Reasons for Sentence

File No.: CR-25-30000069-0000
Date: 2025-07-15
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King
and
Ciro Garofano

Appearances:
M. Petrie and K. Garett, for the Crown
G. Gross-Stein, for Ciro Garofano

Heard: May 23 and June 26, 2025

Judge: Kelly

Introduction

[1] On November 15, 2023, Mr. Ciro Garofano drove his vehicle deliberately and repeatedly over his common-law wife’s niece, Ms. Karen Montague, killing her. He also struck Ms. Montague’s husband, Mr. Wayne Montague, and his common-law wife’s sister, Ms. Joyce Collins, wounding both.

[2] Mr. Garofano has pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He now appears before me for sentencing.

[3] The imposition of a life sentence without eligibility for parole until Mr. Garofano has served at least 10 years of his sentence is mandatory following a conviction for second-degree murder. However, the sentencing judge may increase the period of parole ineligibility from 10 years up to a maximum of 25 years.

[4] Crown counsel seeks a period of parole ineligibility of 22 to 23 years. Counsel for Mr. Garofano submits that the appropriate period of parole ineligibility is 16 years. They jointly agree that the sentence imposed for the two offences of aggravated assault should be 10 years’ imprisonment concurrent to the sentence imposed for second-degree murder. They also agree on the ancillary orders to be imposed.

[5] I find that the appropriate period of parole ineligibility is 18 years for the offence of second-degree murder. Concurrent sentences of 10 years will be imposed for the offences of aggravated assault. The ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition and non-communication with the victims and their families are granted.

[6] What follows are my reasons.

The Law: Parole Ineligibility

[7] Pursuant to ss. 235(1) and 745(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, the sentence to be imposed on a person convicted of second-degree murder is a term of imprisonment of life without eligibility for parole until the person has served at least 10 years of their sentence. However, s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code provides that the sentencing judge may increase the eligibility for parole from 10 years up to a maximum of 25 years having regard to:

a. the nature of the offence and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence;
b. the character of the offender; and
c. the recommendation, if any, of the jury.

[8] On exercising this discretion, Iacobucci J. stated as follows in R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, paras. 27 and 29:

[A]s a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. [745.4], the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be “unusual”, although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.

In permitting a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, Parliament intended to recognize that, within the category of second degree murder, there will be a broad range of seriousness reflecting varying degrees of moral culpability. As a result, the period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder will run anywhere between a minimum of 10 years and a maximum of 25, the latter being equal to that prescribed for first degree murder.

[9] In addition to the statutory considerations regarding parole, I must also consider the purposes of sentencing set out in s. 718 and the principles contained in ss. 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. The principles of denunciation and deterrence are the primary purposes to be considered. The statutory ten-year minimum period of parole ineligibility for second-degree murder limits the weight that can be attached to rehabilitation, although it cannot be excluded from consideration. R. v. McKnight

[10] Regardless of the period of parole ineligibility imposed, the sentence remains one of life imprisonment. The sentencing judge does not decide when the offender should be paroled but decides the period that he or she must serve before parole can even be considered. It must be remembered that a person sentenced for murder might never be paroled. R. v. Trudeau (1987), 24 O.A.C. 376

The Nature and Circumstances of the Offence

[11] In considering whether to increase the period of parole ineligibility, I am required to consider the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding it. The facts giving rise to the conviction were provided by way of an Agreed Statement of Facts, which may be summarized as follows:

Background

a. Mr. Garofano was 79 at the time of the offence and unmarried. Prior to November 2023, he had been involved in a lengthy common-law relationship with a woman several years his senior, Ms. Elsie Gilchrist. The two did not have any children and lived together in Ms. Gilchrist’s apartment at 250 Cassandra Blvd. in Toronto. Ms. Gilchrist was the leaseholder of the apartment and had lived in the building since 1975. Mr. Garofano had resided with Ms. Gilchrist since 1978. Ms. Gilchrist eventually moved into a nursing home, where she lived for approximately four years before passing away in July of 2023.

b. Prior to her death, Ms. Gilchrist gave power of attorney over her finances to her niece, the deceased Ms. Karen Montague, 61. Ms. Gilchrist also named Ms. Montague as a beneficiary in her will. Mr. Garofano was not named as a beneficiary.

