Anne Marie Morphew

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.

The applicant, S.B., sought a s. 525 bail review for serious charges including attempt murder and firearm offences, having been in custody for over 90 days without a bail hearing.

The defence proposed a release plan involving residential and back-up sureties, and electronic monitoring, citing COVID-19 risks and potential trial delays.

The Crown opposed, citing S.B.'s extensive criminal record, including 14 breach-type offences and a manslaughter conviction, and the overwhelming evidence against him.

The court found the proposed supervision plan insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of S.B. reoffending and determined that his continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, despite the acknowledged risks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities and the possibility of trial delays.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 99(2) and s. 99(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court declined to hold a full hearing on s. 99(2)(a), ruling that prior declarations of constitutional invalidity by judges of coordinate jurisdiction rendered the provision of no force and effect, and it would be inappropriate to reconsider whether those decisions were plainly wrong.

The challenge to s. 99(3) was dismissed as moot because the applicant was not being sentenced for an offence under that section.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's calculation of defence delay, noting that defence counsel was unavailable for 17 blocks of trial dates offered by the court.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the appellant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The appeal was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application requesting that the Court call two third-party suspects as witnesses, or alternatively, permit the defence to call and cross-examine them.

The court declined to call the witnesses itself, finding it unnecessary and potentially disruptive to the adversarial process.

However, the court exercised its common law discretion to permit the defence to cross-examine the witnesses on specific topics, noting that the provisions of section 9 of the Canada Evidence Act were inadequate for this situation.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit expert evidence from a Brazilian Jiu Jitsu practitioner regarding the mechanics and effects of blood chokeholds.

The Crown theorized that the accused used a rear naked choke to kill the victim, explaining the lack of structural damage to her neck.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and the Abbey two-step process to assess the admissibility of the evidence.

The court found that the evidence had low probative value because there was insufficient evidence connecting the accused to martial arts training, and high prejudicial effect.

Furthermore, the court held that evidence regarding the physiological effects of chokeholds should be introduced by medical experts, not a martial arts practitioner.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to determine the admissibility of rebuttal evidence in response to the defence's allegations of inadequate police investigation in a murder trial.

The court provided general guidelines, ruling that the reviewing officer could not give opinion or hearsay evidence about the original investigation, but could testify about his own investigative steps.

The court also made specific rulings on several areas of challenge, deferring a decision on the admissibility of the accused's bad character evidence regarding firearms until later in the trial.

This decision addresses the judge's proposed opening comments and jury selection procedures for a first-degree murder trial.

The judge adopted several suggestions from counsel, including referring to the accused as "defendant" and strongly emphasizing that jurors must not conduct external research.

The judge also accepted defence counsel's request to defer their opening statement and for potential jurors with knowledge of the case to submit written notes.

The judge declined to remove all references to the elements of the offence from the opening comments, affirming their general inclusion.

The accused, Michael Ball, brought a pre-trial application seeking evidentiary rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning third-party involvement in the death or disposal of the body of Erin Howlett, and the adequacy of the police investigation.

The court found that evidence suggesting third parties were present at Howlett's death or assisted in disposing of her body was admissible, as it could raise reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt, even if not directly alleging they caused the death.

The court also affirmed the defence's right to challenge the police investigation's adequacy, including specific failures to investigate third parties or conduct certain tests.

The accused, Michael Ball, is charged with first-degree murder.

In this pre-trial application, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of ante mortem statements made by the deceased, Erin Howlett.

The defence also sought a ruling on the admissibility of certain statements, some for the truth of their contents (hearsay) and others for non-hearsay purposes (original evidence).

The court ruled on the admissibility of various statements, excluding double hearsay, statements about the deceased's job loss due to "money gone missing" due to high prejudice and low probative value, and limiting the use of false statements about studying to be a financial planner to assessing credibility and corroborating the accused's police statement, not as evidence of other plans.

The accused, Michael Ball, charged with first-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of a statement made to police.

Police staged a break-in at Ball's residence, removed firearms, and left a threatening note linking him to the murder.

Ball reported the break-in and the note, leading to an interview where he was cautioned but felt compelled to speak due to statutory obligations (reporting stolen firearms) and perceived threats.

The court found that police tactics, including creating an aura of violence and using statutory compulsion, breached Ball's s.7 Charter rights (right to silence, principle against self-incrimination).

