Michael K. Wendl

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the accused was observed driving erratically, failed a roadside screening device test, and provided breath samples showing 140 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath samples on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found no breach regarding the screening device calibration or the vehicle inventory search, but acknowledged a breach of section 9 regarding the accused's continued detention.

However, the court admitted the breath evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

On the merits, the court found the accused guilty of operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit but acquitted on the impaired driving charge, finding insufficient evidence of actual impairment.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after being observed operating a motor vehicle errationally on July 8, 2015.

She provided breath samples showing blood alcohol concentrations of 267 and 288 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The defence raised the issue of automatism arising from parasomnia (sleepwalking), arguing that the accused's actions were involuntary.

The court found that the accused had a documented history of parasomnia episodes triggered by stress and anxiety, had been fatigued from a long drive, had not used her sleep apnea device, and had ingested sleep medication.

Expert evidence and observations by the arresting officer supported the conclusion that the accused was in a dissociative state.

The court found the automatism to be a disease of the mind and rendered a verdict of Not Criminally Responsible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving while operating an e-bike.

He argued that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the undisputed facts—including erratic driving, swaying, red eyes, and an odour of alcohol—amounted to impairment.

He also argued the trial judge misapplied the circumstantial evidence test and improperly discounted the lack of impairment indicia at the police station.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the legal test for impairment and reasonably concluded that the totality of the evidence proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual interference and incest against his daughter.

The offences occurred over a five-year period starting when the victim was eight years old, involving approximately 50 incidents of sexual intercourse accompanied by violence and threats.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the profound breach of trust and severe psychological impact on the victim.

The offender was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, reduced to 93 months after credit for pre-trial custody, along with ancillary orders including a life weapons prohibition and SOIRA registration.

The appellant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and was sentenced to nine months in jail.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for the disparity between his sentence and the 90-day intermittent sentence imposed on his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and the sentencing judge properly considered the parity principle, noting material differences between the offenders such as the co-accused making full restitution.

The accused were charged with multiple offences including conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and heroin, and criminal organization offences related to a motorcycle club.

The Crown relied heavily on police surveillance and intercepted communications.

The court admitted the visual and voice identification evidence, as well as a membership list under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found two of the accused guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and heroin, but acquitted the third.

The court acquitted all accused of the criminal organization charges, finding the Crown failed to prove that one of the main purposes of the motorcycle club was the facilitation of serious offences.

One accused was also found guilty of weapons and proceeds of crime offences.

The accused brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through omnibus warrants and search warrants, alleging insufficient material before the issuing judges and breaches of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court addressed issues of standing, the excision of misleading expert opinion and irrelevant information from the Information To Obtain (ITO), and the sufficiency of confidential informant (CI) information for both predicate warrants (tracking and dialed number recorder warrants) and the main wiretap authorization.

The court found that all accused had standing, excised certain inflammatory and misleading portions of the ITO, but ultimately concluded that the predicate warrants met the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard and the wiretap authorization met the "best interests of justice" standard, supported by credible and corroborated CI information.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 3 years and 7 months for robbery, arguing the sentencing judge erred by crediting his pre-sentence custody at 1.25:1 instead of 1.5:1, and by placing undue weight on his criminal record.

The Crown conceded the error regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal applied the standard of review from Lacasse and found no other errors in principle, noting the appellant was a mature recidivist and the robbery was planned and involved an imitation weapon.

The court allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence by 94 days to reflect the 1.5:1 credit, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion to admit the opinion evidence of two police officers as expert witnesses in a trial involving drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The first officer was proposed as an expert in drug trafficking and slang, which the court admitted fully, finding the evidence reliable and necessary.

The second officer was proposed as an expert on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Outlaws and the Black Pistons.

The court found the second officer qualified to testify on the general history and culture of outlaw motorcycle gangs, but excluded his opinion on the specific culture of the Black Pistons and the ultimate issue of whether they constituted a criminal organization, due to his limited specific experience with that group.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for Crown disclosure of questionnaires, debriefing notes, and handlers' notes regarding 22 confidential informants used to support wiretap authorizations.

