Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-23-0000038-00 Date: 2025-08-22 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King – and – Aysar Younes, Accused

Counsel: Michael Lunski, for the Crown R. Craig Bottomley and Alison Shields, for the Accused

Heard: June 30, 2025

Reasons for Sentence

MUSZYNSKI J.

Circumstances of the Offence

[1] Following a trial, Aysar Younes was found guilty of two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving / over 80 causing death with respect to a motor vehicle collision that tragically killed two young women. I heard sentencing submissions on June 30, 2025. These are my reasons for sentence.

[2] The facts surrounding the collision are set out in detail in the Reasons for Judgment.[1]

[3] Briefly, at 12:25 p.m. on October 3, 2021, Mr. Younes was driving westbound on Highway 2 in Trenton when his GMC Yukon, travelling almost 40 km/hr over the speed limit, crossed the centre line striking a smaller Nissan that was travelling eastbound. There was no evidence that Mr. Younes attempted to brake before the collision. There was nothing that the driver of the Nissan could do to avoid the collision.

[4] Both occupants of the Nissan, Rebecca Beatty and Anastasia Collins, were pronounced dead at the scene. Mr. Younes was transported to Kingston General Hospital by ambulance. Mr. Younes' blood alcohol concentration (BAC), back projected to the time of the collision, was in the range of 110-142 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. I made a finding that Mr. Younes was impaired in his ability to drive, which was a contributing cause of the collision. Further, I found that Mr. Younes' driving was not a mere momentary lapse of attention, but a marked departure from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe in Mr. Younes' circumstances.

The Victim Impact Evidence

[5] There is no question that the collision had catastrophic consequences.

[6] Rebecca Beatty was 22 years old when she died as a result of the collision. She was the younger sister of Victoria, child of Connie and Mark, a Pastry Chef and a "fur mama". That morning, Rebecca and one of her best friends, Anastasia, were going out to lunch to discuss Anastasia's upcoming wedding. Rebecca was to be one of her bridesmaids.

[7] Rebecca's family members prepared compelling victim impact statements explaining the profound impact her death has had on each of them. Victoria writes that since Rebecca's death, she has suffered with increased anxiety and panic attacks, she struggles with insomnia and has difficulty finding enjoyment in life. Connie expresses that, aside from the trauma of losing a child and the daily grief she experiences, the court proceedings have been the hardest, most stressful experience that she has had to date. On the date that the Reasons for Judgment were delivered, Connie experienced such profound stress and anxiety that she had to go to the hospital. Mark describes October 3, 2021 as being the worst day of his life. Following Rebecca's death, he has been "emotionally lost and empty inside". He wakes up every morning hoping that it was all a bad dream. Rebecca's grandparents write: "Our family has been torn apart and we are struggling to keep it together."

[8] Anastasia Collins was also in her early 20s when she died in the collision. She was an aspiring gemologist and engaged to be married to Chase Marshman. In Mr. Marshman's victim impact statement, he describes his overwhelming grief and that of his son, Karson, who Anastasia was helping to raise. Mr. Marshman writes that he and Karson have suffered ongoing debilitating emotional distress and depression that they are addressing in therapy.

Circumstances of the Offender

[9] There was an extensive volume of materials filed at the sentencing hearing that shed light on Mr. Younes' circumstances including a Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR"), 45 letters in support of Mr. Younes, and the written submissions of counsel. Mr. Younes also made a statement at the sentencing hearing pursuant to s. 726 of the [Criminal Code of Canada][2].

[10] Mr. Younes is 26 years old presently and was 22 years old at the time of the collision. He is a first-time offender. Mr. Younes was an excellent student – having graduated from McGill shortly before the collision, he was an athlete, a loving son, nephew and brother and a loyal friend. He had plans to follow in his father's footsteps by attending dental school. Indeed, at the time of the collision, Mr. Younes was studying to take the Dental Aptitude Test. Currently, Mr. Younes is working on a full-time basis doing IT working at his father's dental practice.

[11] Mr. Younes is the oldest of three children and was raised in a loving family. His parents separated when he was a teenager and there was turmoil for a period of time, but he reports having had a generally stable upbringing.

