Andrew J. Goodman

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges including possession of methamphetamine for trafficking and probation breaches.

The court considered a new surety and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as material changes in circumstances, allowing for a de novo review.

Despite the applicant's extensive criminal record and the seriousness of the charges, the court granted judicial interim release.

It found that the proposed release plan, combined with the heightened health risks of incarceration during the pandemic, sufficiently addressed the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention, particularly for a non-violent offender.

Joan Marilyn MacDonald sought an oppression remedy under the Condominium Act, challenging a special assessment levied by Wentworth Condominium Corporation No. 96 (WCC96) for building repairs and the subsequent lien registered against her unit.

WCC96 sought summary judgment to enforce the lien.

The court dismissed MacDonald's application, finding that the Board acted within its authority and that the special assessment for remedial work did not require a unit owner vote under the Act or bylaws.

Summary judgment was granted to WCC96, allowing enforcement of the lien and sale of the unit, though with a 30-day grace period for MacDonald to remedy the default.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

During a police surveillance operation targeting another individual, the accused was arrested in a gas station parking lot after allegedly attempting to flee.

A search incident to arrest revealed fentanyl patches in his pocket.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds to either arrest or detain the accused, as there was no nexus between him and the target of the investigation.

The court concluded the arrest was arbitrary and the subsequent search was unreasonable.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police conduct demonstrated a deliberate disregard for Charter rights.

The appellant, Guesly Gemelus, appealed his convictions for threatening to cause death and disobeying a court order.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to adequately consider material evidence impugning the complainant's credibility, specifically her animus towards the appellant, and the insufficiency of reasons for judgment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge failed to address the defence's theory regarding the complainant's motivation and animus, and did not sufficiently explain why this evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

This constituted a palpable and overriding error, undermining appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown applied to quash a subpoena issued by the respondent to an assistant Crown attorney.

The respondent, who was facing murder charges, sought to compel the prosecutor to testify at a hearing regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct, after a witness claimed the prosecutor had coached him to change his evidence.

The court granted the application to quash the subpoena, finding that the respondent failed to meet the stringent test of demonstrating that the prosecutor's evidence was necessary, as another police officer was present during the relevant meetings and could testify to the events.

The plaintiffs sued their former solicitor and his law firm for professional negligence arising from his representation in three underlying actions.

The court found that the solicitor breached the standard of care in the primary underlying commercial litigation by failing to obtain relevant evidence, failing to bring a motion to strike a certificate of pending litigation, and failing to communicate with his clients and opposing counsel.

The court conducted a 'trial within a trial' and concluded that but for the solicitor's negligence, the plaintiffs would have avoided substantial legal fees.

The plaintiffs were awarded $425,987 in damages.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his 2014 conviction for impaired driving, entered via guilty plea.

He argued that a head injury sustained in the motor vehicle accident rendered him cognitively incapable of making an informed and voluntary plea, and that he only recently understood the collateral consequences regarding his civil accident benefits.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the motion, finding the five-year delay was inadequately explained and the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the applicant possessed the limited cognitive capacity required to enter a valid guilty plea.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of recent Criminal Code amendments (Bill C-75) that abolished peremptory challenges and altered the challenge for cause procedure.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the repeal of peremptory challenges violated the applicant's rights under sections 7, 11(d), and 11(f) of the Charter by denying him a fair trial with an independent and impartial jury, and that the repeal was overbroad.

The court struck down the repeal of the peremptory challenge provisions but upheld the amendments to the challenge for cause procedure.

The Crown and defence were permitted to exercise peremptory challenges as if the provision had not been repealed.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that pervasive pre-trial publicity and community hostility in Brantford made a fair trial impossible.

The court reviewed the media coverage, social media comments, and community attendance at court appearances, finding that the publicity was not overwhelmingly hostile or prejudicial.

The court concluded that procedural safeguards, including an expanded challenge for cause, would adequately protect the applicant's right to a fair trial.

The application for a change of venue was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and prohibition to quash a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice, which held that recent amendments to the Criminal Code limiting the availability of preliminary inquiries did not apply retrospectively.

The Superior Court found that it had jurisdiction to grant prerogative relief because the lower court's statutory interpretation resulted in a jurisdictional error.

The Court held that the preliminary inquiry is a statutory procedure that does not confer substantive rights.

Therefore, the amendments were purely procedural and applied retrospectively.

The application was allowed, the lower court's order was quashed, and prohibition was granted.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment entered against them regarding a failed real estate transaction.

They argued they were not properly served with the statement of claim and were noted in default one day early.

The court found that while personal service was not effected and the noting in default was premature by one day, the defendants had actual notice of the claim and failed to act promptly or present a tenable defence.

The court exercised its discretion to validate service and dismissed the motion to set aside the default judgment.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for intending to harass his former spouse by sending repeated emails.

At trial, the self-represented appellant testified that he believed the police caution against contacting the complainant did not apply to emails regarding immigration matters.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge misapprehended the police officer's evidence regarding the caution and failed to properly apply the second and third prongs of the W. (D.) test to the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, a chartered accountant, was convicted of defrauding the Government of Canada of income tax and GST/HST over $5,000.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence and a $500,000 fine, arguing the fraud exceeded $1 million.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fraud exceeded $1 million, so the statutory aggravating factor did not apply.

Considering the accused's lack of prior record, good character, and the availability of a conditional sentence at the time of the offence, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and a fine of $445,789.30.

The applicant, charged with fraud over $5000 for allegedly collecting social assistance overpayments, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings pending state-funded counsel.

The applicant argued the case was complex and he lacked the means to retain private counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding the case was primarily fact-based and not sufficiently complex to warrant state-funded counsel at the preliminary inquiry stage, without prejudice to renew the application if committed to trial.

The offender, a high school teacher, was convicted of voyeurism after surreptitiously recording videos of female students' cleavage using a pen camera over an 18-month period.

The Crown sought 12 to 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the underage victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

Finding that a conditional sentence would not adequately address these principles, the court imposed a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' probation.

Following a successful summary judgment motion where the court determined a farm tractor was not an 'automobile' for insurance coverage purposes, the successful defendant sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued the issue was unique and warranted litigation, suggesting a reduced costs award.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, noting the law was settled by binding appellate authority, and awarded the defendant its full requested costs of $16,311.32 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by the accused towards another complainant.

The accused had previously been tried and acquitted of the charges relating to that other complainant, although the trial judge in that case noted the allegations were likely true on a balance of probabilities.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents the Crown from re-litigating an issue determined in the accused's favour in a prior criminal proceeding, even if decided on the basis of reasonable doubt.

Admitting the evidence would violate trial fairness and judicial finality.