Andrew J. Goodman

The applicant, charged with several offences including sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 41 months.

The court deducted three months for defence delay due to counsel's unavailability.

The court also deducted three months as a discrete exceptional circumstance due to the unavailability of the trial judge who was seized with a first-degree murder trial, and nine months due to the COVID-19 pandemic suspending jury trials.

The net delay of 26 months fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant did not demonstrate meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, and dismissed the application.

Judge-alone retrial on a charge of first degree murder arising from a 2006 disappearance where the victim's body was never located.

The Crown relied principally on accomplice evidence, a prior KGB statement from the accused's former common-law partner, and corroborative circumstantial evidence including cellphone records and post-offence conduct.

The court treated the accomplice as a classic Vetrovec witness, rejected large portions of his evidence absent confirmation, but found essential aspects of the killing and body disposal corroborated by independent evidence.

The court held the Crown proved intentional killing beyond a reasonable doubt, but failed to prove planning and deliberation or the distinct predicate confinement necessary for constructive first degree murder.

The accused was acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the accused applied to reopen the evidentiary portion of the trial to cross-examine the Crown's principal witness, a Vetrovec witness, about new second-degree murder charges laid against him after he testified.

The court applied the Hayward test and dismissed the application, finding the proposed fresh evidence was not sufficiently relevant to material issues, would cause undue delay, and was unnecessary given the witness's character had already been thoroughly impeached at trial.

The appellants sought leave to appeal an arbitration award that upheld a condominium rule prohibiting the retail sale of cannabis from their commercial units.

The appellants argued the arbitrator erred in law by finding the rule consistent with the condominium declaration and by validating certain proxies used to pass the rule.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion for leave, concluding the alleged errors were questions of mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law as required under section 45 of the Arbitration Act.

However, the court exercised its equitable jurisdiction to grant a temporary extension for the appellants to wind down their business and dispose of perishable inventory.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences against his grandchildren, brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide full and frank financial disclosure to establish indigence and had not made reasonable efforts to save funds for his defence.

Furthermore, the court held that the case was not sufficiently complex to require counsel for a fair trial, noting that the trial judge could appoint counsel to cross-examine the complainants under section 486.3(2) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, on trial for first-degree murder, sought disclosure of police records relating to recent murder charges against a key Crown witness.

The records were held by a different police force and Crown office than those prosecuting the applicant.

The court determined that the third-party records regime under O'Connor applied, rather than the first-party Stinchcombe regime, because the prosecuting Crown did not have possession of the records and they were not 'obviously relevant' to the applicant's case.

Applying the O'Connor test, the court found the records were likely relevant to the witness's credibility and ordered their production to the defence.

During a re-trial for second-degree murder, the accused brothers sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The principal shooter, John, argued he was provoked by the victim's threats.

The court found an air of reality to John's claim, despite evidence of prior threats and preparation.

However, the court ruled that provocation is not available in law to an aider, Mato, as it only applies to the person who committed the murder.

Furthermore, there was no air of reality to provocation for Mato based on the evidence.

In a pre-trial ruling for a second-degree murder case, the court determined the appropriate jury selection procedure following the enactment of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory challenges.

The defence proposed combining the challenge for cause and stand-aside inquiries.

The court rejected a combined approach but permitted a limited expansion of the challenge for cause questions.

The court established a procedure where, after the challenge for cause, a specific question is asked to assess juror competence, allowing counsel to make submissions on whether the judge should exercise the enhanced stand-aside power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with first degree murder following the abduction, severe beating, and death of the victim over a drug debt.

The accused conceded causing the death and forcible confinement, leaving the sole issue of whether he had the requisite intent for murder.

The court found that the accused's actions, including the brutal attack and leaving the victim in a remote, freezing field with severe injuries, demonstrated the requisite intent for murder.

The accused was found guilty of first degree murder.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter after firing five shots into a vehicle, intending to shoot the vehicle but striking and killing the victim who was seated inside.

The Crown sought 13 to 15 years, while the defence sought 8 years.

The court considered the accused's extensive criminal record, use of an illegal firearm, and lack of insight as aggravating factors, balanced against his guilty plea.

The court imposed a sentence of 13 years imprisonment, less 44 months credit for pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders.