Accused Arranges Victims’ Attendance at the Apartment

c. On November 2, 2023, Mr. Ricardo Turcios, the property administrator of 250 Cassandra Blvd., learned that several of Ms. Gilchrist’s prior pre-authorized payments for rent had been reversed. The next day, Mr. Turcios further learnt that Ms. Gilchrist had passed away and was told that her husband was still living in the apartment. Mr. Turcios obtained Ms. Montague’s contact information and called her but got her voicemail. On November 6, 2023, Ms. Montague returned Mr. Turcios’ call to confirm that her aunt, Ms. Gilchrist, had passed away, and that Mr. Garofano should be paying the rent. Mr. Turcios contacted Mr. Garofano and requested that he fill out a rental application and provide a cheque for the rent, which he did. Mr. Garofano had in fact already been paying the rent since Ms. Gilchrist had moved into the nursing home, four years earlier.

d. Sometime before November 15, 2023, Mr. Garofano and Ms. Montague spoke about Ms. Montague clearing Ms. Gilchrist’s belongings from the apartment. They agreed that Ms. Montague would attend at 11:00 a.m. on November 15, 2023. Mr. Garofano requested that in addition to Ms. Montague, Ms. Gilchrist’s sister, Ms. Joyce Collins, who was 88 years old, and her daughter, Ms. Eileen Mignardi, attend that day.

e. Ms. Collins advised police that she did not get along well with Mr. Garofano. Her sister had been a private person, and she hardly saw Mr. Garofano. She considered it “very strange” that he had requested her attendance on November 15, 2003. He had never invited her over to the apartment. Nevertheless, she agreed to attend to assist in collecting her sister’s belongings.

The Events of November 15, 2023

f. On November 15, 2023, Mr. and Ms. Montague, Ms. Collins and Ms. Mignardi attended at 250 Cassandra Blvd. to clear out Ms. Gilchrist’s belongings. They arrived together in a vehicle, driven by Mr. Montague. Mr. Montague parked in the visitor’s parking lot, which was in a circular roundabout in front of the building. They were met by Mr. Garofano, who told them that he would wait in his car while they cleaned out the apartment. It was not unusual for Mr. Garofano to vacate the apartment and stay in his car while they were present. According to Ms. Mignardi, it would have been unusual had he stayed.

g. Mr. Garofano’s usual parking spot was in the underground parking garage at the building. Shortly before Ms. Montague and her family arrived, Mr. Garofano moved his vehicle above-ground, so that it was now parked in the visitor’s parking lot. Mr. Garofano had his vehicle in the visitor’s parking lot rather than the underground on a previous occasion when Ms. Mignardi picked up some belongings from the trunk of his vehicle.

h. After clearing out a few of Ms. Gilchrist’s boxes and household items from the apartment, Mr. and Ms. Montague, Ms. Collins and Ms. Mignardi left the apartment. Ms. Montague and Ms. Collins went over to speak to Mr. Garofano, who was sitting in his vehicle, while Mr. Montague and Ms. Mignardi remained behind, loading items into Mr. Montague’s vehicle.

i. Three of the residents of 250 Cassandra Blvd. (Ms. Mullan, Mr. Dalton and Mr. Bailey) heard yelling outside the building that sounded like a heated argument, although none of them could make out the contents of the exchange. The noise prompted them to look outside their windows. Each saw Mr. Garofano’s vehicle out of park and faced towards Ms. Montague, who was walking away from the vehicle with her back turned to it. Ms. Mignardi, on the other hand, described the final exchange between Mr. Garofano and the parties as cordial.

