5 total
The accused was convicted of impaired and dangerous driving causing death after crossing the centre line and colliding head-on with another vehicle.
This decision concerns the prosecution of Aysar Younes for two counts each of impaired driving/over 80 causing death and dangerous driving causing death, arising from a fatal collision on Highway 2 in Trenton, Ontario.
The court addresses the admissibility and reliability of blood alcohol evidence, the continuity of evidence, and the legal standards for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.
The court finds the evidence of blood alcohol concentration and impairment reliable and sufficient, and concludes that Younes' conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in conviction on all counts.
Expert toxicology evidence regarding cocaine use was ruled inadmissible to prove impairment but admissible to establish blood sample continuity.
This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence from Cara Shepard, a forensic toxicologist, in the trial of Aysar Younes for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.
The court found that while Ms. Shepard’s evidence regarding cocaine use was necessary and within her expertise, it lacked probative value on the issue of impairment or crash phase at the time of the collision and was therefore inadmissible for that purpose.
However, the court allowed the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing continuity of the blood sample.
Charter Case dismissed
The accused, Aysar Younes, faced charges of operating a conveyance causing death while impaired/over 80 and dangerous operation causing death.
This ruling addressed two Crown applications: to declare a statement made by Younes to police voluntary, and to determine the admissibility of evidence from a friend regarding the normality of cocaine use in their social group.
The court found the statement voluntary for cross-examination purposes, as conceded by the defence.
However, the court dismissed the Crown's application to admit evidence about the normality of cocaine use, finding its probative value low and the risk of moral prejudice high, particularly in a jury trial.
The court admitted airbag and medical data but excluded cell phone evidence due to an overly broad warrant.
The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained by police following a fatal motor vehicle collision, alleging breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights.
The court found that the warrantless seizure of airbag control module (ACM) data was lawful under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, as police had reasonable grounds to believe it would provide evidence of an offence.
Similarly, the production order for medical records and search warrant for blood vials were deemed valid, as reasonable grounds existed to suspect impairment.
However, the search warrant for the applicant's cell phone was found to be overly broad and the subsequent search unlawful, infringing s. 8.
Applying the Grant factors, the court admitted the ACM data, medical records, and toxicology reports, but excluded all evidence obtained from the cell phone search due to the seriousness and impact of the breach.
A young person was acquitted of theft due to inconsistent and non-credible Crown witness testimony.
A young person was charged with theft of a dirt bike valued at approximately $2,000 under section 334(b) of the Criminal Code.
The bike was stolen from the Mohawk Bay of Quinte Territory on or about September 26, 2017, and was recovered several days later in a severely damaged condition.
The Crown's case relied on testimony from witnesses who claimed the accused admitted to giving the bike to another youth.
However, the court found significant inconsistencies and credibility issues in the Crown's witness testimony, including contradictory statements about how the bike was obtained, material inconsistencies between police statements and trial testimony, and evidence of motive to fabricate.
The accused testified and denied both stealing the bike and giving it to anyone.
The court acquitted the accused, finding that the Crown had failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.