Bradley J. Greenshields

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial, building upon a previous decision.

The court assessed the qualifications and proposed opinion evidence of several Crown experts: Jeremy Dupuis (forensic computer and digital analysis), Dr. Elena Bulakhtina (postmortem examination, adopting conclusions of the deceased Dr. John Fernandes), D/Cst.

Greg Kaut (phone analysis), and Mr. Beatty (functionality of BlackBerry phones).

The court found all experts qualified and their opinion evidence admissible, with counsel agreeing to redact inadmissible portions of the postmortem report for the jury.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought leave to cross-examine three police officers (D/Cst Brian Welsh, Julie Meier, and Constable Michael Ryder) in relation to a pre-trial motion to exclude electronic evidence obtained from a vehicle's infotainment system.

The defence argued the warrant for this evidence was invalid due to alleged s. 8 Charter breaches, material non-disclosure, or misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant, particularly concerning a prior warrantless search.

The Crown agreed to Welsh's cross-examination but opposed Meier and Ryder.

The court granted leave to cross-examine all three officers, finding that the defence had met the "reasonable likelihood" standard that the cross-examination would assist in determining whether the issuing justice was materially misled by the ITO, thereby undermining the warrant process.

The defence brought a pre-trial motion for disclosure of communications between the investigating officer and the Crown attorney regarding an infotainment system warrant, following the Crown's filing of an affidavit by the officer.

The defence argued the materials were relevant to the officer's credibility and the validity of the warrant.

The Crown opposed, arguing the request was overly broad and a "fishing expedition." The court, following an in camera review of the requested documents, ordered the disclosure of specific emails and a volume of documents deemed relevant to the officer's credibility.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion seeking standing to challenge the search and seizure of electronic data (GPS tracklogs and a phone contact list) extracted from a rental vehicle's infotainment system.

The Crown argued the accused lacked standing because the vehicle was obtained under false pretenses and the phone belonged to a third party.

The court applied the Marakah framework and found that the accused had a direct interest and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic data, as it had the potential to reveal intimate biographical details.

The accused was granted standing to argue the Section 8 Charter breach.

The defence moved for disclosure of legal advice provided to the Guelph Police Service, arguing that the police implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by referencing legal advice in an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant, thereby putting their good faith in issue.

The Crown and Guelph Police Service denied waiver.

The court distinguished the facts from R. v. Campbell, finding no illegal police activity and that the references to legal advice were part of a narrative for full disclosure, not an attempt to justify illegal activity.

The court held that the police did not implicitly waive privilege, and the defence's request for disclosure was dismissed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude Crown evidence due to alleged s. 8 Charter breaches.

In response to an affidavit filed by the investigating officer, the applicant sought disclosure of all recorded communications between the officer and the Crown Attorney regarding a warrant.

The Crown did not object to providing the materials to the judge for review.

The court ordered the Crown to provide the requested information for the judge's review pursuant to R. v. Dixon and R. v. Chu.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the accused, Raja Dosanjh, during a police interview in a first-degree murder case.

The defence put the Crown to its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, without raising specific issues regarding promises, threats, or oppressive circumstances.

The court conducted a contextual analysis, considering factors such as the accused's demeanor, understanding of rights, and the absence of inducements, oppression, lack of operating mind, or trickery.

The court found that the accused voluntarily chose to speak to the officer and that the statements were admissible.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court, acting as gatekeeper, reviewed the qualifications and reports of seven proposed expert witnesses.

While the defence conceded the admissibility of most experts, the court ruled on the scope of their evidence.

The court accepted experts in DNA analysis, photogrammetry, gunshot residue, and firearms examination.

However, the court expressed concerns regarding the clarity of reports and the current qualifications of two experts in phone analysis and phone functionality, requiring further clarification or a voir dire before their evidence could be admitted.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of two sex trade workers found in different locations in the Niagara Region approximately 29 months apart.

Both victims died of blunt-force trauma to the head, and blood of both victims was found in the appellant's residences.

The trial judge admitted evidence of one count as similar act evidence on the other count and refused to sever the counts.

The trial judge also refused to discharge a juror who had a prior acquaintance with the victim's stepmother, and declined to leave manslaughter as an included offence.

The Court of Appeal found multiple errors: the similar act evidence did not meet the required threshold of striking similarity, the juror should have been discharged to preserve the appearance of fairness, and manslaughter should have been left to the jury.

The court also addressed a Charter breach regarding live monitoring conditions in wiretap authorizations but found the evidence admissible under section 24(2).

