Bradley J. Greenshields

The appellant appealed his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility for a murder conviction.

He argued that the unforeseen statutory consequences of a subsequent drug sentence on his overall period of parole ineligibility rendered the murder sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the subsequent drug sentence and the order of proceedings had no bearing on the fitness of the sentence imposed for the murder conviction.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to elicit from its witness in chief that she had given a previous inconsistent statement because she was afraid of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing this constituted impermissible oath-helping.

The court ruled that eliciting the fact of a previous inconsistent statement in chief does not constitute oath-helping, as it detracts from rather than bolsters the witness's truthfulness.

However, the court held that the explanation for the previous statement should generally wait for cross-examination and re-examination.

The Crown was permitted to elicit the fact of the previous statements and the timing of the witness's change of heart.

In a murder prosecution, the court considered a voir dire on the voluntariness of several statements given by the accused to police in 2002.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to lack of a proper caution, deceptive investigative tactics, and the police use of evidence previously obtained in breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.

The court held that the absence of a caution and police deception did not undermine voluntariness, as the accused understood her right to silence and demonstrated sophistication during the interviews.

However, fairness concerns arose where police referenced material seized unconstitutionally from a gun locker.

The court ruled the statements voluntary but ordered that portions referring to that material be excised.

During a murder trial, the defence challenged the admissibility of a journal and cassette recording seized from a locked gun locker in the marital home, arguing the search violated the accused’s s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the accused had not provided legally valid consent for police to open the locker and seize the items, resulting in a Charter breach.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact on the accused’s privacy interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The police were found to have acted in good faith during the early stages of a homicide investigation and reasonably believed consent had been given.

Balancing the factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and ruled the items admissible.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in relation to the death of her spouse.

The Crown sought a ruling that multiple statements made by the accused to police during the investigation were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary because the accused had become the primary suspect during the investigation but was not cautioned, and police misled her about her status.

Applying the confessions rule and the operating mind doctrine, the court assessed the context of the interviews, the accused’s sophistication, and the absence of coercive police conduct.

The court concluded the accused understood she was speaking with police and that her statements could be used as evidence, and that the police conduct, including limited deception, did not undermine voluntariness.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a co-accused who recanted his preliminary inquiry testimony at trial, providing exculpatory evidence for the appellant.

The trial judge admitted the preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents but failed to properly distinguish between the exculpatory and inculpatory portions in her Vetrovec warning to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to seek confirmatory evidence for both the exculpatory and inculpatory portions of the testimony, rather than tying the exculpatory evidence to the reasonable doubt standard.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on statements made by the appellant during a 'Mr. Big' operation, cell phone records, and a tacit admission to a friend.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by permitting prohibited propensity reasoning, ruling that the defence violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no impermissible propensity reasoning, upholding the Browne v. Dunn ruling as fair, and concluding the hearsay instruction caused no prejudice.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a Superior Court order allowing the respondent's appeal from his conviction on two counts of sexual assault and directing a new trial.

The Crown conceded the appeal did not raise an issue of broader significance but argued leave should be granted because the merits were very strong.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the merits alone did not warrant granting leave in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of seven months' imprisonment for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements without a voir dire, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and prematurely terminating the cross-examination of the child witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of evidence, the assessment of credibility, or the trial judge's decision to stop cross-examination due to the witness's distress.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm and assault with intent to resist arrest.

He appealed his sentence of 90 days intermittent custody and a two-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the gravity of the conduct which involved running two red lights and causing significant injuries to two people.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed for robbery.

The sentencing judge had determined a penitentiary sentence was warranted but used pre-sentence custody to reduce the sentence to under two years, thereby making a conditional sentence available.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error under R. v. Fice, as pre-sentence custody should be treated as a credit against the appropriate sentence, not a mitigating factor to alter the sentence type.

The appeal was allowed, and a three-year penitentiary sentence was deemed appropriate, resulting in 16 months and two weeks remaining to be served in custody.

The appellant hospital appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board placing a young person, who was found not criminally responsible, in medium security at its facility.

All parties had jointly submitted that the young person should be placed at a youth mental health facility.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's disposition unreasonable, as there was no evidentiary foundation for its conclusions regarding medical treatment availability or family support logistics.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for an expedited new hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge rejected his evidence simply because she believed the complainant, and that the reasons were insufficient under the Sheppard test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not expressly articulate the basis for rejecting the appellant's evidence, a fair reading of the reasons as a whole showed she considered all the evidence, including the complainant's emotional state and the 911 call, which supported the complainant's version of events.

The Crown appealed a sentence of two years' probation imposed on a young person convicted of assault causing bodily harm, which the sentencing judge designated a serious violent offence.

The young person, acting as the principal in a group assault, knocked the victim unconscious and continued to strike him, causing a broken jaw and concussion.

The Court of Appeal found the probationary term failed to reflect the proportionality principle under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence of four months' open custody, two months' community supervision, and six months' probation was substituted.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to make a mandatory DNA data bank order under s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code following the respondent's conviction for robbery.

The sentencing judge declined to make the order because a DNA order had previously been made against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the legislation requires the mandatory order to be made even if a profile already exists in the data bank, as the new order ensures the existing sample is not destroyed if the prior order is successfully appealed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for welfare fraud, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that bank accounts held in trust need not be disclosed on a welfare application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicable legislation authorized the municipality to request information regarding all bank accounts, including trust accounts, to determine eligibility.

The Court also noted the appellant had access to the funds and had failed to disclose other assets and income.

The appellant was convicted of possession of an unlicensed firearm and careless storage after a sawed-off shotgun was found under his bed.

At trial, he testified that an acquaintance had stayed at his condominium and left the gun.

The trial judge rejected this explanation because the appellant had not disclosed it to the police earlier, treating it like an alibi defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by using the appellant's pre-trial silence to reject his credibility, violating his section 7 Charter right to silence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for dangerous driving involving a police chase, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by using a three-year penitentiary term as a starting point.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a lower penitentiary sentence was called for given the aggravating features of the conduct.

In an addendum to a sentence appeal decision, the Court of Appeal corrected an illegal probation order it had previously imposed.

The appellant's new sentence of two years was consecutive to a previous sentence of five years and nine months.

Because the total merged sentence exceeded two years, a probation order was not legally available under the Criminal Code.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to correct the accidental error and struck the probation order.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a driving offence involving excessive speed and racing.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence and failing to strictly follow the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly considered all evidence and that the sentence was entirely fit given the finding that the appellant was racing.