David Reinhold Nash

The applicant, the elected Chief of the Caldwell First Nation, sought judicial review of a Band Council decision removing her from office.

The Council had passed a motion to remove the applicant during an in-camera meeting without prior notice, relying in part on without prejudice settlement communications.

The Federal Court granted the application, finding that the Council breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with notice of the intention to discuss her removal and an opportunity to be heard.

The decision was set aside and the matter referred back to Council for redetermination.

The applicants, who were the foster parents of a two-and-a-half-year-old child, applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to review the Children's Aid Society's decision to remove the child from their care and place him with a maternal kin family out of province.

The child had lived with the applicants since he was three days old, along with his half-sister.

The Board considered expert evidence on attachment and the potential trauma of disrupting the child's bond with the foster family.

The Board determined that it was in the child's best interests to remain with the applicants, where he could be adopted alongside his half-sister, and directed the Society not to carry out the proposed removal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found her incapable of making treatment decisions regarding anti-psychotic medications.

The Board found she understood relevant information but could not appreciate the foreseeable consequences of her decisions due to her inability to recognize her mental condition's manifestations.

The Superior Court upheld the Board's decision, finding no error of law and that the Board's application of the capacity test was reasonable, particularly regarding the corroboration of suicidal ideation as a manifestation of her condition, despite her attributing it to life circumstances.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include claims for punitive and aggravated damages, and costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995, arising from a motor vehicle accident involving an impaired driver.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments constituted a new cause of action and would cause prejudice.

The court granted leave to claim punitive and aggravated damages and to plead impaired driving, finding these were not new causes of action and any prejudice could be remedied by costs or adjournment.

However, leave to claim costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights was denied, as impaired driving is not a prescribed offence under the relevant section of the Act.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging reprisal, poisoned environment, and discrimination based on sex and disability, stemming from a 2005 incident where she witnessed the former Executive Director sexually assault a colleague.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for delay, as the application was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident.

Following a preliminary hearing by teleconference, the Tribunal dismissed the allegations relating to the 2005 incident and the subsequent investigation as out of time.

The Tribunal directed an in-person preliminary hearing to determine whether the delay in filing the remaining allegations was incurred in good faith, whether the respondent would suffer substantial prejudice, and whether certain allegations have no reasonable prospect of success.

A lender brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of a loan exceeding $1.6 million and dismissal of the borrower’s counterclaim.

The borrower, a First Nation, alleged that the lender negligently advanced loans and acted in an advisory capacity when financing land purchases intended for a reserve, creating a fiduciary or special relationship beyond a typical debtor‑creditor relationship.

The borrower asserted that the lender’s conduct contributed to financial losses and raised an equitable set‑off defence grounded in alleged breaches of duty.

The court held that the evidentiary record raised genuine issues regarding whether the lender assumed an advisory role and whether exceptional circumstances created a fiduciary relationship.

Because those issues required a detailed factual assessment and credibility determinations, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and varied the order below in accordance with the agreement of the parties.

No costs were ordered.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until the insurer terminated them.

The applicant applied for arbitration, claiming an ongoing inability to perform her essential tasks as a Becker's store manager due to chronic pain and psychological factors.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's job was physically demanding and that she remained substantially unable to perform its essential tasks.

The arbitrator rejected the insurer's arguments that the applicant's disability was solely due to unrelated personal tragedies or pregnancy, and ordered the insurer to pay ongoing weekly income benefits, interest, and arbitration expenses.

The applicant union sought an interim order under section 92.1 of the Labour Relations Act regarding changes to drivers' working conditions implemented by the responding employer without union input.

The union argued the changes violated the statutory freeze under section 81(1) of the Act.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board granted the interim direction, ordering the employer to rescind the new arrangements and return the situation to what it was prior to the changes, pending bargaining in good faith.