Anne Marie Morphew

The Crown sought to admit a modified summary of cellphone records, replacing phone numbers with the names of the accused, to simplify evidence for the jury.

The accused objected, arguing identity and phone number association were disputed, making the summary prejudicial.

The court ruled that while summaries are generally admissible to clarify evidence, the proposed modified summary was inadmissible as evidence because replacing phone numbers with accused names on a disputed issue of identity would be unfairly prejudicial and amount to impermissible advocacy, potentially misleading the jury.

The Crown could use the summary as an aid in closing arguments but not as evidence.

This endorsement addresses several pre-trial procedural issues in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

The court provides directions on the order of peremptory challenges, the procedure for challenging jurors for cause, disclosure of electronic records and aids (Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoints, maps), and the examination of a key witness, Cassandra Hudson.

The court also sets out non-sitting dates and addresses miscellaneous requests regarding nourishment and clothing exchanges for the accused.

Key rulings include declining to prohibit Crown counsel from preparing a witness and denying a request to videotape witness testimony for discovery purposes.

This endorsement addresses numerous pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder trial involving three accused.

Key rulings include denying the Crown's application for prisoner restraints, dismissing defence applications for accused to sit at counsel table and for an immediate opening statement after the Crown.

The court granted internet access for counsel, denied a challenge to the jury array based on an erroneous questionnaire but outlined vetting procedures, permitted a race-based challenge for cause with specific questions, ordered a 14-member jury with two alternates, and granted the exclusion of unsworn jurors during selection.

Further, the court dismissed an application to exclude cell phone numbers provided to probation officers, granted the introduction of alternate suspect evidence, permitted eyewitness identification evidence regarding males on video, allowed evidence of post-offence conduct (haircut change, phone number changes), and dismissed an application to exclude evidence due to a lost police interview, offering alternative remedies.

An application to admit discreditable conduct evidence against one accused was dismissed, while the Crown was permitted to call a detective multiple times with prior notice.

In a first-degree murder trial, the accused sought an order compelling Crown counsel to provide a draft list of proposed witnesses and a draft order for calling those witnesses by specific dates.

The Crown opposed, arguing against court-directed production.

The court granted the accused's request, asserting its jurisdiction under trial management functions.

The decision emphasized that such disclosure promotes efficiency, fairness, and preparedness for a lengthy jury trial, without prejudicing the Crown, as the lists were merely drafts.

Sharon Baksh pleaded guilty to manslaughter during her second-degree murder trial.

The sentencing hearing considered aggravating factors, including a home invasion, the victim's age (89), and 149 stab wounds, alongside mitigating factors such as her drug/alcohol dependency and troubled childhood.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 12-year custodial sentence, which, after 1.5x credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 7 years, 8 months, and 13 days.

Non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders were also issued.

The respondent was acquitted of impaired driving and over 80 charges after the trial judge granted a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Boudreault by requiring the Crown to prove a realistic risk of danger even when the statutory presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was not rebutted.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, holding that the requirement to prove a realistic risk of danger only arises when the accused has rebutted the statutory presumption.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought an application seeking to admit evidence of discreditable conduct consisting of mail belonging to the deceased that was found in the apartment occupied by the accused and another individual.

The deceased had lived across the hall from the accused and there was no evidence of any relationship that would explain the presence of the deceased’s mail in the accused’s residence.

The court considered whether the evidence was relevant and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Applying the principles governing admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the court found the evidence was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity of the person responsible for the death.

The probative value was found to outweigh any potential prejudice to a fair trial.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking permission to sit at counsel table with defence counsel during a jury trial for second-degree murder rather than in the prisoner’s dock.

The Crown opposed the request, relying on customary courtroom practice and security concerns.

The court reviewed authorities recognizing that the location of the accused in the courtroom is a matter within the trial judge’s discretion and that the traditional use of the dock does not create a presumption of guilt.

