8 total
The court denied the defence's request to cross-examine a police officer on prior adverse judicial findings from an unrelated case due to lack of relevance and probative value.
The court considered whether the defence could cross-examine Constable Ali Sabeeh on prior negative judicial findings made against him in an unrelated case (R. v. Uniat) to challenge his credibility and establish a pattern of Charter breaches.
The court reviewed the legal framework for admitting such evidence, including the need for a high degree of similarity and a proper evidentiary foundation.
Ultimately, the court found that the prior findings in Uniat were of marginal relevance and that their prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.
The application to cross-examine on those findings was dismissed, but the defence was permitted to explore the officer’s training on Charter issues.
Drug evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and misleading police testimony.
The court considered whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Hassan Ozeir for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.
The court found that police lacked such grounds, as their observations of Ozeir were consistent with benign behaviour and did not match the pattern of drug trafficking described by tipsters or observed in relation to his brother, Yousef Ozeir.
The court concluded that the arrest and subsequent search violated sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.
The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) due to the seriousness of the Charter breach and misleading police testimony.
An accused's guilty plea is valid and informed if they were advised of their trial rights by a different judge shortly before entering the plea.
The appellant sought to strike his guilty plea for tax evasion, arguing the sentencing judge failed to adequately inform him he was waiving his right to a trial where the Crown bore the burden of proof.
The Court of Appeal found that a different judge had already provided this information four days prior to the plea, and the appellant was fully aware of the implications of his plea.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The court also noted that by pleading guilty, the appellant waived his right to challenge a prior Charter application decision.
Evidence of drug trafficking was excluded and the accused acquitted after police unjustifiably used a dynamic entry.
This criminal trial addressed charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.
The accused challenged the manner of police entry into his residence, arguing it breached his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The court found that the police's dynamic, no-knock entry was unjustified, as they failed to conduct an individualized assessment of risks (e.g., presence of a child, specific threat of weapons) and operated under a blanket assumption that dynamic entry is warranted in drug trafficking cases, which is contrary to established law.
This constituted serious police misconduct and a significant impact on the accused's privacy interests.
Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence obtained from the search, leading to acquittals on all remaining charges.
Charter applications to exclude evidence dismissed; search warrant and arrest found lawful.
The accused brought two Charter applications seeking to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at an apartment unit.
He argued the warrant lacked facial and subfacial validity, and that his arrest amounted to arbitrary detention.
The court dismissed both applications, finding the warrant was properly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds of drug trafficking, the arrest was lawful, and there were no material omissions that would invalidate the warrant.
The accused was sentenced to 7 months imprisonment and 18 months probation for possessing crack cocaine for non-commercial trafficking and breaching probation, with the court considering his addiction and systemic racism.
The accused was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (not for commercial purpose) contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and breaching a probation order contrary to s. 733.1 of the Criminal Code.
The sentencing hearing considered the accused's personal background, including ADHD and learning disabilities diagnosed at a young age, exposure to racism, family instability, and addiction issues.
The court rejected the Crown's submission that the accused's incomplete participation in rehabilitation programming should be treated as an aggravating factor.
The court imposed a sentence of 7 months imprisonment (with credit for pre-trial custody and residential programming already served), followed by 18 months of probation with conditions including drug counselling, school attendance or employment, and community service.
A mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition was imposed.
Application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter dismissed; mistrial deemed an exceptional circumstance.
The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.
The total time from the charges to the anticipated end of the second trial was 53 months.
The court deducted 10 months of defence delay and 11 months of delay caused by a mistrial, which was deemed an exceptional circumstance.
The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.
The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.
The court dismissed the motion for a directed verdict, finding sufficient evidence of constructive possession.
The applicant, Anton Dokaj, moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on charges of drug trafficking, firearm offences, and possession of proceeds of crime.
The Crown alleged constructive joint possession of drugs and a firearm found in an apartment unit and a vehicle, and aiding or abetting in drug transactions.
The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including Dokaj's identification found in the apartment, his driver's license in a related vehicle, his association with co-accused Basha, and his presence at the apartment building.
Applying the standard for a directed verdict, the court found that the evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of Dokaj's constructive joint possession and aiding or abetting.
The motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was dismissed.