Victoria Rivers

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) whether the first case management judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant; (2) whether the second case management judge erred in dismissing the motion to relitigate the cross-examination application; (3) whether the application judge erred in rejecting the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrant; and (4) whether the application judge erred in admitting evidence despite a violation of the appellant's section 10(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging his prosecution for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the prosecution should be stayed as it offended the rule against double jeopardy following his conviction on institutional disciplinary charges; that the search of his cell violated s. 8 of the Charter; that questioning by correctional officers violated s. 10(b) of the Charter; and that evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed all arguments, finding that s. 11(h) does not apply to inmate disciplinary proceedings; that the search was properly authorized; that no s. 10(b) violation occurred; and that evidence exclusion was not warranted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings granted due to a breach of the respondents’ rights under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed with the trial judge that last-minute offering of earlier trial dates did not require defence counsel to be available, nor did it make any resulting delay attributable to the defence.

The court also found the case was not sufficiently complex to justify an exception to the Jordan framework, and the presence of a Garofoli application did not elevate the case’s complexity.

The applicant, T. D., brought Charter applications to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the applications related to sections 8 and 9, finding the search warrants and arrest lawful.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel and a failure by police to "hold off" from asking investigative questions before the applicant consulted counsel.

Applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), the court determined that admitting the evidence found in the applicant's car would negatively impact public confidence in the justice system, and therefore excluded it.

The Crown appealed a stay of charges granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial judge found that defence counsel acted reasonably in not accommodating earlier trial dates offered by the Crown, which would have brought the case within the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the delay was not attributed to the defence, and the charges were stayed as the original schedule exceeded the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact regarding defence counsel's reasonableness, noting it was entitled to deference, and found no error in the application of law, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of firearm possession and drug trafficking and appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the information to obtain a search warrant (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds, specifically alleging the affiant misled the Justice of the Peace (JP) regarding the appellant's address and failed to establish reasonable grounds for drugs at his residence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the reviewing judge misapprehended one argument, it was immaterial as police observations provided sufficient grounds for the search warrant.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded credit for time served, and the Court granted enhanced credit (1.5:1) for 145 days, resulting in 217 days credit.

The sentence appeal was allowed.

The applicant, Andrew Rocha, sought a stay of proceedings for charges of possession of cocaine for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, alleging police stole money and drugs during a search warrant execution, violating his s. 7 Charter rights.

The court found approximately $6000 of seized cash was missing and inferred it was taken by police officers involved in the investigation.

This misconduct was deemed an abuse of state power and a breach of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Given the egregious nature of the police misconduct and the lack of an adequate alternative remedy, the court granted a stay of proceedings to dissociate the justice system from the impugned conduct, despite the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits.

Donovan Shah appealed his convictions for possession of heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the search warrant affiant regarding the inclusion of information about dismissed charges, and whether the trial judge improperly used Shah's pretrial silence to assess his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to deny cross-examination and concluding that the trial judge did not rely on pretrial silence in assessing credibility.

The appellant, Ryan Gomboc, appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking cocaine.

He challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the validity of a search warrant for one of his residences (6 Gibbon Drive), specifically arguing that the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) misled the issuing justice and that there were insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The trial judge had found the search warrant for another residence (32 Royal Oak Drive) invalid but admitted the seized cellphone under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the affiant did not mislead the justice and that there were sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to search 6 Gibbon Drive based on the appellant's conduct and police observations.

Consequently, a new s. 24(2) analysis was deemed unnecessary.

The accused was charged with possession of a fentanyl/carfentanil mixture for the purpose of trafficking after police found the drugs in a locked safe in his bedroom closet.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge and control.

A defence witness testified that he shared the bedroom, had exclusive access to the safe, and that the drugs were his alone.

The court found the defence witness's evidence, while problematic, raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant, Peter Cowan, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his nine-month sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, specifically the "could reasonably be true" phrase in relation to the W.(D.) questions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite the inappropriate language, the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

Regarding the sentence, the parties agreed the trial judge misapprehended the likelihood of deportation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence and varied it to a 12-month conditional sentence, considering the appellant's first-offender status, low-level trafficking, and mental disabilities.

