Victoria Rivers

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after cocaine was found in her rental car at a border crossing.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was unfair due to rhetorical questions and a failure to fully present the defence position.

She also appealed her 5.5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the jury charge and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range for a first-time offender importing approximately 1.5 kilograms of cocaine.

The defendant was sentenced for possessing a loaded restricted firearm and dangerous controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, including fentanyl.

The court balanced the objectives of denunciation and deterrence with the defendant's strong rehabilitative potential, youth, and community support.

Aggravating factors included the firearm's purpose (drug trade protection), the deadly nature and quantity of fentanyl, other drugs, motive of greed, bail breaches, and quick return to drug trade.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, first offender status, youth, community support, and excellent rehabilitative potential.

The global sentence was set at six years, reduced from an initial seven years to foster rehabilitation, less presentence custody.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought an application under ss. 8, 9, 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found in a satchel when he was arrested.

The court found that the police did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him based on a confidential informant tip and ambiguous surveillance, resulting in a s. 9 breach.

The subsequent search of his person and satchel was therefore unlawful, breaching s. 8.

The police also delayed implementing his right to counsel for over four hours, breaching s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

BMD, detained since October 2018 on firearm and drug-related offences, sought a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

He proposed a strengthened release plan including house arrest, two sureties, and GPS electronic monitoring, and argued the COVID-19 pandemic favored his release.

The court found the pandemic irrelevant to the secondary ground but relevant to the tertiary ground.

The strengthened release plan, particularly electronic monitoring and responsible sureties, addressed public safety concerns under the secondary ground.

On the tertiary ground, despite serious charges, the robust release plan and the public health imperative to de-populate correctional facilities due to COVID-19 led the court to conclude that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence.

BMD was ordered released on strict conditions.

The appellant, Beverley Bernard, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

She claimed she was unaware of the drugs concealed in jars in her suitcase, which a stranger had asked her to bring to Canada.

Her appeal was based on four grounds: the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire regarding a Jamaican Patois interpreter, misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider the third branch of W(D), and misapplication of R. v. Villaroman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the voir dire issue was not pursued at trial, any misapprehension of evidence was immaterial to the ultimate findings, W(D) was correctly applied, and the trial judge's reasoning, when read as a whole, correctly applied Villaroman by concluding the appellant's evidence defied common sense and supported a finding of deliberate ignorance.

The accused was arrested outside a target apartment building on suspicion of possession for the purpose of trafficking crystal methamphetamine and GHB.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful, lacking reasonable and probable grounds.

The detectives relied on mere suspicion based on the accused's presence outside the building and a "hard stare," without evidence connecting him to the target unit or any drug activity.

The court found multiple Charter breaches including violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b), stemming from an unlawful arrest effected through excessive force, an unlawful search, and a three-and-a-half-hour delay in providing access to counsel.

The court excluded the evidence and dismissed all charges.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at their home.

The Information to Obtain (ITO) relied heavily on tips from two confidential informants.

The applicants argued the ITO lacked reasonable grounds and contained misleading statements.

The court excised certain erroneous statements but found that, based on the totality of the circumstances and the Debot criteria, the remaining information provided sufficient grounds for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant.

The court also held that even if a section 8 Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana following a R.I.D.E. stop where police discovered a large quantity of freshly harvested marijuana in his van.

The appellant appealed on the basis that his Charter rights under sections 10(a) and (b) were breached during his roadside detention and that the evidence should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach.

The initial detention was lawful as a R.I.D.E. stop, and the appellant's own voluntary production of marijuana paraphernalia short-circuited the officer's obligation to provide counsel information before arrest.

The offender, a 24-year-old first offender, was convicted of possessing a loaded restricted firearm and possessing heroin and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered the aggravating factors of the firearm and drugs, and mitigating factors including the offender's youth, lack of record, remorse, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a total sentence of two years less a day imprisonment, after accounting for pre-sentence custody and totality, followed by 24 months of probation.

Adrian Skeete was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a prohibited weapon.

The Crown sought an 18-month concurrent sentence, arguing for a mandatory minimum of one year due to the weapon.

