His Majesty the King v. Gary Leblanc, 2026 ONSC 1166

Court File and Parties

Citation: R. v. Leblanc, 2026 ONSC 1166 Court File No.: CR-25-1213 Date: 2026-02-27 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King

• and - Gary Leblanc

Counsel: H. Palin, for the Crown M. Falovo, for Mr. Leblanc

Heard: January 21, 2026

Reasons for Sentence

A.J. GOODMAN J.:

1On December 5, 2025, after a judge-alone trial, the accused, Gary Leblanc (“Leblanc”) was found guilty of two counts in the indictment, namely - one count of sexual interference and one count of sexual assault, contrary to their respective provisions in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. He was found not guilty and acquitted of the remaining counts.

2The Crown seeks a significant penitentiary sentence in relation to the conviction for sexual interference.

3The Crown has proposed a sentence of seven years, citing the aggravating factors present in this case. In support of its position, the Crown primarily relies on a series of cases to demonstrate that a seven-year sentence aligns with the principles and objectives of sentencing.

4The Crown also seeks various ancillary orders including; DNA, a weapons prohibition order, a SIORA order, a s. 161 order for life; and a s. 743.21 prohibition of contact with the complainant.

5Leblanc submits that the principle of parity requires this Court to impose a sentence consistent with those handed down to similarly situated offenders for comparable offences under similar circumstances. In contrast, the cases cited by the Crown are relied upon for the legal principles they establish rather than the actual facts and circumstances of the offence or his conduct. Therefore, according to Leblanc, the cases the Crown relies upon are less relevant to determining an appropriate sentence in this case.

6Leblanc contends that his more than 20-year conviction-free period should be given significant weight and, to some extent, mitigate the impact of his prior record. This lengthy interval demonstrates not only his capacity for rehabilitation but also the reduced risk he currently poses to the public, particularly as a 62-year-old man with substantial health concerns.

7Leblanc respectfully submits that, having regard to the applicable statutory sentencing provisions, the relevant jurisprudence and the specific facts of his case, he is in a time-served position, having accumulated actual pre-sentence custody days, enhanced to 1,454 days (approximately four years). Leblanc acknowledges that sentencing is a highly discretionary exercise and that, depending on the weight the Court assigns to the relevant factors, a fit global sentence could reasonably fall within a range of two and a half to four and a half years.

8Leblanc does not oppose the DNA order, the weapons prohibition order, or the order prohibiting contact with the complainant. He accepts that a SOIRA compliance order and a s. 161 order are appropriate in principle, but respectfully submits that their scope and duration should reflect the statutory framework and the facts proven at trial. A lifetime SOIRA compliance order is not warranted.

Circumstances of the offences:

9My oral reasons for judgment were provided to the parties. Briefly, the victim met Leblanc's daughter in grades three or four. The victim lost contact with the daughter but viewed Leblanc as a father figure. The victim moved into Leblanc’s residence in November of 2022. Leblanc knew the victim as a friend of his daughter's and was aware of her age. Leblanc began providing the victim with alcohol and began sexually assaulting her by grabbing her breasts and putting his hands down her pants. On one occasion, Leblanc got on top of the victim and held her wrists down trying to force himself on her and he began slamming her wrists down as she tried to break free. He also forced her to put her hands down his pants saying"Come on, come on, come on.” She would not be able to say no because Leblanc would get really angry and would withhold alcohol and/or drugs from her. Leblanc would fondle the victim's breasts daily before leaving the apartment to go to work.

Victim Impact Statement (“VIS”)

10The victim writes: “shortly after this happened, CAS told me I had to go into foster care… I missed out on finishing school because of me constantly moving from one placement to another. I never felt safe.”

11“I still can’t look at a grown man or be near a man, even male family members without automatically thinking of the ways they can harm me and the power they hold over me. I am terrified of a man hurting me. I looked at him as my protector, the one who would keep me safe, except he chose to sexualize me. For a long time, I continued to believe that I had to have sex with people for them to love me. I haven’t ever allowed myself to feel what happened to me, because if I feel the feelings, it means it really happened. And I can’t allow myself to go there. I lost most of my friends because they were angry with me because of telling the truth.”

