Christa Reccord

The appellant, Kensky Dautruche, appealed two convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the validity of a vehicle search incident to arrest for flight from police under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the trial judge's inference regarding the appellant's possession of cocaine found outside the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the search was a valid search incident to arrest, as the officer had a reasonable subjective belief that the search might uncover evidence explaining the flight.

The court also determined that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial judge's inference of possession of the second bag of cocaine, finding it to be the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

This is an appeal from convictions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for aiding or abetting persons to possess a passport to contravene the Act and aiding or abetting illegal entry into Canada.

The appellant drove individuals to a border crossing, presenting Canadian passports that did not match the individuals, with Nigerian passports subsequently found.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of lay opinion identification evidence from border services officers, arguing a voir dire was required.

The Court of Appeal found no voir dire was necessary, as the evidence constituted admissible lay opinion based on direct observations.

The appellant also argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, which the Court found to be an error in narration, not substance, and thus not warranting appellate intervention.

Finally, the Court dismissed the unreasonable verdict argument, finding the circumstantial evidence of guilt overwhelming.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

Specifically, the court upheld the trial judge's use of the appellant's general drug trafficking activities (including marijuana) as relevant to his involvement in cocaine trafficking, her holistic consideration of circumstantial evidence for constructive possession, and her rejection of speculative defence theories in the absence of the appellant's testimony.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

He appealed his convictions on grounds of Charter delay under s. 11(b), arguing the trial judge erred in applying the law of reasonable doubt, and contending his conviction for drug possession was inconsistent with his acquittal on firearm possession charges.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the delay was reasonable in the transitional post-Jordan context, the convictions were supported by evidence, and the sentence, though lenient, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's secondary role in the drug enterprise and rehabilitative efforts.

The applicants sought disclosure of the complete investigative file relating to a homicide investigation that formed the basis for wiretap authorizations under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing that materials not explicitly relied upon in the Information to Obtain were irrelevant and protected by public interest privilege.

The court held that the accused's right to make full answer and defence applies to pre-trial evidentiary hearings, including Garofoli applications.

The court established that materials in the "investigative file" are presumptively relevant and should be disclosed, defined as all materials accumulated by the investigating agency as a consequence of its investigative efforts in the investigation giving rise to the authorization itself.

The court ordered disclosure of specified materials from the homicide investigation file, subject to redactions protecting informer privilege, while declining to order disclosure of the entire investigative file to prevent needless complexity.

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possessing proceeds of crime.

The evidence was obtained through a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code, which authorized covert entry into a leased unit to locate and observe narcotics.

The appellant appealed on grounds relating to the jury charge and the validity of the general warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the general warrant was improperly issued as it was used to circumvent the more stringent requirements of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act s. 11 warrant.

The court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The applicant, Anton Dokaj, moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of drug trafficking, firearm offences, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown alleged constructive joint possession of drugs and a firearm found in an apartment unit and a vehicle, and aiding or abetting in drug transactions.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including Dokaj's identification found in the apartment, his driver's license in a related vehicle, his association with co-accused Basha, and his presence at the apartment building.

Applying the standard for a directed verdict, the court found that the evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of Dokaj's constructive joint possession and aiding or abetting.

The motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was dismissed.

The applicants, Valdrin Basha and Anton Dokaj, jointly charged with drug and firearms offences, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court found that the total delay for Basha (29 months and 10 days) and Dokaj (28 months) fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court determined that neither applicant demonstrated that the case took "markedly longer to conclude than it should have" or that the delay caused significant prejudice beyond the inherent nature of the charges.

The court also rejected Dokaj's argument regarding severance, finding that trying the co-accused together was in the interests of justice due to overlapping evidence and the risk of inconsistent verdicts.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.