Defence proposed a 9-month sentence with credit for pre-trial house arrest.

The court rejected the mandatory minimum, finding no link between the weapon and trafficking.

Considering aggravating factors (nature of crack cocaine, prior robbery conviction) and mitigating factors (steady employment, family ties, desire for counseling), the court imposed a total concurrent sentence of 15 months for trafficking and 4 months for the weapon, reduced by 6 days for pre-sentence custody and 2 months for house arrest, resulting in 13 months less 6 days.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and victim surcharges.

Brandon Michael Baker was found guilty of three counts of trafficking crack cocaine and three counts of possession of the proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors including the nature of crack cocaine, the multiple transactions, the profit motive, and the offender's criminal record.

Mitigating factors included a supportive relationship.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and considering the sentencing range for similar offences, the court imposed a global sentence of 12 months in custody, with ancillary orders for a lifetime firearm prohibition, a 10-year prohibition for other weapons, a DNA sample, and victim surcharges.

The applicants challenged the constitutional validity of step six of the Garofoli procedure, arguing it violates section 7 of the Charter by preventing them from making full answer and defence.

The applicants contended that judicial summaries of redacted information in an Information to Obtain (ITO) do not provide sufficient disclosure to know the case they must meet.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding that step six does not breach section 7 rights because it is a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on admissibility, not a trial on guilt or innocence, and the procedure appropriately balances the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the near-absolute privilege of confidential informants.

The accused was stopped by police for driving with an unlit rear license plate.

During the stop, an officer spotted a knife on the passenger seat, leading to the accused's arrest.

A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded 12.12 grams of crack cocaine, $1,300 in cash, and a digital scale.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), finding the stop, arrest, and search lawful.

At trial, the court rejected the accused's claim that the drugs were for personal use and convicted him of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a prohibited weapon, but acquitted him of possession of proceeds of crime and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The accused was charged with trafficking crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following three undercover drug purchases.

The sole issue at trial was identity, specifically the reliability of the undercover officer's identification of the accused from a photo lineup.

The court found that although the photo lineup was not videotaped or audiotaped as recommended by the Sophonow inquiry, the identification was reliable due to the officer's multiple interactions with the accused and independent confirmatory circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion seeking to excise from an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant references to the unlawful search of a third party's vehicle in which cocaine was found.

The search had been previously determined to be unlawful by another justice.

The Crown opposed the excision, arguing the defendants lacked standing to challenge a third party's search.

The court held that while the defendants could not challenge the lawfulness of the third party search itself, they could seek excision of evidence obtained through a judicially determined Charter breach to prevent the state from benefiting from illegal police conduct.

The court granted the motion and excised all references to the stop, arrest, and seizure from the third party's vehicle.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant challenged the grounds for his arrest and the basis for issuance of a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot criteria, finding ample basis for both the arrest and warrant based on police surveillance evidence.

The trial judge made no errors in sentencing or in calculating pre-trial custody.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions under sections 7(1) and 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for operating a marijuana grow-operation in his rental apartment unit.

The appellant challenged the convictions on grounds of misapprehension of evidence and unreasonable verdict.

The trial judge had found that the appellant maintained control of the unit and had knowledge of the grow-operation based on his tenancy, exclusive access, rent payment, and personal documents found in the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding all findings of fact were open to the trial judge and that no other rational conclusion was available on the evidence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime following a dial-a-dope investigation.

He subsequently applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the police conduct constituted entrapment through random virtue testing.

The court found that the police were engaged in a bona fide investigation of a targeted individual based on an informer tip, and that the undercover officer merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence without inducing it.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possessing heroin and cocaine after a police officer entered his unlocked public washroom stall without a warrant and discovered him with drugs.

The trial judge found a section 8 Charter breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his application of the Grant framework, specifically regarding the seriousness of the police conduct and the impact on his privacy interests.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable determination in the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis.

The accused was charged with simple possession of crack cocaine.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the police detention, search of the vehicle, and strip search, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the police detained the accused based on mere suspicion and hunches rather than reasonable grounds, conducted an unlawful search of the vehicle, and performed an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the evidence of the crack cocaine under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.