Circumstances of the offender:

12Leblanc is currently 62 years old and was 59 at the time of the offences. Prior to his arrest, he was employed part-time as a driver with Kelly’s Residence and received provincial and federal disability benefits due to complications arising from type-2 diabetes. Leblanc is the sole caregiver and primary source of support for his 18-year-old daughter Destiny, whom he has raised on his own. Leblanc also has the ongoing support of his extended family, all of whom have remained supportive throughout these proceedings.

13Leblanc’s dated criminal record commenced in 1980 and contains 48 convictions, some of which are quite serious, including three prior convictions for sexual offences, two of which were committed against underage persons.

14Leblanc was convicted of sexually assaulting two girls (aged nine and 10) on May 12, 1987. Mr. Leblanc was 22 years old at the time of these offences.

15Leblanc was convicted of two counts of armed robbery on October 14, 1994, and received a five-year sentence.

16On September 14, 1999, Leblanc was convicted of another sexual assault. This time the victim was 18 years old. Leblanc was 35 at the time of the offence. He received a two-year sentence. The Crown has filed the plea transcripts for this hearing.

17On June 24, 2025, Leblanc was placed on an 18-month common law peace bond.

Case law:

18I have been provided with several cases from both counsel on the issue of the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Although the law is clear that each case turns on its own specific facts, a careful review of these cases, to the extent I can find similarities to the case before me, does assist me in determining what an appropriate range is for the sentence to be imposed. As some of the cases relied upon by counsel are distinguishable on the facts or the circumstances of the particular offender, my intention is to only set out those cases that are somewhat similar to the issues in the case at bar.

19Both counsel referred to the seminal case of R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, wherein the Supreme Court of Canada provided guidance to trial judges on sentencing principles for sexual crimes against children or young persons.

20In Friesen, the Supreme Court stated:

At para. 5: Third, we send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament’s sentencing initiatives and by society’s deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

At para. 56: This emphasis on personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality requires courts to focus their attention on emotional and psychological harm, not simply physical harm. Sexual violence against children can cause serious emotional and psychological harm that, as this Court held in R. v. McCraw, 1991 29 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72 (S.C.C.), “may often be more pervasive and permanent in its effect than any physical harm” (p.81).

At para. 58: “Even a single instance of sexual violence can “permanently alter the course of a child’s life” (Stuckless (2019), at para. 136, per Pepall J.A.).”

At para. 82: We would emphasize that courts should reject the belief that there is no serious harm to children in the absence of additional physical violence (Benedet, at p. 299). As we have explained, any manner of physical sexual contact between an adult and a child is inherently violent and has the potential to cause harm.

At para. 90: The fact that the victim is a child increases the offender’s degree of responsibility. Put simply, the intentional sexual exploitation and objectification of children is highly morally blameworthy because children are so vulnerable.

At para. 114: D. (D.), Woodward, S. (J.), and this Court’s own decisions in M. (C.A.) and M. (L.), make clear that imposing proportionate sentences that respond to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of offenders will frequently require substantial sentences. Parliament’s statutory amendments have strengthened that message. It is not the role of this Court to establish a range or to outline in which circumstances such substantial sentences should be imposed. Nor would it be appropriate for any court to set out binding or inflexible quantitative guidance – Moldaver J.A. wrote in D. (D.), “judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice in individual cases” and to individualize the sentence to the offender who is before them (at para. 33). Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us to provide an overall message that is clear D. (D.), at paras. 34 and 45. That message is that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. We would add that substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or single victim, as in this case, Woodward, and M. (L.). In addition, as this Court recognized in M. (L.), maximum sentences should not be reserved for the “abstract case of the worst crime committed in the worst.

21In R. v. J.C., [2021] O.J. No. 7396, (C.J.) the offender was sentenced after trial. The victim was his 14-year-old niece. He had no prior criminal record. He received a sentence of 35 months for sexual interference (45 months total when including voyeurism charge, sentenced consecutively). He also received a nine-month consecutive sentence for invitation to sexual touching.