j. As Ms. Montague and Ms. Collins walked back towards Mr. Montague’s vehicle, Mr. Garofano drove his vehicle at them, striking them both. Ms. Collins was knocked down near the curb near Mr. Montague’s vehicle, her leg severely injured. Ms. Montague was knocked to the ground in the middle of the roundabout.

k. Ms. Mignardi, seeing her mother lying face down in the roadway and Mr. Garofano’s vehicle in motion, screamed, picked her mother up, and moved her out of harm’s way onto the curb behind Mr. Montague’s vehicle.

l. After striking Ms. Collins and Ms. Montague, Mr. Garofano proceeded to drive towards Mr. Montague, Ms. Collins and Ms. Mignardi. Mr. Garofano mounted a curb, hitting Mr. Montague and his vehicle, but was blocked from hitting Ms. Collins and Ms. Mignardi by Mr. Montague’s vehicle and a nearby staircase.

m. Mr. Garofano then reversed, and proceeded to drive twice around the roundabout, running his vehicle over Ms. Montague two further times.

n. The incident was witnessed by at least three residents of 250 Cassandra Blvd. whose balconies faced the roundabout (Ms. Mullan, Mr. Dalton and Mr. Bailey). One described Ms. Montague as having been dragged by Mr. Garofano’s vehicle. All witnessed Mr. Garofano driving over Ms. Montague at least three times before finally stopping his vehicle, putting it in park, and waiting for police to attend and arrest him.

o. Police were called and paramedic services transported Ms. Montague, Mr. Montague and Ms. Collins to Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. Ms. Montague was pronounced deceased shortly after her arrival at hospital. The cause of her death was determined to be multiple blunt force (crush) trauma. At the time of her death, Ms. Montague’s blood alcohol level was 258 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

p. Mr. Montague suffered a minor head injury, and lacerations to his face and legs. Ms. Collins suffered a fracture to her right femur and right patella.

q. Mr. Garofano was arrested at the scene and eventually charged with first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder.

Victim Impact Statements

[12] In considering the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding it, I consider the impact on the victims and their community, particularly the family. In this case, three Victim Impact Statements were filed. The impact of this act may be summarized as follows:

Ms. Sandra Montague:
She describes that the tragic loss of Ms. Montague has been devastating to everyone who knew her. Her life and that of her family will never be the same. She describes that it has shattered and transformed their lives, especially those of her husband, her son, her mother, and herself. She said, “Karen was a retired teacher, beloved by her students, family, and colleagues. She recently retired and looked forward to sharing a long fulfilling retirement with her husband. Sadly, this is not to be.” Sandra added, “Her loss is senseless, traumatic and [the] violent way is totally inexplicable.”

Ms. Eileen Mignardi:
She describes that no words can fully express the pain and devastation that she feels. She states, “I witnessed the entire thing and I relive it every single day. I can’t unsee what happened. I can’t forget my mother lying face down not knowing if she was okay and moving her out of the way, feeling helpless seeing my cousin being run over multiple times and the sound of my own voice screaming for help. Since that day my life has not been the same. I have trouble sleeping. I struggle with anxiety, depression, and overwhelming grief.”

Ms. Eileen Mignardi on behalf of her deceased mother, Ms. Joyce Collins:
She describes the profound and irreversible impact of the incident on the lives of the family. Her late mother passed following months of physical and emotional suffering caused by the incident. While she ultimately died of cancer, it progressed at a terrifying pace following the incident. She describes that her mother was deeply affected by what happened to her niece. She replayed that scene in her mind over and over. It haunted her.

