Rosalind Eve Conway

The offender was convicted by a jury of assault and assault causing bodily harm against his former intimate partner.

The assaults occurred years apart, with one resulting in fractured ribs.

The Crown sought six to eight months of incarceration, while the offender sought a non-custodial or intermittent sentence.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the court sentenced the offender to 122 days in custody followed by two years of probation.

The applicants, Valdrin Basha and Anton Dokaj, jointly charged with drug and firearms offences, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court found that the total delay for Basha (29 months and 10 days) and Dokaj (28 months) fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court determined that neither applicant demonstrated that the case took "markedly longer to conclude than it should have" or that the delay caused significant prejudice beyond the inherent nature of the charges.

The court also rejected Dokaj's argument regarding severance, finding that trying the co-accused together was in the interests of justice due to overlapping evidence and the risk of inconsistent verdicts.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding eighty milligrams per one hundred millilitres of blood.

The sole issue was whether breath samples taken by an approved technician using an Intoxilyzer 8000C were taken "as soon as practicable" after the alleged offence, as required by the Criminal Code for the statutory presumption to apply.

The defendant argued the tests were delayed by approximately 22 minutes to allow consultation with counsel, despite his initial waiver of the right to counsel, and by approximately 28 minutes in notifying the technician.

The court found the Crown established the tests were taken as soon as practicable and convicted the defendant.

The appellant appealed from convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding online communications, and failed to properly consider inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate under the Dinardo standard, no misapprehension of evidence, and no error in the trial judge's treatment of inconsistencies.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

Sentencing decision following convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a child under the offender’s care.

The offender compelled the child to perform oral sex and threatened her with death if she refused, constituting a serious breach of trust by a person acting in a parental role.

The court considered aggravating factors including the offender’s position of trust, threats used to compel the sexual act, and the psychological impact on the complainant, while recognizing the offender’s lack of prior criminal record as a mitigating factor.

The court also addressed whether time spent on bail with a curfew should reduce the custodial sentence and concluded that such conditions warranted minimal credit.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence and reviewing comparable appellate authorities, the court imposed a four‑year custodial sentence with credit for pre‑trial custody and several ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter.

The trial judge found the appellant unlawfully entered the victim's home and committed mischief by causing damage during entry.

However, the trial judge failed to determine whether the appellant intended to commit an indictable offence at the time of entry, which was a significant issue with a clear factual dispute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the necessary findings of fact regarding intent were not made.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on two counts of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent lost control of his vehicle, striking a concrete pillar and killing two passengers.

The trial judge found the only evidence was excessive speed and, relying on R. v. Pezzo, concluded speed alone could not ground a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in law, clarifying that excessive speed can constitute dangerous driving depending on the context.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the effects of intoxication and the common sense inference, as well as errors in the Crown's re-examination of the complainant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no significant error in the jury charge and agreeing with the Court of Appeal that any error in the re-examination did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.