22Relying on Friesen, the court in J.C. [2021] stated at para. 16:

… The focus of a sentencing court should be on the emotional and psychological harm caused to children and not just the physical harm. Maximum sentences for these offences have been increased and Parliament has prioritized denunciation and deterrence in such cases… The Court further observed that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and upper-single and double-digit penitentiary terms should neither be unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. A maximum sentence should be imposed whenever warranted. The Court also directed that sexual offences against children should generally be punished more severely than sexual offences against adults and, lastly, that sexual interference of a child under 16 should be treated just as seriously as sexual assault of a child or an adult. In addition, substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or a single victim. This is because even a single instance of sexual violence can “permanently alter the course of a child’s life.

23In R. v. J.C., 2023 ONSC 5020, a 40-year-old, first time offender was found guilty of two counts of sexual interference: one with his nine-year-old niece and the other with his two-year-old daughter. He had masturbated on his two-year-old daughter and had put his hands down his nine-year-old niece’s pants to touch her vagina for approximately five seconds. Davies J. imposed a two-year sentence for sexually interfering with the nine-year-old, and a three-and-a-half-year sentence for the offences involving the two-year-old. These sentences were served consecutively for five-and-a-half years total. Leblanc acknowledges similarities to the case at bar, namely the touching was by a person in a position of trust and that the offence occurred inside the home, or in a private dwelling.

24In R. v. Roper, 2020 ONSC 7411, the accused was sentenced to five and a half years after trial. He had no criminal record. He was sentenced for three incidents of sexual touching on one victim who was nine years old. These offences had a significant impact on the victim and her mother. The judge was mindful particularly of the age of the victim, the fact that she suffered several incidents of abuse, the fact that the offender breached the trust of her caregiver in her own home, and the emotional and psychological harm suffered by the victim and her mother - harm they are still suffering.

25In R. v. M.W., 2024 ONSC 583, Sotiropoulos J. noted a post-Friesen range of five to 10 year sentences for sexual interference where there is an abuse of a position of trust. A global sentence of 12 years for sexual interference, sexual exploitation and sexual assault convictions against two victims (reduced from 17 years for totality), was imposed.

26In R. v. M.B., 2024 ONSC 6397, the offender sexually assaulted his stepdaughter and, years later, his biological daughter. He would rub his stepdaughter’s vagina when she was about eight or nine years old. Three years later, she would wake weekly to find him rubbing her and himself. He was 56 years old at the time of sentencing. He had a dated criminal record, including a conviction in 2007 for sexual assault of his girlfriend’s 13-year old niece, for which he received a suspended sentence with one year probation. His likelihood of reoffending was unclear. He showed a lack of remorse. A global sentence of 10 years was imposed.

27In R. v. T.K.N., 2023 ONCA 488, the 26 year old offender was the victim’s basketball “mentor” and groomed her to engage in a sexual relationship with him over several months when she was 13 or 14 years old. There were five to six acts of sexual intercourse. The offender had no criminal record and he was found guilty after trial. The court recognized that he had a difficult childhood as outlined in a pre-sentence report. The trial judge sentenced the offender to six and half years for sexual interference and three months concurrent for assault.

28The Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion that the sentence was unduly harsh and noted that aggravating factors including a breach of trust, grooming of the victim, that the offence took place within the victim’s home and that the complainant lost her virginity as a result of the offender’s actions.

29In R. v. Shilling, 2021 ONCA 916, the offender was in a romantic relationship with the victim’s mother. There were two occasions of sexual contact when the victim was between 11-14 years old. The offender was Indigenous was 47 years old at the time of sentencing. He had family support and was a father to two sons. He had a prior criminal record, including a conviction for sexual assault from June of 1998 for which he received a sentence of five months custody and 24 months probation. The court upheld a sentence of four and half years in jail.

30In R. v. J.S., 2025 ONCA 279, the Court of Appeal upheld a three year sentence for sexual interference. The offender was 27 at the time of the offences. He abused the 14-year old daughter of his father’s girlfriend. The offender was convicted after trial. He did not have a prior criminal record. The court upheld the sentence for three years incarceration for sexual interference and one year concurrent on child luring.