The accused, Jeetinder Gill, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown did not pursue attempted murder.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of multiple witnesses, including the complainant and his associates, finding their testimonies to be inconsistent, self-serving, and unreliable, particularly regarding alcohol and drug consumption and the events leading to the stabbing.

Objective evidence from a hotel guest and manager contradicted the complainant's narrative of a peaceful interaction.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the stabbing.

An acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to provide the necessaries of life to his blind and cognitively impaired mother and sister, resulting in their deaths from starvation and septic shock respectively.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of 18 years (8 years consecutive for criminal negligence in his sister's death and 10 years for manslaughter in his mother's death).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal.

The court found that while the verdicts were inconsistent (acquittal on manslaughter but conviction on criminal negligence for the sister's death), the criminal negligence conviction was reasonable and supported by evidence, whereas the manslaughter acquittal arose from a manifest legal error.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's cognitive limitations on the sentencing issue and reduced the global sentence to 14 years, minus presentence custody credit of 1,405 days, resulting in a net sentence of 10 years and 2 months.

The Crown appealed an acquittal resulting from the exclusion of evidence of child pornography under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

Police seized a family computer from the home co-owned by the respondent and his common-law spouse without a warrant, based on the spouse's consent.

The computer was retained for four months without judicial authorization before a warrant was obtained to search it.

The application judge found multiple Charter violations and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the application judge erred in finding the spouse could not consent to the seizure, and conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, ultimately admitting the evidence and ordering a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import and importing heroin following a jury trial.

He received concurrent sentences of 16 years in penitentiary, less 4 months pre-disposition credit.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on six grounds, including issues relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, post-arrest statements, travel history evidence, and jury instructions regarding a Vetrovec witness.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the sentence appeal as well.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal under s. 20 of the Extradition Act after being committed for extradition to the United States on allegations of online child sexual exploitation and child luring.

Applying the s. 679 Criminal Code test as modified by the extradition context, the court held that although the appeal was not frivolous, the grounds were weak, the applicant failed to show he was not a flight risk, and continued detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court emphasized the expanded record alleging a broader pattern of systematic exploitation of numerous young female victims, the limits of the proposed electronic monitoring regime, and the risk of internet access despite house arrest.

Public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice both required continued detention.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the convictions were unreasonable because no cocaine was seized during the transactions and the substance could have been methamphetamine.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting intercepted communications without a Carter ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, police surveillance, and physical evidence found upon arrest, overwhelmingly established the substance was cocaine.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to make a Carter ruling, the error was harmless given the strength of the other evidence.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, brought a second application for the extradition of the respondent on charges of cross-border internet child sexual exploitation.

The first committal order was quashed on appeal due to insufficient evidence linking the respondent to the IP address.

In this second application, relying on both American and Canadian-gathered evidence, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the reasonable inference that the respondent committed the offences using his laptop and IP address.

The respondent's applications for further disclosure and Charter exclusion having been dismissed, the court ordered his committal for extradition.

The applicant, Marco Viscomi, brought a Charter application to exclude Canadian-gathered evidence from a second extradition application, alleging unlawful residential searches, improper execution of searches, unauthorized forensic searches, unlawful detention of seized items, and a breach of the affiant's duty of candour in obtaining a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the search warrants were lawfully issued, the forensic searches were authorized, the detention of items was not contrary to the Charter, and there was no material breach of the duty of candour.

While acknowledging potential minor Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, the court concluded that these were not serious and had no meaningful impact on the lawfulness of the evidence seizure, thus not warranting exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault against his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence solely because he accepted the complainant's evidence, misapplied the burden of proof, and improperly ruled prior out-of-court statements inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the burden of proof was properly applied, and the trial judge's credibility findings were sound despite the evidentiary ruling on prior statements.

In advance of a renewed extradition committal hearing, the applicant sought further police notes and investigative reports to challenge the admissibility of Canadian-gathered computer evidence on Charter grounds.

The court held that the governing threshold was an air of reality test, even where the requested disclosure related to Canadian-derived evidence that would be central to committal under s. 32(2) of the Extradition Act.

After reviewing the extensive disclosure already provided, the court found the applicant had more than adequate material to mount meaningful Charter arguments concerning the searches, seizures, detention orders, and related investigative steps.

There was no realistic possibility that additional disclosure would affect the outcome, and the application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and assault following a brawl in a restaurant where he brandished a knife and a patron was stabbed.

The appellant testified he brandished the knife in self-defence and the stabbing was accidental.

The trial judge refused to leave self-defence to the jury, finding it incompatible with accident, and directed the jury that the first two elements of the weapons charge were proven.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge usurped the jury's fact-finding function, erred in finding self-defence and accident incompatible, and improperly directed a verdict on essential elements.