The appellant, Bradley Kennedy, appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on anecdotal expert testimony regarding typical personal use quantities of methamphetamine, citing R. v. Sekhon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion was grounded in objective facts, not inadmissible anecdotes, and that the trial judge did not rely on the impugned testimony.

The court also found the verdict was reasonable, as the trial judge was entitled to draw an inference of guilt after rejecting the appellant's testimony, given the significant quantity of drugs and lack of indicia of personal use.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after cocaine was found in her rental car at a border crossing.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was unfair due to rhetorical questions and a failure to fully present the defence position.

She also appealed her 5.5-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the jury charge and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range for a first-time offender importing approximately 1.5 kilograms of cocaine.

The defendant was sentenced for possessing a loaded restricted firearm and dangerous controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, including fentanyl.

The court balanced the objectives of denunciation and deterrence with the defendant's strong rehabilitative potential, youth, and community support.

Aggravating factors included the firearm's purpose (drug trade protection), the deadly nature and quantity of fentanyl, other drugs, motive of greed, bail breaches, and quick return to drug trade.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, first offender status, youth, community support, and excellent rehabilitative potential.

The global sentence was set at six years, reduced from an initial seven years to foster rehabilitation, less presentence custody.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought an application under ss. 8, 9, 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found in a satchel when he was arrested.

The court found that the police did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him based on a confidential informant tip and ambiguous surveillance, resulting in a s. 9 breach.

The subsequent search of his person and satchel was therefore unlawful, breaching s. 8.

The police also delayed implementing his right to counsel for over four hours, breaching s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

BMD, detained since October 2018 on firearm and drug-related offences, sought a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

He proposed a strengthened release plan including house arrest, two sureties, and GPS electronic monitoring, and argued the COVID-19 pandemic favored his release.

The court found the pandemic irrelevant to the secondary ground but relevant to the tertiary ground.

The strengthened release plan, particularly electronic monitoring and responsible sureties, addressed public safety concerns under the secondary ground.

On the tertiary ground, despite serious charges, the robust release plan and the public health imperative to de-populate correctional facilities due to COVID-19 led the court to conclude that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence.

BMD was ordered released on strict conditions.

The appellant, Beverley Bernard, appealed her conviction for importing cocaine.

She claimed she was unaware of the drugs concealed in jars in her suitcase, which a stranger had asked her to bring to Canada.

Her appeal was based on four grounds: the trial judge's failure to conduct a voir dire regarding a Jamaican Patois interpreter, misapprehension of evidence, failure to consider the third branch of W(D), and misapplication of R. v. Villaroman.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the voir dire issue was not pursued at trial, any misapprehension of evidence was immaterial to the ultimate findings, W(D) was correctly applied, and the trial judge's reasoning, when read as a whole, correctly applied Villaroman by concluding the appellant's evidence defied common sense and supported a finding of deliberate ignorance.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana following a R.I.D.E. stop where police discovered a large quantity of freshly harvested marijuana in his van.

The appellant appealed on the basis that his Charter rights under sections 10(a) and (b) were breached during his roadside detention and that the evidence should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breach.

The initial detention was lawful as a R.I.D.E. stop, and the appellant's own voluntary production of marijuana paraphernalia short-circuited the officer's obligation to provide counsel information before arrest.

Adrian Skeete was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a prohibited weapon.

The Crown sought an 18-month concurrent sentence, arguing for a mandatory minimum of one year due to the weapon.

Defence proposed a 9-month sentence with credit for pre-trial house arrest.

The court rejected the mandatory minimum, finding no link between the weapon and trafficking.

Considering aggravating factors (nature of crack cocaine, prior robbery conviction) and mitigating factors (steady employment, family ties, desire for counseling), the court imposed a total concurrent sentence of 15 months for trafficking and 4 months for the weapon, reduced by 6 days for pre-sentence custody and 2 months for house arrest, resulting in 13 months less 6 days.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and victim surcharges.

Brandon Michael Baker was found guilty of three counts of trafficking crack cocaine and three counts of possession of the proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors including the nature of crack cocaine, the multiple transactions, the profit motive, and the offender's criminal record.

Mitigating factors included a supportive relationship.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and considering the sentencing range for similar offences, the court imposed a global sentence of 12 months in custody, with ancillary orders for a lifetime firearm prohibition, a 10-year prohibition for other weapons, a DNA sample, and victim surcharges.