Mr. Wayne Montague:
Although there was no statement filed, the court was advised that he suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from this incident. This is understandable as he watched his wife die at the hands of Mr. Garofano. As a result of his trauma, he was unable to attend the preliminary hearing and the court appearances in the Superior Court of Justice.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[13] There are several aggravating factors about the nature of the killing and the circumstances of the offence. These aggravating factors include the following:

a. The crime itself was horrific. It was senseless and brutal.
b. The attack was against three members of the same family. They ranged in age from 61 to 88.
c. The three victims thought they were attending at the apartment complex to retrieve items belonging to their family member. While they may have accomplished that, the consequences of that visit were devastating.
d. All the victims were unarmed and vulnerable. Mr. Garofano weaponized his car as he drove at Ms. Montague and Ms. Collins as they were walking away. Ms. Mignardi intervened to save her mother from being hit a second time. Mr. Garofano struck Mr. Montague, rendering him unable to assist his wife who lay motionless on the ground as Mr. Garofano circled the roundabout hitting her two more times.
e. The incident happened, midday, in front of others not associated with the family. I have no doubt that there has been an impact on those who watched the incident.
f. Regardless of motivation (animus or an argument), Mr. Garofano drove over the victims in broad daylight in front of others.
g. The impact on the victims is unimaginable. As eloquently described by Crown counsel, “the fabric of the family was ripped apart”. Ms. Montague’s death was witnessed by her husband. Mr. Montague suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder caused by the incident. The fact that Ms. Collins spent the last months of her life in the hospital recuperating from her injuries caused by this incident before succumbing to cancer shortly thereafter is cruel. Mr. Garofano caused this family catastrophic trauma.
h. There is more than one victim. One who was killed and two that suffered significant physical injuries and mental anguish giving rise to the convictions for aggravated assault.

[14] I am unable to conclude that the attack was planned and deliberate. Although it is curious as to why Mr. Garofano parked his car and waited in the visitor’s parking lot rather than leaving it in its usual spot in the underground, this is what he had done previously when Ms. Mignardi attended. Further, there is evidence that Ms. Montague and Ms. Collins attended at the car and spoke with Mr. Garofano before the incident. Three residents described that they heard a heated argument which prompted them to look outside, following which Mr. Garofano hit his victims. Regardless of this finding, Mr. Garofano’s conduct is disturbing and extremely aggravating.

The Character of Mr. Garofano

[15] The next statutory consideration is the character of the offender.

Personal Background

[16] Mr. Garofano’s background may be summarized as follows:

a. He was born on March 19, 1944, in Italy. He is now 81 years of age.
b. He has four siblings.
c. He did not complete his high school education but completed his mandatory military service.
d. He came to Canada in 1967 at age 22.
e. He settled in Montreal and lived there for 12 years. That is where he met Ms. Gilchrist.
f. He moved to Toronto in 1978 and was employed in various jobs, including factory work and truck driving. He did this until he fractured his back at which time he started receiving worker’s compensation.
g. He has no children and no family in Toronto.
h. He has several physical ailments including osteoporosis, an irregular heartbeat, etc.
i. He has been incarcerated since his arrest, in the Toronto South Detention Centre.

[17] Mr. Garofano has a criminal record with the following entries:

Date	Offence	Penalty
March 14, 1972	Assault	$25 fine in default of which 5 days custody.
June 21, 2000	Drive Impaired	$600 fine and driving prohibition for 1 year.

Recommendations of the Jury

[18] The third matter that a sentencing judge is required to consider in determining whether to increase the parole ineligibility period is any recommendation made by the jury. Of course, there were no recommendations made by the jury as this matter was a plea before me.

Analysis

[19] The issue for me to determine is whether the time that Mr. Garofano must wait before being considered for parole should be increased beyond the minimum period of 10 years for the offence of second-degree murder. The sentences of 10 years, concurrent for the two counts of aggravated assault are agreed.