31In R. v. T.A., 2022 ONCJ 528, the offender was 70 years of age and was convicted of sexual interference involving his step-granddaughter. The offender would have her sit on his lap and rub her thigs and touch her vaginal area. On another occasion, he took her to the bedroom and tried to coax her to touch his penis over the clothing. At the time, the victim was nine or 10 years old. The judge sentenced him to two years less a day. The trial judge allowed the offender to take advantage of the programs offered at the Ontario Correctional Institute. Leblanc claims that there are similarities between the facts of that case and the case at bar, and that both he and the offender had prior convictions for sexual assault. However, he submits that the facts in T.A.’s case were significantly more serious and far more invasive than the circumstances before this Court. The judge found it particularly troubling that the offender in T.A. persisted the victim and was found to suffer from a form of sexual deviance.

32R. v. A.M., 2024 ONSC 714, was a case where a 55-year-old offender pled guilty to one count of sexual interference committed upon his partner’s 11-year-old daughter. The sexual abuse was repetitive over a five-month period and included digital penetration on at least three occasions. After considering all of the factors, which included that the offender had no criminal record, the judge imposed a sentence of three years jail. Leblanc acknowledges certain similarities, including the abuse of a position of trust, the roughly comparable length and duration of the offences, the fact that the offences occurred within the home, and the relative closeness in age of the complainant. However, there are notable distinguishing features, including that A.M. pled guilty, had no prior criminal record, and that the sexual assaults committed by Leblanc were significantly more invasive and occurred on a greater number of occasions.

33In R. v. C.B., 2021 ONSC 187, the offender was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his biological daughter when she was between the ages of 13 and 16. The sexual abuse was repeated and took place over a period of three years in the family home. The abuse included oral sex and digital penetration perpetuated upon the victim. Woodley J. sentenced the offender to five years. Leblanc acknowledges certain similarities, including the age of the complainant, that the incidents occurred within the home, and the abuse of a position of trust. However, there are several distinguishing factors, including the nature, duration, and invasiveness of the sexual touching which spanned three years, the fact that the offender was the biological father of the victim, the absence of a prior criminal record and the apparent lack of remorse.

Application of the Legal Principles to the Facts of this Case:

34The court is guided by the principles of sentencing as set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. As directed by s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing sanctions that reflect enumerated objectives. Those objectives include denunciation of the unlawful conduct, deterrence and rehabilitation. It is also important to impose a sentence that promotes a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community.

35The sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility. The circumstances of the offence and of the offender must be analyzed to identify the aggravating and the mitigating factors.

36Section 718.2 addresses the principles of totality, parity and the principle of restraint among other factors. Section 718.2 also addresses specific aggravating and mitigating factors that shall be taken into consideration based on certain enumerated principles.

37Section 718.2 of the Code also requires a sentencing judge to consider as aggravating factors: (a) abuse of victim under 18 years of age (s. 718.2(a)(ii.1); (b) abuse of position of trust or authority in relation to the victim (s. 718.2(a)(ii); and (c) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim (s. 718.2(a)(iii.1).

38In R. v. D(D.), 2002 44915 (ON CA), [2002] 58 O.R. (3d) 788 (CA), Moldaver J.A. (as he then was) explained at para. 34:

The overall message, however, is meant to be clear. Adult sexual predators who would put the lives of innocent children at risk to satisfy their deviant sexual needs must know that they will pay a heavy price. In cases such as this, absent exceptional circumstances, the objectives of sentencing proclaimed by Parliament in s. 718(a), (b) and (c) of the Criminal Code, commonly referred to as denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and the need to separate offenders from society, must take precedence over the other recognized objectives of sentencing.

39As mentioned, the Supreme Court in Friesen, emphasized that sentences for these offences must reflect the contemporary understanding of sexual violence against children. When determining the gravity of the offence, it is not sufficient to simply state that sexual offences against children are serious. Courts must impose sentences that recognize and give effect to (1) the inherent wrongfulness of these offences, (2) the actual harm that children suffer, and (3) the potential harm to children that flows from the offences.

Likelihood to Re-Offend:

40The first Friesen factor is the likelihood the offender will re-offend. Although an expert report or letter from a qualified professional would be helpful, especially in light of the weight sentencing judges frequently assign to such evidence, the absence of expert opinion does not preclude a proper assessment. The sentencing judge may draw reasonable inferences from the circumstances of the offence, the offender’s age and past behaviour, and demonstrated prospects for rehabilitation.

