Andrew J. Goodman

The accused, Scott Reeves, pleaded guilty to one count of fraud over $5000.00, involving a total loss of over $3.1 million from four victims (Donna Aiken, Rachel Reeves, Gayle Meehan, and Peter Vignjevic) over several years.

The fraud involved a significant breach of trust, as the victims were friends, relatives, or long-term clients who relied on the accused for financial advice.

The Crown sought a five-year incarceration, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day or 18 months jail.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the magnitude, complexity, and duration of the fraud, and its severe impact on the victims, as well as mitigating factors including the accused's lack of prior record, late guilty plea, and mental health issues.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, and sentenced the accused to four years' incarceration in a federal penitentiary, along with a lifetime prohibition order, a non-communication order, a DNA sample order, and a restitution order totaling $3,125,453.00, with a fine in lieu of forfeiture of the same amount.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the Agreed Statements of Fact (ASF) from two co-accused who had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter and subsequently recanted portions of their ASF while testifying.

The defence conceded necessity and threshold reliability but contested the scope of the ASF to be admitted.

The court granted the application but ordered the ASF to be edited to exclude hearsay, background information, and matters beyond the witnesses' personal knowledge, allowing only what the witnesses personally heard or observed.

The applicant sought the appointment of Section 3 counsel under the Substitute Decisions Act for her mother, whose capacity was in issue amid a family dispute over powers of attorney.

The respondent opposed the appointment, relying on a geriatric psychiatrist's report concluding the mother had severe dementia, lacked capacity to instruct counsel, and would likely suffer significant emotional distress if forced to deal with an unfamiliar lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while Section 3 counsel can sometimes be appointed even when a person cannot provide instructions, in this specific case it would not be in the mother's best interests, would be ineffective, and would not assist in resolving the underlying litigation.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pretrial application to exclude his formal statement to police, alleging it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police interrogation techniques did not overbear the applicant's will.

However, the court found that the police breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to inform the applicant of the deceased's name or specific details of the murder charge, which prevented him from meaningfully instructing counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

Following a summary judgment motion where the defendant successfully dismissed the plaintiff's constructive dismissal and sexual harassment claims, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff had recovered only a nominal amount for vacation pay.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding that while the plaintiff's claims largely failed, her conduct did not warrant elevated costs.

The court also found the defendant's claimed hours excessive and halved them, awarding partial indemnity costs of $45,150 plus disbursements.

The plaintiff's motion to preserve funds under Rule 45.02 was dismissed, and the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant had delivered a Rule 49 offer to settle prior to the motion.

The court found the defendant was entitled to substantial indemnity costs but reduced the claimed hours by 50% as they were excessive and duplicative of preparation for a prior summary judgment motion.

Costs were fixed at $6,200 for fees and $500 for disbursements, plus HST.

The applicants, devout Christians, applied to be foster parents and informed the Children's Aid Society that they would not lie to children about the existence of Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny.

The Society initially approved them, but later removed two foster children from their care and closed their foster home because the applicants refused to proactively tell the children that the Easter Bunny was real.

The applicants sought a declaration that their Charter rights were violated.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the Society's actions arbitrarily and unreasonably violated the applicants' freedom of religion and freedom of expression under ss. 2(a) and 2(b) of the Charter, and ordered the Society to note the Charter violations in the applicants' file.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff employee's action for constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff alleged she was constructively dismissed due to a unilateral change in her employment contract, improper deductions of vacation pay, and a poisoned work environment involving sexual harassment.

The court found that the new employment contract was valid as it was supported by consideration and reasonable working notice.

While the employer improperly deducted $3,763 in vacation pay, this minor breach did not amount to constructive dismissal.

The court also dismissed the allegations of sexual harassment and a poisoned work environment, finding the plaintiff voluntarily resigned.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendant, save for an order that the defendant repay the improperly deducted vacation pay.

The applicant, charged with fraud-related offences involving two different complainants in proximate periods of time, brought an application to sever the counts under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed the severance, arguing the events were intertwined.

The court applied the factors from R. v. Last and found that the factual nexus between the counts was negligible and that joinder created a risk of prohibited propensity reasoning.

The application for severance was granted to protect the applicant's right to a fair trial.

Christopher Newton applied for severance of accused persons in a multi-count indictment, seeking to be tried separately from co-accused Shaquille Collins.

Newton argued that joinder would delay his trial beyond a reasonable time and confuse the jury due to different charges (second-degree murder for Newton, first-degree murder for Collins) and complex liability paths.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was intertwined, separate trials would be inefficient, and juries are capable of following complex instructions.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 13-week delay was not significant enough to override the presumption of joint trials, and that jurors are capable of understanding complex legal instructions.