[20] In each case where the issue of parole ineligibility is considered, the offender will be a person who, without lawful justification, has not only killed someone but had the intent to kill or meant to cause harm knowing it would likely kill the victim. A conviction for murder will always be founded on inherently serious conduct deserving of the significant sanction of imprisonment for life. R. v. Pandurevic, 2013 ONSC 3323, para. 28

[21] Section 754 of the Criminal Code, however, does not require unusual circumstances to justify a deviation from the minimum period of parole ineligibility. Extending the parole ineligibility period is not restricted to cases involving extreme brutality or the worst offenders. However, it is only those circumstances that can be said to be aggravating beyond the essential elements for second-degree murder that will justify an increase above the ten-year minimum parole ineligibility period for second-degree murder. R. v. Kim, 2014 ONSC 2043, para. 13

[22] A further consideration is that all sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender as set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. The gravity of the offence is significant. The murder itself was brutal, as were the aggravated assaults committed on Mr. Montague and Ms. Collins. Mr. Garofano’s moral blameworthiness is high.

[23] Sentencing judges must also consider the principle of parity: similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances should receive similar sentences pursuant to s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code. R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, paras. 30-33; R. v. Pearce, 2021 ONCA 239, paras. 17-18; R. v. Courtney, 2012 ONCA 478, para. 4

[24] I have been referred to cases in which the courts considered the appropriateness of increasing parole ineligibility for persons convicted of second-degree murder. I have considered all of them in reaching my decision and observe that no two cases are alike. However, I agree with counsel for Mr. Garofano, that the circumstances of this case put it in the range of a 15 to 20 year period of parole ineligibility. R. v. Hayles-Wilson, 2018 ONSC 4337

[25] The cases in the range submitted by Crown counsel are distinguishable as being more serious. As stated by Thomas J. in the case of R. v. Brush, 2017 ONSC 664, para. 8:
“Most cases involving parole ineligibility in the 20 year range usually involve repeat offenders, multiple victims or circumstances of the most egregious and appalling nature.” The cases filed by Crown counsel support that proposition. For example:

• R. v. Sarao: R. v. Sarao — The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of second-degree murder. The victims were his wife and her parents. A period of parole ineligibility of 22 years was imposed.
• R. v. Sutherland: R. v. Sutherland, 2024 ONSC 1679 — The offender killed two women on two different occasions by stabbing them after breaking into their homes. Justice Forestell concluded that the period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Sutherland was 21 years.
• R. v. Schwalm: R. v. Schwalm, 2025 ONSC 864 — Justice Fuerst imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 20 years. This case involved intimate partner violence “of the most extreme kind.” It was described as an “egregious breach of trust”. Mr. Schwalm’s actions involved “chilling elements of planning and deliberation”. He killed the mother of his two children to “make him happy” and to avoid the financial consequences of divorce.
• R. v. Berry: R. v. Berry, 2019 BCSC 2362 — The offender was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. He killed his two daughters, who were six and four years old. He did so because he harbored resentment towards his former common-law spouse, their mother. The Court imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 22 years.
• R. v. Cerra: R. v. Cerra, 2004 BCCA 594 — The offender leveled a brutal beating against a young woman over a petty drug dispute. The beating was described as “severe and prolonged”. The victim would have died from the head injuries inflicted had she not been drowned. Mr. Cerra had an opportunity to discontinue the attack when he was interrupted by others but did not. The Court of Appeal held that there were “extraordinary aggravating factors” in upholding the period of parole ineligibility of 20 years. The court found that, “Mr. Cerra did not kill the victim in a sudden burst of anger or on an impulse; he drove the victim to a secluded place, beat her then drowned her in the course of a drawn out episode.”

[26] Situating an offender such as Mr. Garofano in his proper place amongst the precedents is fact specific and an inexact science. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para. 57:
“Sentencing ranges are nothing more than summaries of the minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and objectives.”

[27] In considering the fit sentence for Mr. Garofano, I find the following to be the aggravating factors:

a. Those involving the offence itself referred to in paragraph 13 above. I will not repeat those factors here but observe that the offence was horrific. In summary, there is a high degree of moral culpability.
b. The impact on the family is significant. The family has suffered the loss of a loved one in front of two others who were seriously injured.

