Stephanie Dickson

The defendant, charged with historical sexual offences against his daughter, applied under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of the complainant's previous inconsistent statements regarding the paternity of a miscarried pregnancy.

The Crown concurrently applied under the Kinamore framework to introduce evidence of the complainant's sexual inactivity and bleeding during the alleged first assault.

The court granted the defendant's application, finding the previous statements significantly probative to the charge of sexual assault causing bodily harm.

The court partially granted the Crown's application, admitting evidence of the bleeding and sexual inactivity, but excluding the complainant's lay opinion that the bleeding was caused by a ruptured hymen and evidence of her virginity due to lack of competence and potential prejudice.

The defendant, charged with historical sexual offences against his daughter, applied under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of a statement the complainant made to a roommate about being sexually abused by a peer.

The defendant argued the statement was relevant to show animus and as a prior inconsistent statement.

The court found the statement had no probative value as a prior inconsistent statement but had significant probative value as evidence of animus towards the defendant, providing a potential motive to fabricate.

The court concluded that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice and allowed the application to cross-examine the complainant on the statement for the limited purpose of demonstrating animus.

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting the complainant to testify via CCTV from outside the courtroom.

The complainant, who alleged sexual offences by the accused, suffered from Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and experienced severe anxiety when testifying in the visual presence of the accused.

The court found that the Crown established on a balance of probabilities that the complainant may have difficulty communicating her evidence due to a mental disability.

The application was granted.

The Crown applied for permission to introduce similar fact evidence in a case involving six charges of sexual touching and extortion of a nude photograph.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the defendant attempted to obtain a nude photograph from the complainant's friend (extrinsic similar fact evidence) and to have evidence relating to the photograph charges admitted in support of the sexual touching charges (cross-count similar fact evidence).

The court granted the extrinsic similar fact evidence application but denied the cross-count similar fact evidence application, finding insufficient probative value in the latter.

Norman Ellis pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation under section 153(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the sentence should be served in custody or in the community.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence; the defence sought less than two years to allow for a conditional sentence.

The court reviewed the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles, ultimately imposing a five-year custodial sentence.

The decision discusses the gravity of sexual offences against minors, the impact on the victim, and the unavailability of a conditional sentence in these circumstances.

The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on two counts of trafficking in a scheduled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown subsequently preferred an indictment that included two counts of trafficking in a substance held out to be a scheduled substance, based on the same underlying facts.

The accused brought a motion to quash these counts, arguing they were the same offences for which he had been discharged.

The court agreed, finding that trafficking is a single offence that can be committed in different ways, and therefore the Crown could not prefer an indictment for these charges under section 574 of the Criminal Code.

The application was granted and the counts were quashed.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 37.4 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 33 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating exceptional circumstances or reasonable efforts to mitigate the delay.

The court found no specific link between the delay and the COVID-19 pandemic as argued by the Crown.

Consequently, the application was granted, and the charges were stayed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, brought a Charter motion under s. 24(1) seeking an individual exemption from mandatory registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA).

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ndhlovu, which struck down mandatory registration but suspended the declaration of invalidity, the applicant argued the registration was overbroad and grossly disproportionate to his circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant did not fall into the lowest risk category of offenders and failed to establish that the impacts of registration on his liberty were grossly disproportionate to the objective of preventing and investigating sexual offences.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting an incapacitated Indigenous woman on his front porch.

The Crown sought a sentence of four years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence or eight to twelve months of incarceration.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's prior record for domestic violence and the extreme vulnerability of the victim.

The offender was sentenced to 30 months of incarceration, along with DNA, firearms, and sex offender registry orders.