Rutu Gadhia

The accused were charged with unlawful act manslaughter following a workplace incident where a co-worker was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose.

One of the accused brought a motion to admit expert evidence from an occupational health and safety expert regarding the hazards of compressed air and the need for workplace training.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence regarding domestic law was inadmissible, and the factual evidence lacked probative value and was unnecessary, as the objective standard for manslaughter does not require such specialized knowledge.

During a trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the defence sought to cross-examine the Crown's forensic pathology expert on a statement from a 1942 journal article regarding public perception of the dangers of compressed air.

The Crown objected.

Following a voir dire, the court ruled that the question could not be put to the expert.

The court found that public perception was outside the expert's area of expertise, the 1942 article was of limited reliability for assessing public knowledge in 2015, and the question had no probative value while carrying significant prejudicial effect.

During a jury trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

They argued there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that a reasonable person would have objectively foreseen the risk of bodily harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence including video footage, the sound and power of the air hose, and the bypassing of a safety mechanism provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to find objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

The accused was tried for attempted murder and aggravated assault following a stabbing in an apartment building.

During the trial, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his section 7 Charter rights were violated because the police failed to seize and preserve video surveillance footage from the building's lobby.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police were not unacceptably negligent as they had no reason to believe the lobby video was relevant until months later.

Furthermore, the defence knew of the video's existence from the outset but took no steps to obtain it, and the video would not have captured the actual altercation.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, administering a stupefying substance, and assault against three complainants.

The Crown's case relied almost entirely on the testimony of one complainant, whose evidence was fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions.

The court found the complainant's testimony unreliable and noted a complete lack of corroborating forensic or independent evidence, such as security footage, taxicab records, or DNA.

Given the significant evidentiary gaps and credibility issues, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of all charges.

The accused brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a preliminary inquiry judge revoked a prior release order under s. 523(2)(b).

The revocation was based on a modest increase in the strength of the Crown’s identification evidence and two new convictions that had been outstanding at the time of the original bail hearing.

The court held that s. 523(2)(b) does not authorize a de novo bail hearing and requires proof of a substantial or material change in circumstances.

The identified developments did not constitute a sufficient change to justify revoking bail.

The revocation order was vacated and the accused was ordered released on stricter bail with additional sureties and conditions.

In a trial for possession of a loaded firearm, the court ruled on several pre-trial motions and a motion for a directed verdict.

The court admitted evidence of the accused's prior possession of the same firearm, finding its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also allowed the Crown to ask an eye-witness for an in-dock identification and admitted crime scene photographs verified by other officers.

A directed verdict of acquittal was granted for an obstructing justice charge because providing a false name did not actually obstruct the arresting officer.

However, the motion for a directed verdict on the firearm possession charges was dismissed, as the circumstantial evidence could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

Following a jury trial, the accused was convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to his infant child but the jury was unable to reach verdicts on related aggravated assault and assault counts.

At sentencing, the issue arose whether the court could determine under s. 724 of the Criminal Code whether the trauma inflicted on the child was intentional, which would constitute an aggravating circumstance.

The court held that a sentencing judge may determine relevant factual issues not resolved by the jury, provided the facts essential to the verdict are accepted and any aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based on medical evidence and the accused’s after‑the‑fact conduct, the court concluded the trauma was intentionally inflicted.

The finding was included as part of the factual basis for sentencing.

The offender was convicted by a jury of failing to provide the necessaries of life to his infant child after failing to obtain urgent medical treatment following severe head trauma.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender intentionally inflicted the trauma and knowingly failed to seek medical assistance for approximately 40 hours while the child displayed symptoms of serious brain injury.

The child suffered catastrophic and permanent disabilities, including blindness, cognitive impairment, seizures, and physical disability.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives given the offender’s knowledge of the injury and his decision to prioritize self‑interest over the child’s safety.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed after credit for pre‑sentence custody.

In a first-degree murder trial involving alleged street gang members, the Crown sought to clarify and maintain the admissibility of certain evidence following a pre-trial ruling.

The court reconsidered the admissibility of a YouTube video after correcting a factual misapprehension about its contents, ruling it remained highly probative of gang affiliation and motive.

The court also permitted the Crown to adduce a composite audio recording for voice identification, provided no visual component was shown.

Finally, the court held that numerous handwritten documents and rap lyrics seized from the respondents' apartment were admissible without further redaction, as their probative value regarding gang membership and animus toward rival gangs significantly outweighed their prejudicial effect as bad character evidence.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, challenged the admissibility of two statements made to police and sought the exclusion of derivative evidence (cell phone records and a witness) under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the first statement involuntary due to the Crown's failure to account for a significant period of the accused's custody, but ruled the second statement voluntary.

The court also found breaches of the accused's s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights during his initial investigative detention.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the derivative evidence, finding the breaches were not serious, the impact on the accused's rights was minimal, and the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.

In a pre-trial voir dire in a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to prove the voluntariness of an utterance allegedly made by the accused to police during a brief encounter in an apartment building.

The defence argued the statement should be excluded on the basis that it was not proven to have been made by the accused and that it was obtained during an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, seeking exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court held that the statement was voluntary and that circumstantial evidence, including self-identification, physical description, and a distinctive tattoo, established on a balance of probabilities that the speaker was the accused.

Applying the framework from Grant, the court further concluded that the encounter did not constitute a detention, as it was brief, non-coercive, and part of general police patrol activity.

The accused’s application to exclude the statement was dismissed and the Crown’s application was granted.

The accused applied for an order requiring YouTube to remove approximately 75 videos associated with a street gang until the completion of a murder trial, arguing that jurors might view the material online despite judicial instructions and thereby jeopardize the fairness of the trial.

The court refused leave to bring the application due to failure to comply with the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including the absence of proper notice and evidentiary foundation.

The court further held that the application had no reasonable prospect of success because it relied on an incorrect statutory provision, lacked evidence of a real and substantial risk to trial fairness, failed to consider alternative measures, and sought an order affecting third‑party Charter expression rights without notice.

The judge also raised concerns about territorial jurisdiction given that YouTube operated outside Canada.

Leave was denied and the application summarily dismissed.

The Crown applied to call a police detective as an expert witness on street gangs in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the expert was biased and the proposed evidence, including rap videos, letters, and graffiti, was highly prejudicial.

The court found the expert evidence necessary and the detective qualified.

The court admitted most of the videos, letters, and graffiti, finding their probative value in establishing motive and the existence of a criminal organization outweighed their prejudicial effect, but excluded evidence of the accused's prior convictions and certain letters.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking to qualify a forensic document examiner as an expert in handwriting analysis to assist in establishing authorship of seized writings.

One accused opposed the application, arguing the proposed expert lacked sufficient qualifications and that her work had not been peer reviewed and used a different classification methodology than other forensic standards.

The court applied the test for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and held that the witness possessed the requisite specialized knowledge through education, training, and experience at the Centre of Forensic Sciences.

Concerns raised by the defence related to methodology and review processes went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility.

The witness was therefore qualified to provide opinion evidence in handwriting analysis.

The applicant sought costs against the Crown following delays in disclosure and non-compliance with undertakings made at a Judicial Pre-Trial.

The applicant alleged that the Crown's failure to respond to six disclosure request letters, delayed notification to Legal Aid regarding appointment of independent counsel, and inconsistent information about occurrence reports and criminal records constituted conduct warranting a costs award.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown's conduct was unsatisfactory, it did not rise to the level of recklessness, conscious indifference to duty, or a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards required to justify costs in criminal proceedings.