[28] In considering the fit sentence for Mr. Garofano, I find the following to be the mitigating factors:

a. Mr. Garofano has pleaded guilty. This is considered a demonstration of remorse.
b. Mr. Garofano took full responsibility for his actions by his pleas of guilt.
c. The plea of guilt comes at a time when the court’s resources are under stress. The plea of guilt saved four weeks of trial time and allowed another matter to proceed.
d. The plea provided certainty of result and prevented the necessity of the family having to relive the tragic loss of a loved one and injuries caused to two others.
e. Although Mr. Garofano has a criminal record, it is dated.
f. Mr. Garofano is currently 81 years of age.
g. Mr. Garofano has been incarcerated at the Toronto South Detention Centre and subject to the harsh conditions there while also suffering health issues.

[29] These are very serious offences that have had devastating consequences for several people. A sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory for the death of Ms. Montague but is also manifestly fit and appropriate. The nature and circumstances of the offence justify an increase of parole ineligibility.

[30] I have considered the conditions of Mr. Garofano’s stay in the detention centre and the principles set out in R. v. Lamba, 2024 ONCA 778. Although there is no evidence before the court, I accept that Mr. Garofano has experienced conditions that are more difficult or punitive. I am aware that conditions in the Toronto South Detention Centre have become harsher since the pandemic. R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, para. 6; R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344

The Sentence Imposed

[31] After having considered the totality of the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence are met by the imposition of a life sentence with parole ineligibility above the minimum for the murder of Ms. Montague. When I take all factors into account, including the facts, the impact, the harsh circumstances of Mr. Garofano’s pre-sentence custody, his plea of guilt, his age, his dated criminal history, etc., I find that the appropriate sentence is life imprisonment with no parole eligibility until Mr. Garofano has served 18 years.

[32] It must not be forgotten that the sentence that is to be imposed in this case is life imprisonment. The 18-year period of parole ineligibility does not mean that Mr. Garofano will be released on parole after serving 18 years. It only means that this is when he first becomes eligible for parole. Whether he will be released will be up to the Parole Board, and that decision will be based in part on how Mr. Garofano conducts himself between now and then.

[33] I accept the joint submission that Mr. Garofano receive concurrent sentences of 10 years on each count of aggravated assault.

The Ancillary Orders

[34] Because Mr. Garofano has been convicted of an indictable offence involving the use of violence that is punishable by life imprisonment, a prohibition order under s. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is mandatory. Pursuant to s. 109(2) of the Criminal Code, I direct that Mr. Garofano be prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited or restricted weapon, ammunition, and explosive substance for life.

[35] Murder is a primary designated offence within the meaning of s. 487.04 of the Criminal Code and accordingly, in these circumstances, a DNA order is mandatory. There will therefore be a DNA sample order made under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code.

[36] Pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, I order that Mr. Garofano have no contact (direct or indirect) while he is serving his sentence with Ms. Eileen Mignardi, Mr. Wayne Montague, Ms. Anne McPhail, Mr. Kyle Montague, Ms. Sandra Montague and any other member of their immediate families.

Released: July 15, 2025

Cited Cases

Legislation

• Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46

Case Law

• R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, paras. 27 and 29
• R. v. McKnight
• R. v. Trudeau (1987), 24 O.A.C. 376
• R. v. Pandurevic, 2013 ONSC 3323, para. 28
• R. v. Kim, 2014 ONSC 2043, para. 13
• R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, paras. 30-33
• R. v. Pearce, 2021 ONCA 239, paras. 17-18
• R. v. Courtney, 2012 ONCA 478, para. 4
• R. v. Hayles-Wilson, 2018 ONSC 4337
• R. v. Brush, 2017 ONSC 664, para. 8
• R. v. Sarao
• R. v. Sutherland, 2024 ONSC 1679
• R. v. Schwalm, 2025 ONSC 864
• R. v. Berry, 2019 BCSC 2362
• R. v. Cerra, 2004 BCCA 594
• R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para. 57
• R. v. Lamba, 2024 ONCA 778
• R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, para. 6
• R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344