Gabriel Gross-Stein

The applicants, jointly charged with first degree murder, applied for directed verdicts of acquittal on first and second degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including gunshot residue and the applicants' presence near the scene, to prove identity and intent.

The court found sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to infer that both applicants were involved in an intentional killing as either principal or aider/abettor.

However, the court concluded there was no evidence upon which a jury could reasonably infer that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The applications were allowed in part, with the court directing verdicts of acquittal on first degree murder and ordering the trial to proceed on second degree murder.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm without a licence, possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order, and possession for the purpose of trafficking crack cocaine.

The offences occurred during a civic holiday weekend in downtown Toronto when the accused robbed an American tourist at gunpoint near Union Station.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 7 years, while the defence sought 5 years and 2 months with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdown conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years and 5 months, less pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a remaining sentence of 4 years and 5 months.

The court also imposed a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

At a preliminary inquiry into the deaths of Tyler McLean and Zemarai Khan Mohammed, who were shot outside the Rebel nightclub on October 1, 2017, the Crown sought committal of both accused on murder charges.

Tanade Mohamed conceded committal on two counts of second-degree murder as the alleged shooter.

Abdirisaq Ali, who drove the vehicle from which the shots were fired, contested committal and sought to be committed only as an accessory after the fact.

The court found that while the accessory provisions captured Ali's involvement, there was a reasonable inference that Ali knew Mohamed had a gun and intended to assist in the murders, based on Ali's conduct in positioning the vehicle, waiting in the parking lot, and fleeing the scene.

The court committed both accused to stand trial on two counts of second-degree murder.

The accused, charged with drug possession for trafficking, brought applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence (drugs and statements) obtained from a motel room.

The Crown also sought a ruling on the voluntariness of an accused's statement.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: police entered the motel room without informed consent, conducted a warrantless search, and breached the right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the court held a pre-charge discussion to determine whether the lesser included offences of manslaughter and second-degree murder should be left to the jury.

The Crown argued that neither should be left, while the defence argued both should be available.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found no evidentiary foundation for manslaughter, as the forensic evidence indicated a targeted killing with no signs of a fight gone wrong.

However, the court found a gasping air of reality to second-degree murder, as a properly instructed jury could find the accused had the intent to kill but have a reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation.

Consequently, second-degree murder was left to the jury, but manslaughter was not.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the defence requested a jury instruction that the accused's after-the-fact conduct of attempting to collect the deceased's life insurance and death benefits had no probative value.

The Crown argued the conduct was relevant to the financial motive for the murder.

The court dismissed the defence's request, finding that the post-offence conduct was directly relevant to motive, which in turn was circumstantially relevant to the identity of the killers.

The court declined to give a 'no probative value' instruction.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce ante-mortem statements made by the deceased to demonstrate his state of mind and the accused's motive to kill.

The defence objected to the viva voce evidence of five witnesses and a Facebook thread, arguing they failed the test of necessity and were not material to motive.

The court ruled the statements admissible, finding they fell under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were not introduced for the truth of their contents.

The court also held the statements were material to establishing motive and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, subject to minor redactions.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to exclude sworn jurors from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process using rotating triers.

The Crown argued that recent appellate jurisprudence eliminated the trial judge's inherent jurisdiction to exclude sworn jurors.

The court held that it retained the common law discretion to exclude sworn jurors, as the Criminal Code is silent on the matter.

The court exercised its discretion to exclude the sworn jurors to prevent them from sitting idly in court for up to a week while the remainder of the jury was selected, which would diminish respect for the process.

The applicants, sought for extradition, applied for disclosure of U.S. customs and Canadian police notes, Information to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants and production orders, and communications between prosecutors.

They alleged breaches of Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to warrantless searches and non-compliance with seizure reporting, and abuse of process (s. 7) regarding the timing of Canadian charge withdrawals.

The court found an air of reality to the s. 8 claims regarding the initial warrantless border search of electronic devices and the failure to comply with s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code, ordering disclosure of the notes and ITOs.

However, the s. 9 argument regarding arrest and the s. 7 abuse of process claim lacked an air of reality, and disclosure of prosecutorial communications was denied.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act and was assisted by his brother-in-law, an unlicensed non-lawyer, in proceedings before a justice of the peace.

A stay of proceedings was granted due to the prosecutor's failure to provide proper disclosure in violation of Charter rights.

On appeal to the Ontario Court of Justice, the appeal judge refused to permit the brother-in-law to continue representing the appellant based on general concerns about non-licensed persons representing defendants in provincial offence matters.

The appeal judge set aside the stay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the appeal judge erred by failing to apply the proper legal test for disqualifying a representative and by relying on a blanket concern rather than examining the particular circumstances and competence of the representative.

The appellants were convicted of possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a jury trial.

They appealed on four grounds: (1) breach of s. 11(b) Charter rights to trial within a reasonable time; (2) erroneous admission of expert opinion evidence from a police officer involved in the investigation; (3) an unreasonable Corbett ruling excluding certain prior convictions; and (4) unfairness in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the defence witness.

The Court of Appeal rejected the s. 11(b) argument but found merit in the other three grounds, concluding that the cumulative effect of these errors denied the appellants a fair trial.

The applicant sought bail pending the Minister's surrender decision in an extradition matter.

The applicant had been convicted in absentia in Illinois in 2004 for drug trafficking and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.

He fled to Jamaica and subsequently immigrated to Canada in 2006, becoming a Canadian citizen in 2009.

Upon attempting to renew his passport to attend his mother's funeral in 2016, he was arrested under the Extradition Act.

The court granted bail, finding that the applicant met the three-part test under section 679 of the Criminal Code as applied to extradition proceedings: the application was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender when ordered, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The accused was charged with four serious offences: conspiracy to commit weapons trafficking, offer to transfer a firearm, conspiracy to commit extortion, and conspiracy to commit robbery.

The Crown's case relied almost entirely on intercepted private communications from Project RX between the accused and an alleged co-conspirator.

The accused testified in his own defence and made significant admissions regarding discussions about illegal activities.

The court found that while the accused engaged in discussions about these crimes, the Crown failed to prove the essential element of agreement required for conspiracy charges.

The court distinguished between mere discussion and negotiation versus a true meeting of the minds.

The court also applied the mutuality of object doctrine to the weapons trafficking charge, finding that a simple buy-sell agreement does not constitute a conspiracy to traffic firearms.

The accused was acquitted on all four counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired care or control and driving with excess alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, in exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias by preparing reasons before hearing submissions, in failing to exclude breath readings due to a s. 2(a) Charter breach involving the removal of his turban, and in rejecting his evidence of bolus drinking.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his s. 11(b) analysis, his s. 2(a) analysis, and his credibility findings regarding the appellant's bolus drinking defence.

A new trial was ordered on both counts.

The accused applied to exclude recordings of telephone conversations made while he was an inmate in a federal penitentiary, arguing that the interception violated his s. 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure.

The calls had been recorded by correctional authorities and later seized by police pursuant to a search warrant.

The court held that the accused failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications, given institutional policies, warning signs, and signed acknowledgments indicating calls could be monitored or recorded.

The presence of a third party on the calls further undermined any claim of privacy.

As a result, the court found no Charter breach and declined to exclude the evidence.