Alison Shields

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) whether the first case management judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant; (2) whether the second case management judge erred in dismissing the motion to relitigate the cross-examination application; (3) whether the application judge erred in rejecting the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrant; and (4) whether the application judge erred in admitting evidence despite a violation of the appellant's section 10(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

Following conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving/over 80 causing death arising from a motor vehicle collision that killed two young women, the court imposed a global sentence of six years custody on the impaired driving counts and five years custody on the dangerous driving counts, all running concurrently.

The court rejected both the Crown's submission for 7-8 years and the defence submission for 4 years, balancing denunciation and deterrence against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

The court also imposed a 12-year driving prohibition and a non-communication order.

The court rejected the defence argument that the impaired driving counts should be stayed under the Kienapple principle, finding that impaired driving and dangerous driving address different aspects of road safety.

The court sentenced Jaleem Abdella-Smith for second degree murder, following a jury verdict.

The sentencing reasons review the facts of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, the impact on the victim’s family, and the applicable sentencing principles and ranges.

The court imposed a life sentence with 12 years of parole ineligibility, considering the impulsive nature of the shooting, the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, difficult background, and the particularly harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The decision also addresses the weight of jury recommendations and the importance of denunciation and deterrence in gun violence cases.

The appellant, Cody Cuthbertson, appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in not classifying a Charter breach as more serious.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the seriousness of the breach or in the balancing of factors under R. v. Grant.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision concerns the prosecution of Aysar Younes for two counts each of impaired driving/over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death, arising from a fatal collision on Highway 2 in Trenton, Ontario.

The court addresses the admissibility and reliability of blood alcohol evidence, the continuity of evidence, and the legal standards for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court finds the evidence of blood alcohol concentration and impairment reliable and sufficient, and concludes that Younes' conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in conviction on all counts.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence from Cara Shepard, a forensic toxicologist, in the trial of Aysar Younes for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that while Ms. Shepard’s evidence regarding cocaine use was necessary and within her expertise, it lacked probative value on the issue of impairment or crash phase at the time of the collision and was therefore inadmissible for that purpose.

However, the court allowed the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing continuity of the blood sample.

The accused, Aysar Younes, faced charges of operating a conveyance causing death while impaired/over 80 and dangerous operation causing death.

This ruling addressed two Crown applications: to declare a statement made by Younes to police voluntary, and to determine the admissibility of evidence from a friend regarding the normality of cocaine use in their social group.

The court found the statement voluntary for cross-examination purposes, as conceded by the defence.

However, the court dismissed the Crown's application to admit evidence about the normality of cocaine use, finding its probative value low and the risk of moral prejudice high, particularly in a jury trial.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained by police following a fatal motor vehicle collision, alleging breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the warrantless seizure of airbag control module (ACM) data was lawful under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, as police had reasonable grounds to believe it would provide evidence of an offence.

Similarly, the production order for medical records and search warrant for blood vials were deemed valid, as reasonable grounds existed to suspect impairment.

However, the search warrant for the applicant's cell phone was found to be overly broad and the subsequent search unlawful, infringing s. 8.

Applying the Grant factors, the court admitted the ACM data, medical records, and toxicology reports, but excluded all evidence obtained from the cell phone search due to the seriousness and impact of the breach.

The appellant, Mustaf Yusuf, was on judicial interim release pending his appeal, with conditions including remaining in Ontario and surrendering for the appeal hearing.

His counsel advised the court that he failed to surrender because he was in prison in Somalia, breaching his release conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned, in accordance with the terms of the release order, and issued a warrant for his arrest.

The appellant, Marcia Motayne, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000, stemming from a large-scale payroll fraud exceeding $900,000 perpetrated through her employer's system.

The appellant, as Director of Finance, had exclusive control over the payroll, and the fraudulent transfers were linked to her bank accounts and directly benefited her and her family.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, the elements of fraud, and motive, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, when viewed functionally, was adequate.

The court held that any minor errors in the charge were harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, to which the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.