[12] With respect to substance abuse, Mr. Younes reports to the author of the PSR that he engaged in social drinking, sometimes to an excess, while he was a student at McGill and attributes this behaviour to the university culture. Mr. Younes reports that he now only drinks alcohol very sporadically. Mr. Younes reports that he used cocaine three times in his life and that he had not used cocaine since the collision. The family members of Mr. Younes that were interviewed for the purposes of the PSR all report that the actions of Mr. Younes that resulted in the collision were out of character.

[13] Although I have reviewed and considered them all, I do not intend to recite or summarize all of the letters of support marked as an exhibit at the sentencing hearing. I have elected to quote from a select number of the letters to provide an overview the contents:

• Mr. Younes' father writes: "He speaks often of the girls and their families, tormented by a pain no words can soothe. Yet even in his darkest moments, he strives to honour life through acts of service, as he always has."

• One of Mr. Younes' uncles writes: "What strikes me most about Aysar is his integrity. In our community, he is known as someone respectful, dependable, and humble. He volunteers his time when he can, always carries himself with dignity, and is a source of support for those around him."

• Mr. Younes' sister writes: "The guilt is still there and will always be, but he's using it as motivation to become better."

• Another uncle writes: "He is a respectful compassionate individual who is well-loved by family, friends, and colleagues."

• A friend writes that: "Aysar has consistently demonstrated a genuine desire to give back. He does so quietly, never seeking recognition – motivated only by a sincere desire to make a positive difference."

[14] During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Younes made a statement apologizing to the families of the victims, acknowledging the unimaginable loss they have suffered, and expressing that he thinks of both Ms. Beatty and Ms. Collins daily, wishing that he could trade places.

Positions of the Parties

[15] The Crown submits that a fit and just sentence is:

• A global 7-8 year custodial sentence, with the impaired driving / over 80 counts to attract a 7-8 year sentence and the dangerous driving counts to be slightly less, all to run concurrently;

• A 12-year driving prohibition; and

• Pursuant to s. 743.21 of the [Criminal Code][2], a non-communication order while Mr. Younes is in custody with respect to Judy O'Shaughnessy and Chase Marshman.

[16] The defence submits that a more appropriate sentence is:

• A global 4-year custodial sentence; and

• A 10-year driving prohibition.

[17] Mr. Younes consents to the requested non-communication order.

[18] Mr. Younes takes the position that the impaired driving / over 80 causing death counts should be stayed due to the rule in [Kienapple][3]. The Crown submits that the rule in Kienapple does not apply as there are legal and factual distinctions between the offences of impaired driving/over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death.

Analysis

Principles of Sentencing

[19] The principles of sentencing are largely codified.

[20] Section 718 of the [Criminal Code][2] sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing which is to "contribute, along with crime prevention measures, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing sentences that have one or more of the following objectives:"

a) denouncing unlawful conduct,

b) deterring the offender and others from committing crimes,

c) separating offenders from society where necessary,

d) assisting in the rehabilitation of the offender,

e) providing reparations for harm done to the victim or to the community,

f) promoting a sense of responsibility in the offender, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community.

[21] The principle of proportionality is set out in s. 718.1. This is a foundational principle of sentencing. Any sentence I impose must reflect the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender.

[22] I am also required by s. 718.2 to take the following matters into consideration when imposing sentence:

• the sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender;

• where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

• the sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

• offenders should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate; and

• all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to the victim or the community should be considered for all offenders.

[23] Section 718.2(a)(iii.1) expressly mentions specific aggravating circumstances that must be taken into account on sentencing, including: "evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation."

Mitigating Factors

[24] Mr. Younes is a youthful offender and has no criminal record. The PSR is very strong, as is Mr. Younes' family support. Post-offence Mr. Younes has had to put his educational pursuits on hold but has continued to work on a full-time basis and engage with his community in a prosocial way. These are mitigating factors that I consider in reaching a fit and just sentence.

[25] While there were judicable Charter issues to litigate, Mr. Younes is not entitled to the full mitigating effects of a guilty plea. I do find, however, that the letters of support and Mr. Younes' statement at the sentencing hearing demonstrate that he is remorseful, and I consider this in reaching a fit and just sentence.

Aggravating Factors

[26] The Crown relies on several statutory aggravating factors for sentencing purposes that are specific to certain driving offences.

