Victoria Rivers

The applicants challenged the constitutional validity of step six of the Garofoli procedure, arguing it violates section 7 of the Charter by preventing them from making full answer and defence.

The applicants contended that judicial summaries of redacted information in an Information to Obtain (ITO) do not provide sufficient disclosure to know the case they must meet.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that step six does not breach section 7 rights because it is a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on admissibility, not a trial on guilt or innocence, and the procedure appropriately balances the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the near-absolute privilege of confidential informants.

The accused was charged with trafficking crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following three undercover drug purchases.

The sole issue at trial was identity, specifically the reliability of the undercover officer's identification of the accused from a photo lineup.

The court found that although the photo lineup was not videotaped or audiotaped as recommended by the Sophonow inquiry, the identification was reliable due to the officer's multiple interactions with the accused and independent confirmatory circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion seeking to excise from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant references to the unlawful search of a third party's vehicle in which cocaine was found.

The search had been previously determined to be unlawful by another justice.

The Crown opposed the excision, arguing the defendants lacked standing to challenge a third party's search.

The court held that while the defendants could not challenge the lawfulness of the third party search itself, they could seek excision of evidence obtained through a judicially determined Charter breach to prevent the state from benefiting from illegal police conduct.

The court granted the motion and excised all references to the stop, arrest, and seizure from the third party's vehicle.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant challenged the grounds for his arrest and the basis for issuance of a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot criteria, finding ample basis for both the arrest and warrant based on police surveillance evidence.

The trial judge made no errors in sentencing or in calculating pre-trial custody.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions under sections 7(1) and 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for operating a marijuana grow-operation in his rental apartment unit.

The appellant challenged the convictions on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The trial judge had found that the appellant maintained control of the unit and had knowledge of the grow-operation based on his tenancy, exclusive access, rent payment, and personal documents found in the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding all findings of fact were open to the trial judge and that no other rational conclusion was available on the evidence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime following a dial-a-dope investigation.

He subsequently applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the police conduct constituted entrapment through random virtue testing.

The court found that the police were engaged in a bona fide investigation of a targeted individual based on an informer tip, and that the undercover officer merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence without inducing it.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possessing heroin and cocaine after a police officer entered his unlocked public washroom stall without a warrant and discovered him with drugs.

The trial judge found a section 8 Charter breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his application of the Grant framework, specifically regarding the seriousness of the police conduct and the impact on his privacy interests.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable determination in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

The accused was charged with simple possession of crack cocaine.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the police detention, search of the vehicle, and strip search, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police detained the accused based on mere suspicion and hunches rather than reasonable grounds, conducted an unlawful search of the vehicle, and performed an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the evidence of the crack cocaine under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his Charter right under section 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial date was approximately 20.5 months, none attributable to the defence.

The delay resulted from delayed disclosure by the Crown and institutional delays.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court trials.

The Crown failed to establish that the transitional exceptional circumstance applied, as the case was straightforward, the jurisdiction was not plagued by systemic delays, and the Crown's reliance on the seriousness of charges was not reasonable given the disclosure failures.

The charges were stayed.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana and heroin for the purpose of trafficking and breach of bail conditions.

The accused argued that police violated his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) when an officer approached him, obtained marijuana he voluntarily produced, arrested him, and searched his backpack.

The court held that the initial interaction did not amount to detention and therefore did not trigger the right to counsel.

The arrest for possession of marijuana was lawful despite arguments regarding s. 495(2) of the Criminal Code, relying on authority that s. 495(3) deems such arrests lawful for Criminal Code proceedings.

The brief delay of less than two minutes in providing rights to counsel was justified for officer and public safety.

The challenged evidence was admitted and the accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

During a traffic stop, a police officer observed what he believed to be marijuana shavings fall from a piece of paper retrieved from the glove compartment.

The officer arrested the accused for simple possession, conducted a search of the vehicle incident to arrest, and located a backpack containing 202 grams of marijuana.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for simple possession based on the observed marijuana shavings, and that the search of the vehicle was lawful.

However, the trial judge acquitted the accused on the trafficking charge, finding that the Crown had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge of or was willfully blind to the contents of the backpack.

Following convictions after trial for multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual interference against young children in a position of trust, the court determined the appropriate global sentence and addressed a constitutional challenge concerning pre‑sentence custody credit.

The offender argued that applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to limit enhanced credit would violate s. 11(i) of the Charter because the offences were committed before the Act came into force.

The court held that pre‑sentence custody constitutes “punishment” for the purposes of s. 11(i) and that retroactive application of the Act would increase the punishment by eliminating the then‑usual practice of granting 2:1 credit.

The relevant provisions of the Act were therefore declared of no force and effect as applied to the offender.

A global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment was imposed with credit for pre‑sentence custody at a 2:1 ratio.