Gabriel Gross-Stein

The offender was sentenced after convictions for child luring, making sexually explicit material available to a person believed to be underage, and possession of child pornography arising from prolonged online communications with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old and similar communications with other purported underage girls.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, particularly in light of Friesen, but gave meaningful weight to rehabilitation, the offender's very low assessed risk of reoffending, autism spectrum disorder, severe depression and anxiety, and sustained therapeutic engagement.

Although the court found a fit sentence to be less than two years, it rejected a conditional sentence as inconsistent with the gravity of the offences and the offender's moral blameworthiness.

A custodial sentence of two years less a day followed by two years' probation was imposed, with tailored ancillary orders including a limited s. 161 prohibition, DNA order, lifetime SOIRA order, and forfeiture of the laptop.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter following a public shooting outside a nightclub.

The offender, who was involved in drug trafficking and habitually carried a firearm, shot and killed an innocent peacemaker and then shot and killed a second victim who attempted to prevent his escape.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with an 18-year period of parole ineligibility for the second degree murder, and a concurrent 15-year sentence for the manslaughter, emphasizing denunciation and the aggravating factor of the offender's involvement in the drug trade.

The accused, Tanade Mohamed, shot and killed two men in a nightclub parking lot following a minor altercation.

He claimed self-defence and provocation for the first victim, and accident for the second.

The co-accused, Abdirisaq Ali, drove the getaway vehicle and was charged as a party to the offences.

The court rejected Mohamed's claims of self-defence and provocation, finding him guilty of second-degree murder for the first victim.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his intent to kill the second victim, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges, as the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his prior knowledge of the shooter's intentions.

The applicants, charged with two counts of second-degree murder following a nightclub shooting, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence.

The police had obtained the applicants' names and contact information from their banks without a warrant, claiming exigent circumstances due to the fleeing armed suspects.

The court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter, noting the applicants had a diminished expectation of privacy in the 'tombstone' banking information.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith with an honest belief in exigent circumstances and that exclusion would significantly harm the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault, sexual assault, mischief, and breach of recognizance against his former intimate partner.

The trial turned on credibility, with the complainant alleging non-consensual sexual acts and physical abuse, while the accused denied the sexual assaults and claimed the physical altercations were justified or exaggerated.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence and accepted the complainant's testimony regarding the physical assaults and the first sexual assault.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the second sexual assault due to inconsistencies in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting.

The accused was found guilty on seven counts and acquitted on one count of sexual assault.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by Adekunle Johnson Omitiran, who was convicted of sophisticated credit card fraud and sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment and a significant restitution order.

The applicant, with a history of similar frauds and breaches of court orders, argued for release based on arguable grounds of appeal, a non-violent record, a substantial release plan, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown opposed, emphasizing the weak grounds of appeal, the seriousness of the offences, the applicant's recidivism, and the unlikelihood of serving the full sentence before appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while the grounds of appeal were "not frivolous" they were weak.

The decision primarily turned on the public interest factor under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the applicant's history of repeat offending, disregard for court orders, and the serious nature of the financial crimes, especially in the current economic climate, outweighed the reviewability interest.

The proposed release plan and surety were deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk of reoffending.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of two unidentified cell phone calls made to the victim moments before he stepped outside and was shot.

The Crown argued the calls supported the theory that the victim was lured to an ambush.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding no direct or indirect evidence connecting the calls to the accused.

The court held that inferring the calls lured the victim outside, contrary to family testimony that he went to buy juice, would be based on impermissible speculation and conjecture.

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on first and second degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue and the applicants' presence near the scene, to prove identity and intent.

The court found sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to infer that both applicants were involved in an intentional killing as either principal or aider/abettor.

However, the court concluded there was no evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The applications were allowed in part, with the court directing verdicts of acquittal on first degree murder and ordering the trial to proceed on second degree murder.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm without a licence, possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order, and possession for the purpose of trafficking crack cocaine.

The offences occurred during a civic holiday weekend in downtown Toronto when the accused robbed an American tourist at gunpoint near Union Station.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 7 years, while the defence sought 5 years and 2 months with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdown conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years and 5 months, less pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a remaining sentence of 4 years and 5 months.

The court also imposed a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

At a preliminary inquiry into the deaths of Tyler McLean and Zemarai Khan Mohammed, who were shot outside the Rebel nightclub on October 1, 2017, the Crown sought committal of both accused on murder charges.

Tanade Mohamed conceded committal on two counts of second-degree murder as the alleged shooter.

Abdirisaq Ali, who drove the vehicle from which the shots were fired, contested committal and sought to be committed only as an accessory after the fact.