The court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s.24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown applied under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code for a pre-trial ruling from the first trial (which ended in a mistrial) to be binding on the second trial.

The prior ruling by Justice Taylor found the accused's statement to police voluntary and admissible, but did not address a Charter s. 7 issue.

The accused sought to raise a s. 7 Charter challenge regarding the statement at the second trial.

The court, applying factors from R. v. Victoria, found it would not be in the interests of justice to bind the second trial to the prior ruling, as new Charter arguments were being advanced, and the public interest in a serious criminal case warranted hearing constitutional concerns on their merits.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence of two unavailable witnesses under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

One witness was too ill to testify, which the defence conceded.

The other witness had left Canada and was evading his subpoena.

The court found that the witness was absent from Canada and that it was not feasible to take his evidence via video link.

Balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential trial unfairness, the court admitted the preliminary inquiry evidence, noting the defence could lead evidence regarding the witness's credibility.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application for the production of third-party medical records belonging to a key Crown witness.

The court found that the witness's credibility was central to the case and that there was an evidentiary link between the witness's mental health history and his reliability.

Balancing the witness's reasonable expectation of privacy against the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the court ordered the production of specific hospital records relating to the witness's psychiatric and substance abuse complaints.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondents on charges of first degree murder.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed one respondent for second degree murder and the other for accessory after the fact, concluding there was 'no evidence' of planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by concluding there was no evidence, rather than insufficient evidence, given the circumstantial evidence of the respondents following the deceased and shooting him.

The application was granted, the discharges quashed, and the matter remitted with a direction to commit both respondents for first degree murder.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a change of venue for his re-trial.

In his first trial, the jury convicted him of causing an indignity to a body but could not reach a verdict on the murder charge, resulting in a mistrial.

The applicant argued that extensive pre-trial publicity regarding the 'split verdict' created a likelihood of prejudice in the local area.

Relying on expert evidence regarding the effects of pre-trial publicity, the court found that knowledge of the first trial's outcome would likely taint a new jury's ability to be impartial, as it implied the first jury rejected the accused's evidence.

The application was granted and the venue was ordered changed.

During a criminal trial, the accused sought to introduce the contents of text messages from cell phone records to show he was not the user of a specific phone number, arguing the messages were circumstantial evidence and not hearsay.

The Crown objected.

The court held that the text messages were implied assertions being tendered for the truth of their contents, and therefore constituted presumptively inadmissible hearsay.

The court further found that the messages did not meet the criteria of necessity and reliability under the principled exception to hearsay, as they were devoid of context and the declarants were unavailable for cross-examination.

The application to instruct the jury on a non-hearsay use was dismissed.

In a jury trial on a first degree murder indictment arising from a planned drug-related shooting, the court issued written reasons addressing objections to the jury charge and counsel's closings.

The court held that an out-of-court statement about a distinctive licence plate was inadmissible for its truth because it was hearsay and did not meet the excited utterance exception.

The court also gave a strong Hay warning on weak police identification evidence, ruled that haircut evidence lacked probative value as after-the-fact conduct, and corrected improper closing submissions by both Crown and defence where they exceeded the evidentiary record.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused of manslaughter and acquitted the third.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the trial judge ruled on several motions.

The judge excused a prospective juror for obvious partiality under s. 632(c) of the Criminal Code.

A motion to sever one of the co-accused due to his counsel's illness was dismissed, as the jury was willing to wait and the public interest favoured a joint trial.

The judge also dismissed a Charter application alleging that the consumption of a DNA negative control by the Centre of Forensic Sciences breached the accused's rights, finding the control was an analytical tool rather than first-party disclosure.

Finally, a request for a mid-trial instruction regarding an in-dock identification was denied, with the judge opting to provide a general warning about eyewitness identification instead.

The Crown and defence brought multiple pre-trial motions in a first-degree murder case.

The court ruled on various procedural and evidentiary issues, including denying the Crown's request to shackle the accused and the defence's request to sit at counsel table.

The court permitted the defence to introduce alternate suspect evidence, finding an air of reality to the claim.

The court allowed the Crown to introduce post-offence conduct evidence regarding changes in hairstyle and phone numbers, but excluded bad character evidence regarding prior firearm possession due to its prejudicial effect.

The court also found a section 7 Charter breach due to the police's unacceptable negligence in losing a witness interview DVD, but ordered alternative remedies rather than excluding the witness's evidence.