The applicant, a doctor, applied to sever a three-count indictment alleging sexual assaults against two different complainants (a patient and a co-worker) occurring years apart.

The applicant argued that joinder would cause prejudice and improper propensity reasoning.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was intertwined and a viable similar fact application would be brought.

The court dismissed the application, finding a factual and legal nexus between the counts, and concluded that in a judge-alone trial, the risk of prejudice could be managed with appropriate evidentiary rulings.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including robbery and firearms offences.

The sole issue was the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The principal witness had only a brief, dark observation of the assailants while intoxicated, and her subsequent in-dock identification was tainted by prior conversations and a flawed photo line-up.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by committing the applicant to trial where the identification evidence was so frail and uncertain that it amounted to no evidence at all.

The application was granted and the committal was quashed.

The appellant brought a motion to extend the time to perfect an appeal.

A threshold jurisdictional issue arose regarding whether the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court interpreted the term 'single payment' in the statute, concluding that it refers to lump sum payments as opposed to periodic payments, and that multiple lump sum payments in an order do not strip the Divisional Court of jurisdiction provided the amounts fall under the $50,000 threshold.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and granted the extension of time.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to extend the time to file an appeal of a final family law order.

A threshold jurisdictional issue arose regarding whether the appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court interpreted the term 'single payment' and concluded that multiple lump sum payments ordered for section 7 expenses, which individually and combined fell under the $50,000 threshold, constituted a 'single payment'.

The court granted the extension of time and confirmed the Divisional Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The applicant and her co-tenant signed a commercial lease for a basement unit to operate a restaurant.

Shortly after, the co-tenant was incarcerated.

The applicant attempted to access the premises but was repeatedly denied entry by the landlord, who demanded confirmation from the incarcerated co-tenant.

The applicant sought a declaration that the lease was terminated due to fundamental breach.

The court found that the landlord improperly refused access, depriving the applicant of substantially the whole benefit of the lease.

The application was granted, the lease was declared terminated, and the applicant was permitted to retrieve her equipment and receive a refund of her rent deposit.

Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought summary judgment for possession of a property and dismissal of a counterclaim against Waheed Michael.

Michael alleged fraud regarding a Power of Attorney (POA) used by his ex-spouse, Nabila Nashid, to transfer the property and secure an RBC mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment to RBC, finding the POA validly exercised as against third parties without notice of limitations, and that Michael was bound by Nashid's acts as agent.

The court also ordered the net proceeds from the sale of another property to be paid towards RBC's judgment against Nashid, with any balance to Michael.

The accused, Richard Bennett, sought to introduce alternate suspect evidence in his first-degree murder trial.

The application concerned four individuals: Jason Bynoe, Nathanial Gibbs, Shaka Reid, and John Gardner.

The court dismissed the application regarding Bynoe and Gibbs due to insufficient connection to the crime, primarily relying on propensity evidence without sufficient opportunity or direct link.

However, the court granted the application in part, allowing the introduction of alternate suspect evidence for Shaka Reid and John Gardner, finding sufficient probative value based on the accused's own statements implicating Reid and Gardner's inconsistent statements, suspicious conduct, and unpublicized knowledge of crime details.

The court rejected the Crown's "additional suspect" argument, affirming that such evidence could address the accused's level of culpability.

The Crown sought to admit pre-death statements made by the deceased, Jean Paul Page, to five individuals in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence challenged the admissibility of these hearsay statements, arguing a lack of reliability and prejudicial effect, particularly concerning alleged drug transactions.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, requiring tests of both necessity and reliability.

The application was granted in part, allowing certain statements related to a rum purchase and the accused's presence at the deceased's apartment, but disallowing statements related to alleged marijuana transactions due to vagueness and lack of reliability, especially from one witness.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving while operating an e-bike.

He argued that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the undisputed facts—including erratic driving, swaying, red eyes, and an odour of alcohol—amounted to impairment.

He also argued the trial judge misapplied the circumstantial evidence test and improperly discounted the lack of impairment indicia at the police station.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the legal test for impairment and reasonably concluded that the totality of the evidence proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought production of third-party police records from the Toronto Police Service concerning five individuals for an alternate suspects application.

The Crown opposed, arguing a lack of likely relevance.

The court applied the two-stage O'Connor test, finding the applicant met the threshold for likely relevance.

After an in camera inspection, the court ordered the production of relevant and redacted excerpts from two police occurrence reports related to two of the five individuals, subject to strict conditions, while denying production for the others.