41Leblanc’s asserts that he poses a low risk to the community, for the following reasons: the offences took place in the home and perpetuated on a single individual; he has a twenty-year gap in his criminal record which demonstrates an ability to not re-offend; Leblanc abused his position of trust in order to commit the offences; and given his age and declining health, poses a decrease in risk. I disagree with these assertions. Leblanc was the dominant authority figure in the home and had a great degree of control over the complainant during the abuse. This included supplying the victim with alcohol and drugs and controlling her movements to a degree. I also recognize his dated, albeit related criminal record, along with the overall facts of this case, and do not find that he is allow risk to re-offend.

Abuse of Trust:

42The second Friesen factor is whether the offender abused a position of trust. The presence of this factor increases the harm to the victim and thus the gravity of the offence, and it also increases the offender’s degree of responsibility.

43In the present case, the offender was an adult who occupied a position of trust and had some responsibility for the victim during the offending period. While he was not her biological father and had known her for only a short time, it is acknowledged that his role in the household bore a resemblance to attributes sometimes associated with a father figure, akin to a position of trust.

Frequency and Duration:

44The third Friesen factor is the frequency and duration of the sexual abuse. The courts have consistently held that sexual violence against children committed over an extended period and repeated on multiple occasions warrants significantly higher sentences, in order to reflect the cumulative gravity of the offending conduct and the offender’s heightened degree of responsibility. In the present case, the offences occurred over a period of approximately two to three months and involved repeated acts. He would fondle the victim’s breasts on a daily basis prior to leaving for work. This degree or moral culpability warrants consideration in light of the seriousness of the facts.

Age of Victim:

45The fourth Friesen factor is the age of the victim. Children who are particularly young are even more vulnerable to sexual violence, thereby enhancing the offender’s moral blameworthiness. In the present case, the victim was 13 years old when the sexual assault began, and the physical aspects of the sexual touching continued for approximately two to three months.

Violence and Degree of Physical Interference:

46The fifth Friesen factor is violence and the degree of physical interference. Sexual assault is inherently violent, regardless of the degree of physical contact. In this case, the sexual touching consisted of contact with the victim’s breasts, legs, back, and buttocks over her clothing. There was no penetration, no other sexual acts, and the offender did not expose himself.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:

47There is no real dispute amongst the parties with respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case.

48The aggravating factors are as follows: (a) Leblanc had a position of trust when he committed the offences; (b) the victim was at a very vulnerable age, being 13 years old, when the abuse started Leblanc was in his 40s; (c) the abuse took place inside the home, and inside the victim’s bedroom; (d) the abuse was repeated and took place over two to three months; (e) the sexual touching was invasive and interfered with the victim’s bodily integrity; (f) the offences had a significant impact upon the victim; (g) there was a significant age gap between the parties; (h) Leblanc has a related criminal record, albeit dated, and (i) in my view, premised on the information presented during this hearing, I am persuaded that the offender has limited insight into his misconduct.

49The mitigating factors are as follows: Leblanc has support in the community, his friends and his daughter; Leblanc has been continually employed up until his incarceration; Leblanc is an older gentleman and he has experienced harsh pre-trial jail conditions; and he has a 20 plus-year gap in his criminal record.

50Leblanc cannot be penalized for insisting on his right to a trial, as he is fully entitled to his day in court. It is not an aggravating factor. In fact, he was successful in being acquitted of other serious charges on the indictment. It cannot be said that the trial was not of utility to getting at the truth of the matter. However, he does not get the benefit of the mitigation of a guilty plea.

51The gap principle has been described as “a foundational consideration in sentencing”, such that where it is engaged, a sentencing court commits an error by failing to apply it. I have considered R. v. Mohla, 2012 ONSC 30, at para. 182, where Hill J. helpfully articulated the underlying rationales for this principle.

52Leblanc submits that a conviction-free period exceeding 20 years is a significant factor. It indicates not only his capacity for rehabilitation but also that he has successfully demonstrated it. This extended period without serious convictions deserves some weight. However, I am not so convinced, as Leblanc has not led a completely pro-social life and had some involvement in the criminal justice system during this same interval. I have considered the applicability of the gap principle and find it of diminutive weight to my overall analysis.