[27] Section 320.22 (e) of the [Criminal Code][2] states that a BAC equal or greater to 120 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time the offence was committed is an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing. In this case, I accepted the evidence of Karen Sheppard, a toxicologist from the Centre for Forensic Science, that Mr. Younes' BAC at the time of the collision was in the range of 110 – 142 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. The Crown must prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.[4] Although Mr. Younes' BAC was likely equal to or above 120 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood at the time of the collision, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this is the case. Accordingly, I have not considered Mr. Younes' BAC as an aggravating factor on sentencing.

[28] The Crown relies on s. 320.22 (f) of the [Criminal Code][2] which states that an aggravating factor on sentencing includes the offender operating a "large vehicle". Mr. Younes was driving a GMC Yukon SUV. It was a large SUV and far bigger than the Nissan it struck. However, the caselaw suggests that for the purposes of this section, a large vehicle is not a SUV or a pick-up truck, but rather vehicles more akin to transport trucks.[5] In my view, s. 320.22 (f) does not apply in this instance. I have not considered the size of the GMC as an aggravating factor on sentencing.

[29] Although Mr. Younes does not have a criminal record, he does have four minor traffic convictions for failure to yield, failure to have insurance, driving using a hand-held device, and driving without a permit. While a history of traffic offences can certainly be an aggravating factor on sentencing in cases such as this, it is significant that there are no convictions for speeding, stunt driving, or careless driving. I have not considered Mr. Younes' remote history of minor traffic convictions as an aggravating factor in this case.

[30] It is conceded that s. 320.22 (a) of the [Criminal Code][2], that the commission of the offence resulted in bodily harm or death to more than one person applies in this case. The fact that both Ms. Beatty and Ms. Collins died as a result of the collision is therefore an aggravating factor that I take into account on sentencing.

[31] I further consider the fact that Mr. Younes was driving on a busy roadway, midday, when the safety of many people was compromised, as an aggravating factor on sentencing.

[32] A further aggravating factor that I take into account on sentencing is the impact of the offence on the family and friends of Rebecca and Anastasia, which, as is noted by the victim impact statements, is extensive.

Range of Sentence

[33] The maximum sentence for impaired driving / over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death is imprisonment for life.[6] When convicted of one of these offences, the sentencing court has discretion to make an order prohibiting the offender from operating a vehicle of any duration that the court considers appropriate.[7]

[34] The parties have filed extensive caselaw and prepared helpful charts in support of their respective positions on sentence. I do not intend to summarize every case in these reasons. I have reviewed and considered all of the law relied upon by the parties, specifically, the cases set out in Appendix "A" to the Defence Position on Sentencing, which has been filed as Exhibit 2 and Tab 3 to the Crown Outline of Sentencing Submissions, which has been filed as Exhibit 1.

[35] The following cases represent a small sample extracted from the extensive lists I have reviewed and considered in coming to a fit and just sentence:

• Rex v. Thakur: This case involved a guilty plea to one count of impaired operation causing death, and five counts of impaired operation causing bodily harm. Mr. Thakur was driving aggressively at excessive speeds in downtown Toronto on a holiday weekend and had a BAC of 160 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. He had a driving record for speeding. The victims who survived sustained significant injuries. Mr. Thakur had no criminal record, was a relatively youthful offender with good support. Mr. Thakur was sentenced to 8 years in custody.[8]

• R. v. Stahn: Mr. Stahn was convicted of one count of impaired operation causing death following a trial. At the time of the collision, he had a BAC of between 85 – 164 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. Mr. Stahn was 72 years old at the time of sentencing. He had a criminal record, including two impaired driving convictions and a lengthy history of traffic infractions, including speeding and careless driving. Mr. Stahn received an 8-year custodial sentence.[9]

• R. v. Romano: Following a trial, Mr. Romano was convicted of dangerous driving causing death. Mr. Romano was a police officer that was speeding (115 km/hr in a 60 km/hr zone) to try and catch up to his colleagues while he was performing surveillance. Mr. Romano struck and killed the victim as she jaywalked across the street. There was no evidence of impairment. Mr. Romano was sentenced to 8 months in custody.[10]

• R. v. Ramage: Mr. Ramage was convicted of impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a trial. Mr. Ramage crossed four lanes of traffic on a busy roadway and struck two oncoming vehicles. His BAC would have been between 212 – 282 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood. He had no criminal record and was an outstanding member of the community. Mr. Ramage was sentenced to 4 years in custody.[11]

