Victoria Rivers

The applicants, charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The anticipated delay from charge to the end of trial was over 48 months.

The Crown argued that much of the delay was attributable to the applicants' co-accused and should be counted as defence delay.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, finding that the delay of one accused cannot be automatically attributed to co-accused.

The court found that the applicants were responsible for very little delay and had repeatedly asserted their desire to move the matter forward.

The net delay significantly exceeded the 30-month ceiling for superior court trials, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify it.

The application was granted and the proceedings were stayed.

The offender was convicted of possessing 486 grams of heroin for the purpose of trafficking after accepting a controlled delivery package.

The offender acted as a low-level conduit or 'mule' for financial gain while also participating in fraudulent schemes.

The court weighed the highly addictive nature of heroin and the profit motive as aggravating factors against the offender's lack of a prior criminal record.

A global sentence of four years was imposed, reduced to 22 months of further custody after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial date was approximately 20.5 months, none attributable to the defence.

The delay resulted from delayed disclosure by the Crown and institutional delays.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court trials.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the case was straightforward, the jurisdiction was not plagued by systemic delays, and the Crown's reliance on the seriousness of charges was not reasonable given the disclosure failures.

The charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana and heroin for the purpose of trafficking and breach of bail conditions.

The accused argued that police violated his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) when an officer approached him, obtained marijuana he voluntarily produced, arrested him, and searched his backpack.

The court held that the initial interaction did not amount to detention and therefore did not trigger the right to counsel.

The arrest for possession of marijuana was lawful despite arguments regarding s. 495(2) of the Criminal Code, relying on authority that s. 495(3) deems such arrests lawful for Criminal Code proceedings.

The brief delay of less than two minutes in providing rights to counsel was justified for officer and public safety.

The challenged evidence was admitted and the accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

During a traffic stop, a police officer observed what he believed to be marijuana shavings fall from a piece of paper retrieved from the glove compartment.

The officer arrested the accused for simple possession, conducted a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, and located a backpack containing 202 grams of marijuana.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for simple possession based on the observed marijuana shavings, and that the search of the vehicle was lawful.

However, the trial judge acquitted the accused on the trafficking charge, finding that the Crown had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of or was willfully blind to the contents of the backpack.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in granting 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had found that the retrospective application of the Truth in Sentencing Act, which capped credit at 1.5:1, violated the respondent's s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pre-sentence custody constitutes punishment under s. 11(i) and that the statutory cap varied that punishment.

The Court further held that the Crown failed to justify the Charter violation under s. 1, as the transitional provision did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

During a first degree murder trial, the Crown sought a publication ban under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code to prevent publication of information identifying the deceased victim, primarily to shield an elderly relative from learning distressing details of the death through media reporting.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck framework governs discretionary publication bans even when sought under a statutory provision.

The Crown failed to establish that the order was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or that a significant public interest justified limiting openness.

The concern raised was characterized as a private interest unsupported by medical evidence demonstrating likely harm.

The interim publication ban was therefore set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing part of the proceedings to be translated simultaneously rather than consecutively.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the interpreter was competent to perform both simultaneous and consecutive interpretation, and that simultaneous interpretation met the constitutional requirement of contemporaneity.

Following convictions after trial for multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual interference against young children in a position of trust, the court determined the appropriate global sentence and addressed a constitutional challenge concerning pre‑sentence custody credit.

The offender argued that applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to limit enhanced credit would violate s. 11(i) of the Charter because the offences were committed before the Act came into force.

The court held that pre‑sentence custody constitutes “punishment” for the purposes of s. 11(i) and that retroactive application of the Act would increase the punishment by eliminating the then‑usual practice of granting 2:1 credit.

The relevant provisions of the Act were therefore declared of no force and effect as applied to the offender.

A global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment was imposed with credit for pre‑sentence custody at a 2:1 ratio.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge should have given a specific caution regarding the complainant's evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was capable of assessing the complainant's credibility using common sense and the general instructions provided.

The court also held that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably could have reached the verdict.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge is entitled to rely on hearsay evidence to make findings of fact on sentence under s. 723(5) of the Criminal Code, even if the facts are disputed.

The Court declined to interfere with the trial judge's findings that the respondent was an addict who turned to crime to support his habit and was taking rehabilitative steps.

The appeal was dismissed as the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision granting certiorari to quash a committal for trial for manslaughter and committing him for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing evidence and preferring inferences favourable to the accused.

However, the Court found the application judge erred by directly committing the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a mandamus order was issued remitting the matter to the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the appellant for trial on second degree murder.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder for an execution-style shooting related to a drug debt.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding unsavoury witnesses (Vetrovec warning) and the defence of abandonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's continuum approach to the Vetrovec warnings, his instructions on confirmatory evidence, or his charge on abandonment.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault following a shooting at a student pub.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury regarding a firearms expert's testimony on muzzle flash, delivered an unbalanced jury charge, and erred in the instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's characterization of the expert evidence or the balance of the charge, and concluding that the error in the post-offence conduct instruction did not warrant setting aside the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder following a nightclub shooting.

At trial, a Crown witness unexpectedly testified that he, not the appellant, was the shooter.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec caution followed by a W.D. instruction regarding this witness's evidence, with the agreement of defence counsel.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Vetrovec caution should not have been given or should have been limited to inculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice and noting the defence's tactical agreement.

The sentence appeal, challenging the denial of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit and delayed parole eligibility, was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting at a bar.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary inquiry testimony of a witness who had since moved to Ukraine, claiming he lacked full opportunity to cross-examine due to late disclosure of a potential 'bail for testimony' deal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'full opportunity' requirement under s. 715 of the Criminal Code is not defeated by an accused's ignorance of potentially useful information, and that the admission did not render the trial fairness.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's decision not to give a Vetrovec warning, as defence counsel had not requested one and the jury was adequately cautioned.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of an unsavoury witness was corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence with great caution and correctly identified evidence capable of confirming the witness's testimony.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of multiple offences arising from a home invasion, including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault.

The primary evidence linking the appellant to the crime was a fingerprint found on a car near the scene, along with circumstantial evidence of the perpetrator's flight path.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the jury was improperly instructed on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint and circumstantial evidence were capable of supporting a reasonable inference of guilt, and the jury instructions on identification were adequate.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to an effective sentence of nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the sentencing judge gave insufficient consideration to the mitigating factors of provocation and intoxication, and placed undue emphasis on the aggravating factor of being armed with a knife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge considered all relevant factors, committed no error in principle, and imposed a sentence within the appropriate range for a violent offence involving multiple stab wounds.