53The Crown also introduced the police reports relating to his prior sexual assault conviction in support of the proposed seven year sentence. While a sentencing judge may consider police reports, I must carefully determine the weight to be given to their contents. It is appropriate to rely on basic factual details, such as dates and ages, but this does not permit treating the entire report as proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be required if it were used as an aggravating factor. I agree with defence counsel that the Crown must satisfy this onus if it seeks to rely on any information beyond these basic details as what may be contained in the reports are less reliable. While still being considered, I have afforded less weight to these reports.

54With respect to the circumstances and nature of the offences, there is no question that, although the acts themselves were brief and non-penetrative, they have had lasting effects on the complainant. While the acts for which Leblanc was found guilty may tend to fall at the lower end of the “severity” spectrum. However, in making this observation, this is not to minimize the impact his actions have had on the victim.

55It bears repeating that Leblanc was in a position of trust and took advantage of a young vulnerable victim. The victim also relied on Leblanc for shelter and the necessaries of life during the relevant period.

56As mentioned, the Crown is seeking a mid-to-high single-digit penitentiary sentence, citing aggravating factors related to his prior criminal record – specifically, his late 1980’s convictions for sexual assaults against two young girls, aged 8 and 13 at the time. While a prior criminal record may constitute an aggravating factor, as discussed above, I must also take into account any significant gap in the offender’s record when determining the weight to be accorded to prior convictions at sentencing.

57Overall, it seems to me that the authorities provide for sentences in the low to mid-single digit penitentiary term for this type of offence. Of course, the individual circumstances of the offender must be taken into account. In considering these cases and the jurisprudence generally, I appreciate that the range of sentence varies considerably. I can only conclude that the range of penalty is very broad and the particular circumstances of this case must be carefully considered.

58That being said, with the offender’s criminal antecedents, in particular sexual offences against young persons, his repeated conduct in this case with his position of trust, the range of sentence ought to be elevated. To the end, I accept the higher range of incarceration being proposed by the Crown as the appropriate global sentence in this case.

Duncan Credit:

59In determining whether any enhanced mitigation should be given, the Court will consider the conditions of the pre-sentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused evidence has been adduced.

60In R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, Doherty J.A. (as he then was) cautioned against quantifying the mitigation arising from R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. While it is common for a specific number of days or months to be given as Duncan credit, there is risk that the credit will be improperly treated as a deduction from the sentence instead of a mitigating factor to be considered when determining an appropriate sentence. While quantification is not necessarily inappropriate, it may skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence.

61In any event, I accept the defence evidence presented during this hearing along with counsel’s submissions as to the harsh conditions while Leblanc was incarcerated, as a meaningful mitigating factor to be considered in this case.

Disposition:

62Mr. Leblanc is to provide a sample of his DNA pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code. A s. 109 weapons prohibition order is imposed for life.

63Pursuant to s. 490.013 of the Criminal Code, I make an order that Mr. Leblanc’s name be added to the Sex Offender Registry for 20 years.

64A s. 743.41 order is made and the offender is to have no contact with the victim or her immediate family while serving his custodial term.

65As mentioned, I agree with Crown attorney that the appropriate range of sentence for this offence and this particular offender falls in the range of six and half to seven years incarceration.

66However, in support of the mitigating factors presented by the defence, including the Duncan/Marshall analysis, I conclude that the global sentence to be imposed for the sexual interference count is six years jail.

67The sexual assault count is stayed pursuant to the Kineapple principle.

68Mr. Leblanc is to be credited for pre-sentence custody in accordance with R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 525. From the calculations provided by counsel, and applying the standard 1.5 to 1 criteria, his pre-sentence credit is equivalent to 48 months or four years.

69Therefore, the net sentence to be imposed for the sexual interference count is two years less a day to be served in a Provincial Reformatory. Mr. Leblanc will also be placed on a period of probation for two years, with terms to be provided to the parties.

70The Victim Surcharge is waived.

A.J. Goodman J.

Date: February 27, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Leblanc, 2026 ONSC 1166