breaches and excluded the breathalyzer evidence and statements.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the stop as an investigative detention rather than a lawful traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court allowed the appeal and entered a conviction.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge after nearly ten years of detention at a psychiatric hospital, while the hospital sought increased security.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety based on her history of assaultive behavior, substance abuse, and recent violent incidents.

However, the court found the Board erred by failing to make mandatory its recommendation for independent professional review and a customized treatment plan aimed at eventual community reintegration, given the appellant's prolonged detention without progress and the risk that continued hospitalization may be counter-therapeutic.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-daughter.

The sole ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that his trial counsel filed a false affidavit in support of a bail review application, failed to prepare him for trial, made incorrect legal arguments, and failed to effectively cross-examine Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown presented an overwhelming case with strong corroborating evidence, including the appellant's confessions to family members, possession of condoms, and his flight from the country.

The court concluded that even without the alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance, the verdict would not have been different and the trial was not rendered unfair.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's declaration that section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the "bail misconduct exclusion," was unconstitutional.

The bail misconduct exclusion restricts pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 (rather than the enhanced 1.5:1 credit) where an accused's bail was cancelled due to alleged misconduct while on release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter as overbroad.

The court found that the legislative purpose of the bail misconduct exclusion—to deter misconduct while on release—is not rationally connected to all of its impacts, particularly where individuals are punished for alleged (rather than proven) misconduct, or where detention results from inability to satisfy a reverse onus rather than actual misconduct.

The appellant was convicted of five firearms offences arising from allegations that he transferred a firearm while on bail for unrelated robbery charges.

He was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months' custody, less 3.92 years' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and sought leave to appeal his sentence, challenging the denial of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code on Charter grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal sentence and adjusted the credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention of a dual-status offender at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2010 for assault on a minor, was convicted in 2015 of assault causing bodily harm on a nurse at a secure forensic hospital and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The Board ordered the appellant serve the remainder of his sentence in a hospital at Waypoint.

The appellant challenged the disposition on multiple grounds, including failure to require testimony from the CECC psychiatrist, failure to require testimony from the Minister, failure to hold a review hearing as soon as practicable, presumption of illness rather than wellness, errors of fact, and failure to explain why detention at Waypoint was the least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered after pleading guilty to carrying a concealed weapon contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had elected to proceed by indictment.

The critical issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to receive the guilty plea.

The appellant was entitled to elect his mode of trial under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code, but was never put to his election.

The court found that the failure to comply with the election requirements went to the jurisdiction of the trial court and could not be cured by the procedural proviso.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to intimidate contrary to section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and two counts of breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant on all counts.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's purpose in attempting to intimidate the complainant was to compel the complainant to abstain from proceeding in public without fear.

The trial judge's findings that the appellant's actions did not make the complainant fearful and the prior friendly relationship between the parties supported an alternative inference that the appellant's purpose was merely to vex, disquiet, or annoy the complainant.

The court also questioned whether "proceeding in public without fear" constitutes a lawful right within the meaning of section 423(1)(b), but declined to address this issue of statutory interpretation as the appeal was disposed of on other grounds.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant had driven across three lanes of oncoming traffic at high speed on a major highway, collided with another vehicle, and crashed into the median.

The appellant argued that the accident may have resulted from falling asleep at the wheel and challenged the trial judge's finding of impairment by alcohol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

While the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the evaporation rate of alcohol, the court applied the proviso, finding that the overwhelming evidence supported the conviction regardless of this error.