Delaram M. Jafari

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting an ex parte eviction order under s. 78 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The eviction was ordered because the tenant failed to comply with a prior conditional order requiring rent to be paid in full and on time.

The tenant paid rent one day late and short of the full amount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.

The court noted that the tenant failed to utilize the statutory mechanism to move to set aside the ex parte order at the Board, which would have allowed for a broader evidentiary challenge.

The appellants sought to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing their application to evict the respondent tenants for personal use.

The LTB found that the appellants, who transferred a 1% interest in the property from their wholly-owned corporation to themselves days before serving the eviction notice, acted in bad faith to evade the statutory prohibition against corporate landlords evicting for personal use.

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to appeal but dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no error of law in the LTB's determination that the corporation remained the true landlord.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy on the basis that the landlord required the unit in good faith for her daughter's residential occupation.

The tenant argued the Board erred by finding good faith without hearing testimony from the landlord, by refusing to join the tenant's maintenance applications, and by relying on a non-compliant statutory declaration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no statutory requirement for the landlord to testify, no breach of procedural fairness in the Board controlling its own procedure, and that the daughter's declaration substantially complied with the statutory requirements.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision refusing to terminate a tenancy.

The landlord argued the building was originally a 'life lease' building exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act, and therefore section 51(1), which protects tenants during condominium conversions, did not apply.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's determination that the Act applied was a question of mixed fact and law based on incomplete evidence regarding the prior life lease, and thus outside the court's appellate jurisdiction.

The tenant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board evicting him from his basement apartment so the landlords' daughter could occupy the unit.

The tenant argued he was denied procedural fairness when the Board refused a further adjournment after his lawyer withdrew, and that the eviction was in bad faith and part of a harassment campaign involving the RCMP.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Board's refusal to grant another adjournment given the history of delays, and holding that the tenant's other arguments raised questions of fact rather than questions of law.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision denying an extension of time to request a review of a prior consent eviction order.

At a case conference, the court considered the conditions for maintaining the statutory stay of eviction pending the appeal.

Finding that the tenant had paid no rent since the LTB proceedings and owed significant arrears, the court ordered the tenant to pay $10,000 in prior arrears, 50% of recent arrears, and ongoing monthly rent to maintain the stay.

Failure to make the payments would result in the stay being lifted.

Following an appeal regarding lawful rent and temporary rent accommodations during the pandemic, the respondent tenant sought costs based on an offer to settle.

The court noted that the tenant succeeded on one issue but conceded the second issue late in the proceedings.

Finding that success on the appeal was divided, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that a 17-month pandemic rent reduction became the lawful rent under s. 111 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The landlord argued the arrangement was a rent deferral, not a discount, and sought $15,000 in arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed this ground of appeal, holding that the Board's conclusion was a factual finding unreviewable on appeal and that the landlord failed to document a deferral agreement.

However, the court quashed a portion of the Board's decision that improperly ruled on the current rent, as the tenant had been paying the original rent plus increases for over a year, triggering the limitation periods in ss. 135.1 and 136.

The appellant/tenant, Jeffrey Potofsky, brought a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal and for a stay of eviction orders issued by Charney J. The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate an intention to appeal within the prescribed deadline or provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

The court also found significant prejudice to the respondent/landlord due to protracted non-payment of substantial rental arrears.

Furthermore, the proposed appeal was deemed meritless, and the criteria for granting a stay (serious issue, irreparable harm, balance of convenience) were not met.

Costs were awarded to the responding party.

The tenant appealed an eviction order and a subsequent review order of the Landlord and Tenant Board, alleging procedural unfairness and a reasonable apprehension of bias by the reviewing Member.

The tenant claimed he did not receive notice of the original hearing and that the reviewing Member improperly restricted his representative's conduct during the review hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of procedural unfairness or bias, and held that the Member's conduct was a reasonable exercise of discretion to manage the hearing expeditiously.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing its application to evict the tenant and seeking compensation for mold damage.