[36] The circumstances that result in convictions for impaired or dangerous driving causing death can vary dramatically. It is for this reason that courts have repeatedly emphasized that there is no defined formal sentencing range.[12] However, as noted by the Court of Appeal in [R. v. Altiman][13]: "..since the turn of the decade, in this province sentences for impaired driving causing death typically have fallen in to the four to six-year range, unless the offender has prior criminal or driving offence record. Where he does, lengthier sentences have been imposed, ranging from seven and one-half to twelve years."[13]

[37] While it is helpful to look at the caselaw, particularly when trying to ensure parity and to extract key legal principles, every case is entirely unique. Further, some of the cases relied upon by counsel pre-date amendments to the [Criminal Code][2] through the introduction of Bill C-46 that increased the maximum penalties for driving offences. I will briefly highlight some key legal principles from the caselaw that guide my approach to determining a fit and just sentence in this case.

[38] Driving offences are often committed by otherwise law-abiding citizens. It is for this reason that denunciation and deterrence are the primary factors to be considered when sentencing an offender for impaired driving or dangerous driving causing death.[14] The sentence imposed must be significant enough to demonstrate society's condemnation of this behaviour and to sufficiently deter others from committing these offences.[15]

[39] Sentences for impaired and dangerous driving offences, particularly those involving fatalities, have increased over time.[16]

[40] The emphasis on denunciation and deterrence should not completely oust consideration of the other principles of sentencing. Particularly relevant in this case, is the prospect for rehabilitation and the principle of restraint given Mr. Younes' lack of criminal record and his young age.

[41] Counsel for Mr. Younes submits that his client is less morally blameworthy than others convicted of the same offence because he did not consume alcohol and immediately drive his vehicle. Instead, counsel submits, that after drinking too much, Mr. Younes went to sleep, woke up, and drove his vehicle for a significant distance before the collision occurred. Mr. Younes did not testify. The only evidence as to when he stopped drinking came in through a medical note wherein it was recorded that Mr. Younes was drinking alcohol until 4:30 a.m. There is no evidence of Mr. Younes' state of mind or whether he even went to sleep. The evidence at trial was Mr. Younes departed the cottage driving his vehicle at approximately 8:30 a.m. and the accident occurred almost four hours later. Although I acknowledge that the facts of this case differ from others where the alcohol consumption and driving occurred contemporaneously or closer in time, I am not convinced that Mr. Younes' moral blameworthiness is reduced significantly given the evidentiary record, or lack thereof, on this issue.[17]

[42] With respect to the driving prohibition, the Crown seeks a 12-year driving prohibition. The defence submits that a 10-year driving prohibition is more appropriate. In coming to an appropriate sentence with respect to the length of driving prohibition, I consider the fact that, for the past four years, Mr. Younes has been prohibited from driving as a condition of his release pending trial. Credit can be granted for a period of pre-sentence driving prohibition.[18] Further, I consider that the prohibition will come into effect immediately on sentencing pursuant to a 2018 amendment to the [Criminal Code][2], and thus will be running while Mr. Younes is incarcerated.[19]

The Application of the Rule in Kienapple

[43] The rule in [Kienapple][3] seeks to prevent multiple convictions for the same delicts.[20]

[44] Mr. Younes submits that there is both a factual and legal nexus between the impaired driving / over 80 causing death counts and the dangerous driving causing death counts. Accordingly, to avoid multiple convictions for the same delicts, Mr. Younes takes the position that the impaired driving / over 80 causing death counts should be stayed.

[45] In support of his position, Mr. Younes relies primarily on a 2024 decision of the Court of Appeal, [R. v. Singh][21]. Mr. Singh was charged with two counts of impaired driving causing death, two counts of over 80 causing death, and two counts of dangerous driving causing death. In reciting the history of the case, the appeal decision notes that the trial judge made findings of guilt on all counts but stayed the over 80 counts and dangerous driving counts pursuant to the principle in Kienapple. The trial decision is not reported. The Kienapple issue was not raised at the appellate level.