The Crown conceded the questionnaires and debriefing notes but opposed disclosing the handlers' notes, arguing they were not relied upon by the affiant.

The court held that in the context of a Garofoli application, handlers' notes not relied upon by the affiant do not form part of the investigative file requiring disclosure.

However, the court ordered disclosure of the handlers' notes for two informants because the affiant himself was their handler.

The applicant sought exclusion of intercepted private communications on the basis of an admitted s. 8 Charter breach arising from the failure to identify her as a known person in a wiretap authorization.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court held that the breach was serious because private communications attract a high expectation of privacy and authorization materials must be accurate and complete.

However, the impact on the applicant’s protected interests was modest because her conversations were intercepted only through communications with a properly named target and would have been captured regardless.

Given the reliability and centrality of the evidence and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits, exclusion was refused.

The accused brought an application to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence of drugs found in his apartment, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked full and frank disclosure and relied on unreliable confidential informants.

The court excised certain unconstitutionally obtained information from the ITO but concluded that the authorizing judge could still have granted the warrant based on the remaining record.

The court also noted that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with attempting to obstruct justice, brought an application for certiorari to quash her committal for trial and mandamus to compel the preliminary inquiry judge to re-open the inquiry.

She argued the judge erred by refusing to allow her to cross-examine the affiant of a wiretap authorization and by failing to assist her, as an unrepresented accused, in seeking to cross-examine other witnesses under s. 540(9) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the Garofoli test in denying the cross-examination of the affiant and did not exceed his jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the court found no denial of natural justice regarding the unrepresented applicant, as she had explicitly declined to call evidence or make submissions when given the opportunity.

The accused applied for a stay or exclusion of evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter after police discovered cocaine and cash during a vehicle stop.

The defence argued the traffic stop was a pretextual ruse based on a hunch about drug activity.

The court held that the officer had lawful authority under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act to stop the vehicle to verify licensing and investigate suspicious circumstances.

Drugs became visible when the accused exited the vehicle, providing reasonable grounds for arrest and a search incident to arrest.

The court also found the subsequent strip search at the station reasonable under the principles set out in Golden.

The accused appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor.

The appeal alleged that the verdict was unreasonable, that the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to the absence of a used condom or wrapper, failed to properly scrutinize the complainant’s credibility, reversed the burden of proof, failed to address the defence theory, and provided inadequate reasons.

Applying the principles from R. v. R.E.M., the appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons were sufficient and demonstrated proper consideration of credibility and reasonable doubt.

The trial judge reasonably rejected the accused’s testimony, accepted the complainant’s evidence, and relied in part on corroborative forensic evidence.

No legal error or miscarriage of justice was established.

The accused brought an application to stay criminal charges (assault with a weapon, assault, unlawful confinement, and criminal harassment) pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was approximately 19 months from charge to trial date.

The court found that while the accused and defence counsel had requested most adjournments to pursue settlement discussions, the delay from the charge date to when counsel was ready to set a trial date (June 11, 2012) was treated as neutral time.

The post-trial-readiness delay of approximately 8.5 months fell within the Supreme Court guideline of 8-10 months for provincial courts.

The application was dismissed.

The accused were charged with aggravated assault arising from a tavern altercation and brought a pre‑trial application seeking a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They alleged that a negligent police investigation, including failures to identify witnesses, properly document blood evidence, and secure surveillance video, impaired their ability to make full answer and defence contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the investigative steps taken by police and found that their decisions were reasonable in the circumstances, including the timing of witness inquiries, handling of potential blood evidence, and attempts to obtain video recordings from the tavern.

The loss of relevant video footage resulted from the actions of tavern management rather than police custody or negligence.

Because no negligent investigation was established, the court held that there was no Charter breach and a stay of proceedings was not warranted.