The Board had found the landlord failed to prove the tenant caused the mold and granted the tenant a rent abatement for inadequate ventilation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the Board misstated the legal test for causation in its conclusion, the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the Board's factual finding that the tenant did not cause the mold was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The tenants appealed an order requiring them to pay $45,397.40 in rent arrears to the landlord.

They argued the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and the matter should have been heard by the Landlord and Tenant Board, alleging the landlord artificially inflated the arrears by refusing rent to exceed the Board's monetary limit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly exercised jurisdiction under s. 207(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, as the claim exceeded the Board's $35,000 limit, and there was no evidence the landlord improperly inflated the arrears.

The applicant condominium corporation sought a compliance order against a unit owner for alleged hoarding, denial of entry to service personnel, and an inoperable vehicle in her parking spot.

The court found that the respondent had engaged in hoarding behavior and unreasonably denied entry on several occasions, and that her car was unsightly and inoperable.

A compliance order was granted, allowing the corporation entry with notice, requiring the respondent to rectify hazards, and to restore or remove her vehicle.

However, the order was narrower than sought by the applicant, with longer notice periods and an obligation for the applicant's personnel to accommodate the respondent's health concerns.

The court declined to award costs to either party, citing divided success and the applicant's excessive allegations.

The applicant property owner brought an urgent application to declare the respondent a trespasser and obtain an order for vacant possession.

The respondent claimed to have an oral lease agreement and refused to vacate, preventing the applicant from closing a pending sale of the property.

The court found no evidence of any lease agreement or payment of rent, concluding the respondent moved in without authorization.

The court held that the Residential Tenancies Act did not apply, declared the respondent a trespasser, and ordered her to vacate the premises.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking his defamation claim against his former employer.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that a termination letter sent to an employment agency was not 'published' to the public, and alternatively, that the appellant failed to provide notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that publication to a single third party satisfies the test for defamation, and that the s. 5(1) notice requirement does not apply to private emails or letters.

The defamation claim was restored.

The tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating their tenancy and evicting them for smoking marijuana in their unit, which caused health issues for the landlords' children.

The tenants argued the notice of termination was invalid because it failed to specify the exact times they smoked, and that they were denied procedural fairness during the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Residential Tenancies Act requires grounds, not specific times, and that the notice provided sufficient detail.

The court also found no procedural unfairness in the Board's conduct of the hearing.

The appellant landlords appealed three decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding they terminated a tenancy in bad faith and denying two subsequent review requests.

The landlords failed to attend the initial hearing, claiming confusion over multiple hearing notices.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of procedural fairness or error of law.

The Board reasonably proceeded in the landlords' absence, considered their late-filed evidence, and properly denied the review requests due to the landlords' lack of diligence in failing to attend or seek clarification.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing her motion to void an eviction order under s. 74(11) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The tenant argued that because she was on a month-to-month tenancy, s. 74(12), which limits a tenant to one such motion 'during the period of the tenant's tenancy agreement', reset every month.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the tenant's interpretation would lead to an absurd result and render the statutory limitation meaningless, as a month-to-month tenancy is a continuation of the same tenancy agreement.

The tenants appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their tenancy to allow the landlord to demolish the rental unit.

The tenants argued the Board erred in finding the landlord took all reasonable steps to obtain the necessary demolition permit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's finding was one of fact or mixed fact and law, which is not appealable under the Residential Tenancies Act.

Furthermore, the court found the Board correctly interpreted the legislation in determining that only the demolition permit, not a building permit, was relevant, and that vacant possession was required to obtain it.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating her tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The tenant argued that the notice of termination was invalid because it was signed by the landlord's property manager, and that section 43(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act requires an agent to be licensed by the Law Society of Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's interpretation that the Act does not define 'agent' and does not require an agent signing a notice of termination to be licensed to provide legal services.