Given the absence of flight risk, anticipated violence, or disruption, and considering the modern courtroom setting, the court held that there was no reason to insist on the traditional arrangement.

The accused was therefore permitted to sit beside counsel without restraints in the presence of the jury.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking production of correctional, parole and probation, telephone, and Children's Aid Society records relating to an alleged jailhouse informant expected to testify about admissions to a murder.

Applying the framework from R. v. O’Connor, the court assessed the likely relevance of the records and balanced the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against privacy interests of the witness and other inmates.

The court found the probative value of certain correctional, parole, probation, and limited telephone records outweighed privacy concerns, given the need to scrutinize jailhouse informant evidence.

Limited disclosure with redactions was ordered, while Children's Aid Society records were withheld.

Strict conditions were imposed governing use, disclosure, and eventual destruction of the records.

The accused was charged with sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and forcible confinement arising from an attack on a child in a public park in 1997.

The Crown relied heavily on DNA evidence obtained from semen found on the complainant’s clothing, which was later matched to the accused after his DNA was entered into the national databank following a later conviction.

The defence argued that the DNA could have been transferred indirectly and invoked the framework in R. v. W.(D.), asserting reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the accused’s account that his semen was deposited during consensual sex in a different area of the park and found the theory implausible and unsupported by evidence.

The judge concluded that the DNA continuity and analysis were reliable and that speculative alternative explanations could not raise a reasonable doubt.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of the right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter due to missing police notes and investigative materials in a historical sexual assault prosecution.

The defence argued that the loss of notes from several investigating officers and the absence of photo lineup materials impaired the ability to challenge the investigation.

The court applied the principles governing lost evidence from R. v. La and related jurisprudence, considering whether the evidence was relevant, whether its loss resulted from unacceptable negligence, and whether the accused suffered actual prejudice.

The court concluded that the substance of the allegedly missing evidence was preserved through existing reports, testimony, and other documentation, and that the missing materials were either irrelevant or duplicated elsewhere.

No prejudice to the ability to make full answer and defence was established and no Charter breach occurred.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons, reached an unreasonable verdict, misapprehended evidence concerning opportunity and post-incident circumstances, and misapplied the W.(D.) framework.

The court held that, although brief, the reasons were sufficient when read in the context of the evidence and submissions, and adequately disclosed why the trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence and rejected the denial evidence.

The court further held that the verdict was supported by the record, no material misapprehension of evidence was shown, and the trial judge properly applied the criminal burden of proof and the W.(D.) principles.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related kidnapping and robbery.

At trial, two key Crown witnesses recanted their prior statements inculpating the appellants.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework but refused to allow defence counsel to cross-examine one of the witnesses on her statement after it was admitted.

The trial judge also admitted the entire transcript of a co-accused's guilty plea proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by denying the defence the right to cross-examine the witness on her prior statement and by admitting the guilty plea proceedings where cross-examination was limited by solicitor-client privilege and the statement contained inadmissible hearsay.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and kidnapping and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his alleged involvement in planning the offences as an aggravating factor, despite it not being proven by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant was outside the store when the offences were initiated.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal criminal convictions entered following guilty pleas, arguing he was unaware that the convictions would trigger deportation proceedings under immigration law.

Applying the factors governing extensions of time for criminal appeals, the court considered whether the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal, whether the delay was adequately explained, and whether the proposed appeal had merit.

The court found that the applicant only became aware of the immigration consequences months after the conviction and reasonably formed an intention to appeal once informed of the risk of deportation.

Although the applicant initially benefited from the plea and some factors weighed against relief, the court concluded that the potential deportation consequences and possible issues with the voluntariness and unequivocal nature of the plea raised an arguable appeal.

The extension of time to file a notice of appeal was granted.

The appellant appealed from convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding online communications, and failed to properly consider inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate under the Dinardo standard, no misapprehension of evidence, and no error in the trial judge's treatment of inconsistencies.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.