Jennifer Joanne Epstein

The Crown appealed a trial judge's declaration that section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the "bail misconduct exclusion" was unconstitutional.

The bail misconduct exclusion restricts pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 (rather than the enhanced 1.5:1 credit) where an accused's bail was cancelled due to alleged misconduct while on release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter as overbroad.

The court found that the legislative purpose of the bail misconduct exclusion—to deter misconduct while on release—is not rationally connected to all of its impacts, particularly where individuals are punished for alleged (rather than proven) misconduct, or where detention results from inability to satisfy a reverse onus rather than actual misconduct.

The appellant was convicted of five firearms offences arising from allegations that he transferred a firearm while on bail for unrelated robbery charges.

He was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months' custody, less 3.92 years' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and sought leave to appeal his sentence, challenging the denial of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code on Charter grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but granted leave to appeal sentence and adjusted the credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention of a dual-status offender at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2010 for assault on a minor, was convicted in 2015 of assault causing bodily harm on a nurse at a secure forensic hospital and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The Board ordered the appellant serve the remainder of his sentence in a hospital at Waypoint.

The appellant challenged the disposition on multiple grounds, including failure to require testimony from the CECC psychiatrist, failure to require testimony from the Minister, failure to hold a review hearing as soon as practicable, presumption of illness rather than wellness, errors of fact, and failure to explain why detention at Waypoint was the least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered after pleading guilty to carrying a concealed weapon contrary to s. 90(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had elected to proceed by indictment.

The critical issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to receive the guilty plea.

The appellant was entitled to elect his mode of trial under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code, but was never put to his election.

The court found that the failure to comply with the election requirements went to the jurisdiction of the trial court and could not be cured by the procedural proviso.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to intimidate contrary to section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and two counts of breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant on all counts.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's purpose in attempting to intimidate the complainant was to compel the complainant to abstain from proceeding in public without fear.

The trial judge's findings that the appellant's actions did not make the complainant fearful and the prior friendly relationship between the parties supported an alternative inference that the appellant's purpose was merely to vex, disquiet, or annoy the complainant.

The court also questioned whether "proceeding in public without fear" constitutes a lawful right within the meaning of section 423(1)(b), but declined to address this issue of statutory interpretation as the appeal was disposed of on other grounds.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant had driven across three lanes of oncoming traffic at high speed on a major highway, collided with another vehicle, and crashed into the median.

The appellant argued that the accident may have resulted from falling asleep at the wheel and challenged the trial judge's finding of impairment by alcohol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

While the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the evaporation rate of alcohol, the court applied the proviso, finding that the overwhelming evidence supported the conviction regardless of this error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's key witness, Bonney, gave inconsistent testimony throughout the trial.

The trial judge permitted the Crown to cross-examine Bonney on a prior statement to police under section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act after finding him adverse.

The appellant challenged the propriety of the Crown's re-examination and the trial judge's acceptance of Bonney's initial testimony.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the re-examination was appropriate and the trial judge properly assessed the evidence.

The conviction on assault with a weapon was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

Joane LaPrise sought to quash her committal to stand trial on charges of fraud over $5,000, money laundering, and possession of proceeds of crime, following a preliminary inquiry.

The application focused on whether there was any evidence that the accused knew or was wilfully blind to the fraudulent enterprise.

The court reviewed the evidence, including the accused's senior role in the companies, her involvement in suspicious financial practices, and her knowledge of misleading information provided to investors.

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find knowledge or wilful blindness, and therefore rejected the application to quash the committal.

An appeal from a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the conviction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituting in its place a conviction for common assault.

The sentence had already been served.