The Crown brought an application regarding the jury selection procedure for a second-degree murder trial during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown proposed that the Sheriff divide the jury panels into smaller groups in the absence of the accused, arguing the proposed 'B.C. Model' violated the Criminal Code.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that dividing the panels in the absence of the accused would violate their right to be present at trial under section 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court adopted the B.C. Model, which allows for random selection and identification of jurors in open court with the accused present, while accommodating physical distancing requirements.

The accused, Jeremy Hall, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application (KGB application) to admit two police statements from a deceased witness, Tracey Friesz, for their substantive truth.

The defence argued for both procedural and substantive reliability of the statements.

The Crown conceded necessity but disputed reliability, highlighting Friesz's motive to protect her then-boyfriend, her history of dishonesty, and the lack of corroborative evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that procedural reliability was not established due to the absence of an oath and ineffective warnings, and substantive reliability was not met as the statements were not inherently trustworthy, given the declarant's motive to lie and lack of corroboration.

The court concluded that the probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

The applicant, Patrick Benson, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary grounds following a bail hearing.

He argued for a de novo hearing based on an alleged error by the Justice of the Peace and a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and an outbreak at the detention centre, coupled with his health issues.

The court found a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

However, after reviewing the proposed release plan, the applicant's extensive criminal record (including violent offences, breaches of court orders, and failures to appear), and the Crown's evidence regarding institutional COVID-19 protocols, the court dismissed the bail review application.

Detention was ordered on both primary (flight risk) and secondary (public safety) grounds, finding the proposed plan insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk posed by the applicant.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an outbreak at the detention centre, and a new release plan including electronic monitoring and additional sureties.

The original bail hearing had already considered the pandemic.

The court found no error in the initial detention order and determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances under the modified Palmer criteria, as the updated information regarding COVID-19 and the enhanced release plan did not sufficiently alter the primary and secondary ground concerns, particularly given the applicant's history of non-compliance and the seriousness of the fraud charges.

The application for bail review was dismissed, and continued detention was ordered.

The accused, Mowafag Saboon, sought judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder and various firearm and drug trafficking offenses.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, including the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offenses, the circumstances of the offenses, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions.

The proposed release plan, involving a $15,000 bond with three sureties and electronic monitoring, was deemed inadequate due to the sureties' inability to supervise and the accused's history of misconduct.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending and that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the violent nature of the charges and the strong Crown case.

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed, and detention was ordered on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The applicant, A.F., sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious firearm and drug-related offences.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the extensive delay in the preliminary inquiry, the withdrawal of a more serious charge, and an enhanced release plan including electronic monitoring.

The court acknowledged the heightened risk to inmates from COVID-19 and the applicant's health concerns and period of unexplained segregation.

Balancing these factors against the seriousness of the charges and the applicant's history of non-compliance, the court was persuaded that the stringent release plan, coupled with electronic monitoring, would sufficiently address public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was granted.

The applicant, P.K., sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on the tertiary ground for serious charges including robbery and firearm offences.

The application argued a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the time spent in custody, and a proposed release plan with sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court acknowledged COVID-19 as a material change but found the proposed plan insufficient to address the substantial risk to public safety (secondary ground) and maintain confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground), given the applicant's violent history and non-compliance with previous orders.

The bail review was dismissed, and detention continued.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a new release plan.

The court accepted COVID-19 as a material change warranting a de novo hearing.

However, the court found the proposed release plan, which was identical to the one rejected at the initial bail hearing and involved a surety with a history of ineffective supervision, insufficient to address public safety concerns, especially given the applicant's violent criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The application for detention review was dismissed, and continued detention was ordered.

The Crown applied to admit a recanted police statement from a material witness (Carol Ann Eaton) for substantive use in a first-degree murder trial against Jeremy Hall, under the "KGB application" framework.

The defence opposed, arguing lack of procedural and substantive reliability due to alleged coercion and the witness's recantation and claimed memory loss.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that procedural reliability was established through the sworn, video-recorded statement and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination of the witness at trial, despite her claims of coercion and memory lapse.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding police misconduct and the witness's credibility.

The plaintiffs, having succeeded in a solicitor's professional negligence trial and awarded $425,987 in damages, sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered the plaintiffs' valid Rule 49 offer to settle and the complexity of the underlying action.

While acknowledging the plaintiffs' entitlement to costs, the court applied a 25% reduction to the legal fees based on the principle of proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, despite finding the hourly rates charged by counsel and staff to be reasonable.