[46] The Court of Appeal decision of [Ramage][11] addresses this issue squarely:

An impaired driving charge focuses on an accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle or, more specifically, on whether that ability was impaired by the consumption of alcohol or some other drug. A dangerous driving charge focuses on the manner in which the accused drove and, in particular, whether it presented a danger to the public having regard to the relevant circumstances identified in s. 249 of the Criminal Code. The driver's impairment may explain why he or she drove the vehicle in a dangerous manner, but impairment is not an element of the offence. Both impaired driving and dangerous driving address road safety, a pressing societal concern. They do so, however, by focussing on different dangers posed to road safety. Impaired driving looks to the driver's ability to operate the vehicle, while dangerous driving looks to the manner in which the driver actually operated the vehicle.[22]

[47] I find the conclusion in [Ramage][11] to be dispositive of the Kienapple issue given the circumstances in this case, including the findings of fact that Mr. Younes was driving at nearly 40 km/hr over the speed limit and that he failed to maintain his lane.[23]

Conclusion

[48] The objective at the sentencing stage is to impose a sentence that is fit and just. It is not an easy task.

[49] I have considered the submission of the parties, and the exhibits filed, including, the heartfelt victim impact statements, the letters of support filed by Mr. Younes, the PSR. I have also considered the circumstance of the offence.

[50] I have considered the mitigating and aggravating factors in this case.

[51] Mr. Younes is a youthful, first-time offender. He has family and community support. By all accounts he was an upstanding citizen before and after the events of October 3, 2021. I find that the risk of re-offending to be very low.

[52] It is worth repeating, however, that these types of driving offences are routinely committed by otherwise upstanding, law-abiding citizens. This was avoidable. There is a strong need to reinforce the principles of denunciation and deterrence. For this reason, I find that the 4-year custodial sentence proposed by the defence is not fit and just.

[53] Similarly, I find that the Crown's proposal for a 7–8-year custodial sentence does not adequately take into account the mitigating factors in this case, most notably that Mr. Younes does not have a criminal record and has only a remote traffic record.

[54] After careful consideration, I find that a fit and just sentence is as follows:

• With respect to each of the impaired / over 80 causing death counts on the indictment (Counts #1 and #2), Mr. Younes is sentenced to six years in custody – Count #2 shall run concurrently to Count #1.

• With respect to each of the dangerous driving causing death counts on the indictment (Counts #3 and #4), Mr. Younes is sentenced to five years in custody – each to run concurrently to Count #1.

• There shall be a 12-year driving prohibition, concurrent on all four counts, that shall take effect immediately.

• Pursuant to s. 743.21 of the [Criminal Code of Canada][2], there shall be a non-communication order while Mr. Younes is in custody with respect to Judy O'Shaughnessy and Chase Marshman.

Muszynski J.

Released: August 22, 2025

Footnotes

[1] See R. v. Younes, 2025 ONSC 1401.

[2] RSC 1985, c C-46 (Criminal Code).

[3] R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.

[4] R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368.

[5] R. v. Coates, 2023 ONSC 3392, 169 O.R. (3d) 401 at para. 125; R. v. Beedawia, 2024 ONSC 3247, at para 28; R. v. Taylor, 2024 ONSC 3842, at para 30.

[6] Criminal Code at s. 320.21.

[7] Criminal Code at s. 320.24(4) and (5).

[8] Rex. v. Nitan Thakur, 2024 ONSC 3539.

[9] R. v. Stahn, 2023 ONSC 3572.

[10] R. v. Romano, 2021 ONCA 211.

[11] R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 499.

[12] R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511 at para 71 and R. v. Junkert 2010 ONCA 549, 103 O.R. (3d) 284 at para 40.

[13] Altiman at para 70.

[14] R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at paras 5 and 73-75.

[15] Lacasse, at paras 73-75.

[16] See R. v. Norris 2024 ONSC 1284 at para 55 and Altiman at paras 51-56.

[17] See R. v. Smirkle, 2013 ONCA 678 at para 18.

[18] R. v. Basque, 2023 SCC 18.

[19] See s. 320.24(5) and R. v. Katz, 2025 ONCA 388 at paras 9-11.

[20] R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729.

[21] R. v. Singh, 2024 ONCA 66.

[22] Ramage at para 64.

[23] Albeit without comment, the Ramage principle can been seen to be applied in R. v. Taylor, 2024 ONSC 3842 at paras 1-3, R. v. Dexter 2013 ONCA 744 at para 2.