Bradley J. Greenshields

The accused was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and sought exclusion of computer-related evidence.

The court found that the police conducted a warrantless search of the accused's home computer relying solely on the consent of his common-law spouse, which was insufficient as a third party cannot waive another's Charter rights.

The police also failed to comply with sections 489.1 and 490 of the Criminal Code regarding the detention and reporting of seized property.

Additionally, the information to obtain the search warrant was misleading and incomplete.

The court excluded all computer-generated evidence and any derivative evidence.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for child luring based on internet communications traced to an IP address.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for extradition after inferring that the appellant was the user of the IP address at the relevant time because he was the subscriber.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable without further evidence linking the subscriber to the actual use of the device at the time of the offence, and quashed the committal order.

The Court also dismissed a constitutional challenge to the ex parte gathering and sending provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, finding they contained adequate safeguards to satisfy procedural fairness under the Charter.

The applicant applied for bail pending his appeal of an order committing him for extradition to the United States on charges relating to child pornography and child luring.

The court found that the applicant was not a flight risk and that the public interest alone did not justify his continued detention.

However, the application for bail was dismissed because the applicant failed to raise an arguable ground of appeal from his committal order.

The court found the evidence was sufficient for committal and that subscriber information obtained without a warrant would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual abuse against his step-daughter and biological daughter.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by relying on improper cross-examination about motive to fabricate, failing to address inconsistencies, and improperly relying on the appellant's courtroom demeanour outside the witness box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was proper, the inconsistencies were minor, and the trial judge's modest reliance on courtroom demeanour did not cause a miscarriage of justice given the other cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The applicant sought to re-open ex parte proceedings under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) that resulted in Gathering and Sending Orders.

The applicant alleged material non-disclosure by the Attorney General regarding the legality of search warrants, the need for disclosure in extradition proceedings, warrantless seizure of subscriber information, and the authority to detain seized items.

The court found no material non-disclosure that would have altered the outcome or justified granting the applicant notice and standing at the MLACMA hearings.

The application to re-open was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's, and erred in drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his father as a witness.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh medical evidence explaining his father's absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it was a strategic decision at trial not to call the father.

The Court upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments and found no error in the limited adverse inference drawn regarding the missing witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission of 20 months and imposed a sentence of 5 years plus time served.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge erred by not allowing further submissions before departing from the joint submission and by failing to give it significant weight.

The Court of Appeal agreed the judge erred procedurally, but found the 5-year sentence fit, as the proposed 20-month sentence would have brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime.

He argued that the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant lacked sufficient reliable evidence and that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the ITO contained sufficient information from confidential informants and police surveillance to justify the warrant.

The Court also held that despite the trial judge's brevity and misapprehension of a defence concession, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review given the uncontroverted evidence of trafficking indicia.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence, which included a 'serious violent offence' designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The convictions arose from an incident where the young person robbed the victim of a cell phone and subsequently assaulted him, resulting in the victim's finger being severed on a chain-link fence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the risk of bodily harm was objectively foreseeable.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the preliminary threshold for a serious violent offence designation is automatically met when serious bodily harm is caused, with foreseeability remaining a factor at the discretionary stage.

The appellant appealed his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility for a murder conviction.

He argued that the unforeseen statutory consequences of a subsequent drug sentence on his overall period of parole ineligibility rendered the murder sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the subsequent drug sentence and the order of proceedings had no bearing on the fitness of the sentence imposed for the murder conviction.

In a murder prosecution, the court considered a voir dire on the voluntariness of several statements given by the accused to police in 2002.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to lack of a proper caution, deceptive investigative tactics, and the police use of evidence previously obtained in breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.

The court held that the absence of a caution and police deception did not undermine voluntariness, as the accused understood her right to silence and demonstrated sophistication during the interviews.

However, fairness concerns arose where police referenced material seized unconstitutionally from a gun locker.

The court ruled the statements voluntary but ordered that portions referring to that material be excised.

During a murder trial, the defence challenged the admissibility of a journal and cassette recording seized from a locked gun locker in the marital home, arguing the search violated the accused’s s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the accused had not provided legally valid consent for police to open the locker and seize the items, resulting in a Charter breach.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact on the accused’s privacy interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The police were found to have acted in good faith during the early stages of a homicide investigation and reasonably believed consent had been given.

Balancing the factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and ruled the items admissible.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in relation to the death of her spouse.

The Crown sought a ruling that multiple statements made by the accused to police during the investigation were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary because the accused had become the primary suspect during the investigation but was not cautioned, and police misled her about her status.

Applying the confessions rule and the operating mind doctrine, the court assessed the context of the interviews, the accused’s sophistication, and the absence of coercive police conduct.

The court concluded the accused understood she was speaking with police and that her statements could be used as evidence, and that the police conduct, including limited deception, did not undermine voluntariness.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a co-accused who recanted his preliminary inquiry testimony at trial, providing exculpatory evidence for the appellant.

The trial judge admitted the preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents but failed to properly distinguish between the exculpatory and inculpatory portions in her Vetrovec warning to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to seek confirmatory evidence for both the exculpatory and inculpatory portions of the testimony, rather than tying the exculpatory evidence to the reasonable doubt standard.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on statements made by the appellant during a 'Mr. Big' operation, cell phone records, and a tacit admission to a friend.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by permitting prohibited propensity reasoning, ruling that the defence violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no impermissible propensity reasoning, upholding the Browne v. Dunn ruling as fair, and concluding the hearsay instruction caused no prejudice.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a Superior Court order allowing the respondent's appeal from his conviction on two counts of sexual assault and directing a new trial.

The Crown conceded the appeal did not raise an issue of broader significance but argued leave should be granted because the merits were very strong.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the merits alone did not warrant granting leave in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of seven months' imprisonment for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements without a voir dire, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and prematurely terminating the cross-examination of the child witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of evidence, the assessment of credibility, or the trial judge's decision to stop cross-examination due to the witness's distress.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and assault with intent to resist arrest.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent custody and a two-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the gravity of the conduct which involved running two red lights and causing significant injuries to two people.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed for robbery.

The sentencing judge had determined a penitentiary sentence was warranted but used pre-sentence custody to reduce the sentence to under two years, thereby making a conditional sentence available.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error under R. v. Fice, as pre-sentence custody should be treated as a credit against the appropriate sentence, not a mitigating factor to alter the sentence type.

The appeal was allowed, and a three-year penitentiary sentence was deemed appropriate, resulting in 16 months and two weeks remaining to be served in custody.

The appellant hospital appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board placing a young person, who was found not criminally responsible, in medium security at its facility.

All parties had jointly submitted that the young person should be placed at a youth mental health facility.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's disposition unreasonable, as there was no evidentiary foundation for its conclusions regarding medical treatment availability or family support logistics.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for an expedited new hearing.