Dirk Derstein

The accused was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for shooting the victim.

The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The court noted that this was the accused's second first-degree murder conviction, but due to the Supreme Court's decision in Bissonnette, consecutive periods of parole ineligibility could not be imposed.

The court also ordered a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a lifetime non-communication order with the victim's family and a key witness.

The respondent brought a motion seeking to dismiss the applicant's spousal support claim on the basis that she did not meet the definition of "spouse" under the Family Law Act.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for interim disbursements.

The court dismissed the applicant's adjournment request, finding she had ample time to secure counsel.

Applying the Hryniak v. Hryniak summary judgment framework, the court determined that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the threshold question of whether the applicant was a spouse.

Based on extensive objective evidence, including the parties' statutory declaration for immigration purposes, tax returns, driver's licenses, and third-party affidavits, the court found that the parties did not cohabit continuously for three years and did not otherwise meet the definition of "spouse" as interpreted by the Molodowich v. Penttinen factors.

The court noted significant credibility issues with the applicant's evidence.

Consequently, the respondent's motion was granted, and the applicant's claims were dismissed.

This ruling addresses a defence application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The Crown contended there was ample evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the accused's identity, the execution-style nature of the killing, the use of a getaway vehicle, efforts to conceal identity, and post-offence conduct suggesting prior knowledge of legal rules, from which a jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the trial proceeded on the first-degree murder charge.

The accused, Saaid Mohiadin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a mid-trial application to exclude bank records due to late disclosure, arguing a violation of his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown sought to admit the records to corroborate a key witness's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while disclosure was not ideal, it did not render the trial unfair, and any potential prejudice could be remedied by recalling the witness for further cross-examination.

The court emphasized that exclusion of evidence for late disclosure is reserved for exceptional cases where no other remedy suffices.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to be permitted to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming the traditional functional approach to courtroom seating.

The judge balanced fair trial interests, including the presumption of innocence, with courtroom security concerns and the need for the jury to clearly observe the accused, especially given that identification was a main issue in the case.

The court emphasized that clear jury instructions can mitigate any perceived prejudice from the accused's placement and noted the accused's significant criminal record and institutional misconduct as legitimate security concerns.