Stephanie Dickson

The Crown applied for permission to introduce similar fact evidence in a case involving six charges of sexual touching and extortion of a nude photograph.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that the defendant attempted to obtain a nude photograph from the complainant's friend (extrinsic similar fact evidence) and to have evidence relating to the photograph charges admitted in support of the sexual touching charges (cross-count similar fact evidence).

The court granted the extrinsic similar fact evidence application but denied the cross-count similar fact evidence application, finding insufficient probative value in the latter.

Norman Ellis pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation under section 153(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the sentence should be served in custody or in the community.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence; the defence sought less than two years to allow for a conditional sentence.

The court reviewed the facts, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles, ultimately imposing a five-year custodial sentence.

The decision discusses the gravity of sexual offences against minors, the impact on the victim, and the unavailability of a conditional sentence in these circumstances.

The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on two counts of trafficking in a scheduled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown subsequently preferred an indictment that included two counts of trafficking in a substance held out to be a scheduled substance, based on the same underlying facts.

The accused brought a motion to quash these counts, arguing they were the same offences for which he had been discharged.

The court agreed, finding that trafficking is a single offence that can be committed in different ways, and therefore the Crown could not prefer an indictment for these charges under section 574 of the Criminal Code.

The application was granted and the counts were quashed.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 37.4 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 33 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating exceptional circumstances or reasonable efforts to mitigate the delay.

The court found no specific link between the delay and the COVID-19 pandemic as argued by the Crown.

Consequently, the application was granted, and the charges were stayed.