The court found that while the accessory provisions captured Ali's involvement, there was a reasonable inference that Ali knew Mohamed had a gun and intended to assist in the murders, based on Ali's conduct in positioning the vehicle, waiting in the parking lot, and fleeing the scene.

The court committed both accused to stand trial on two counts of second-degree murder.

The accused, charged with drug possession for trafficking, brought applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence (drugs and statements) obtained from a motel room.

The Crown also sought a ruling on the voluntariness of an accused's statement.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: police entered the motel room without informed consent, conducted a warrantless search, and breached the right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the court held a pre-charge discussion to determine whether the lesser included offences of manslaughter and second-degree murder should be left to the jury.

The Crown argued that neither should be left, while the defence argued both should be available.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found no evidentiary foundation for manslaughter, as the forensic evidence indicated a targeted killing with no signs of a fight gone wrong.

However, the court found a gasping air of reality to second-degree murder, as a properly instructed jury could find the accused had the intent to kill but have a reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation.

Consequently, second-degree murder was left to the jury, but manslaughter was not.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the defence requested a jury instruction that the accused's after-the-fact conduct of attempting to collect the deceased's life insurance and death benefits had no probative value.

The Crown argued the conduct was relevant to the financial motive for the murder.

The court dismissed the defence's request, finding that the post-offence conduct was directly relevant to motive, which in turn was circumstantially relevant to the identity of the killers.

The court declined to give a 'no probative value' instruction.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce ante-mortem statements made by the deceased to demonstrate his state of mind and the accused's motive to kill.

The defence objected to the viva voce evidence of five witnesses and a Facebook thread, arguing they failed the test of necessity and were not material to motive.

The court ruled the statements admissible, finding they fell under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were not introduced for the truth of their contents.

The court also held the statements were material to establishing motive and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, subject to minor redactions.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to exclude sworn jurors from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process using rotating triers.

The Crown argued that recent appellate jurisprudence eliminated the trial judge's inherent jurisdiction to exclude sworn jurors.

The court held that it retained the common law discretion to exclude sworn jurors, as the Criminal Code is silent on the matter.

The court exercised its discretion to exclude the sworn jurors to prevent them from sitting idly in court for up to a week while the remainder of the jury was selected, which would diminish respect for the process.

The applicants, sought for extradition, applied for disclosure of U.S. customs and Canadian police notes, Information to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants and production orders, and communications between prosecutors.

They alleged breaches of Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to warrantless searches and non-compliance with seizure reporting, and abuse of process (s. 7) regarding the timing of Canadian charge withdrawals.

The court found an air of reality to the s. 8 claims regarding the initial warrantless border search of electronic devices and the failure to comply with s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code, ordering disclosure of the notes and ITOs.

However, the s. 9 argument regarding arrest and the s. 7 abuse of process claim lacked an air of reality, and disclosure of prosecutorial communications was denied.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act and was assisted by his brother-in-law, an unlicensed non-lawyer, in proceedings before a justice of the peace.

A stay of proceedings was granted due to the prosecutor's failure to provide proper disclosure in violation of Charter rights.

On appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice, the appeal judge refused to permit the brother-in-law to continue representing the appellant based on general concerns about non-licensed persons representing defendants in provincial offence matters.

The appeal judge set aside the stay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the appeal judge erred by failing to apply the proper legal test for disqualifying a representative and by relying on a blanket concern rather than examining the particular circumstances and competence of the representative.

The appellants were convicted of possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a jury trial.

They appealed on four grounds: (1) breach of s. 11(b) Charter rights to trial within a reasonable time; (2) erroneous admission of expert opinion evidence from a police officer involved in the investigation; (3) an unreasonable Corbett ruling excluding certain prior convictions; and (4) unfairness in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the defence witness.

The Court of Appeal rejected the s. 11(b) argument but found merit in the other three grounds, concluding that the cumulative effect of these errors denied the appellants a fair trial.

The applicant sought bail pending the Minister's surrender decision in an extradition matter.

The applicant had been convicted in absentia in Illinois in 2004 for drug trafficking and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

He fled to Jamaica and subsequently immigrated to Canada in 2006, becoming a Canadian citizen in 2009.

Upon attempting to renew his passport to attend his mother's funeral in 2016, he was arrested under the Extradition Act.

The court granted bail, finding that the applicant met the three-part test under section 679 of the Criminal Code as applied to extradition proceedings: the application was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender when ordered, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting that occurred after they were robbed at a flea market.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the jury selection process, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the periods of parole ineligibility and the sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as the trial judge had erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's sentencing position without notice and failing to give adequate weight to the appellants' youth and rehabilitative prospects.