Andrew J. Goodman

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a previous summary judgment order, arguing they were unaware of the court date, had repeatedly requested a French-speaking lawyer, and were not properly served.

They also claimed an arguable defence regarding improvident property sales and excessive expenses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of accident, mistake, or insufficient notice, and noted the defendants' significant delays and failure to file responding materials.

The court also found no merit to the alleged defences, including the unpleaded claim of improvident sale, and considered the prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The defendants, an appraisal service, brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a negligence action by the plaintiff mortgage financing company, MCAP, on the basis that the action was commenced beyond the applicable limitation period.

MCAP alleged that the defendants negligently overvalued a property in a 2012 appraisal, leading to a loss on a 2013 mortgage loan.

The court found that MCAP had sufficient knowledge to discover its claim by June 15, 2016, or at the latest, September 6, 2016, when it received various post-default valuations and opinions questioning the original appraisal's accuracy.

The court rejected MCAP's argument that its internal protocol justified delaying discovery until the property sale was complete or a retrospective valuation was obtained.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

Michael Dalia was convicted of drug offences, including possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 16-year sentence for fentanyl-related counts, while the defence requested a global sentence of 10 years, arguing Dalia was a mid-level trafficker with significant mitigating factors, including harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's criminal record, and the impact of fentanyl trafficking, applying principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court also applied a "Duncan credit" for the unduly harsh conditions of Dalia's pre-sentence custody.

Ultimately, a 13-year sentence for the fentanyl count was imposed, reduced to 10 years after the Duncan credit, with concurrent sentences for other counts.

The applicant, a municipal councilor, sought to add the Integrity Commissioner as a respondent to his application for judicial review of a decision imposing penalties for his participation in the Freedom Convoy.

The motion was brought months after the 30-day limitation period under the Judicial Review Procedures Act had expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide a cogent explanation for the delay and failed to demonstrate apparent grounds for relief, as the Commissioner's findings regarding the unlawfulness of the demonstration and the applicant's breaches of the Code of Conduct were reasonable.

The defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Peter Collins, to provide expert opinion evidence on the neurobiological responses to stress and the impact of military training on decision-making.

The Crown objected, arguing the evidence was unnecessary and within the common knowledge of the jury.

The court applied the Mohan framework and the Supreme Court's guidance on self-defence from this very case, concluding that the expert evidence was necessary to help the jury assess the reasonableness of the accused's conduct and his role in the incident.

The application to admit the expert evidence was granted, subject to certain redactions.

The Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from a forensic pathologist regarding the sequence of shots and the positioning of the deceased at the time of the shooting in a second degree murder trial.

The accused objected, arguing the opinion exceeded the expert's scope of expertise and would confuse the jury.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan framework and gatekeeper analysis, concluding the expert was properly qualified and the evidence was logically relevant and necessary.

The court ruled the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect and admitted the expert opinion.

The offender was convicted at trial of possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine, and later pleaded guilty to another count of possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl while on bail.

The Crown sought an 11-year global sentence, while the defence sought 8 years.

The court found the offender to be a mid-level trafficker motivated by addiction, but noted the serious aggravating factor of committing the second offence while on strict bail conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years, which was reduced by 20 months for harsh pandemic jail conditions, 2.5 months for strict bail conditions, and 52.5 months for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of 33 months in a federal penitentiary.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay from the charge date to the anticipated end of trial was 56.5 months.

After deducting 7 months for defence-caused delay and 14 months for exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 35.5 months.

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts and the Crown advanced no argument on complexity, the court found the delay presumptively unreasonable.

The application was granted and the charges were stayed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to declare that a default judgment debt owed by the defendant survived his assignment into bankruptcy pursuant to s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying action involved a breach of trust under the Construction Act for failing to pay for construction materials.

The court held that the defendant's extrinsic evidence attempting to explain the breach of trust was inadmissible on a Rule 59.06(2) motion.

The court found that the deemed admissions from the default judgment established misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, and therefore the debt survived the bankruptcy.

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault for digitally penetrating a 12-year-old child while he was employed as her babysitter.

The Crown sought a 3-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, finding that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offence and the profound impact on the victim.

The court sentenced the offender to 18 months' imprisonment for sexual interference, stayed the sexual assault charge under the Kienapple principle, and imposed ancillary orders including a 15-year prohibition order and a 20-year sex offender registry order.

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 21.01 motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for uninsured motorist coverage.

The plaintiff was injured as a passenger in a stolen vehicle insured by the defendant.

The Minister, responding on behalf of the uninsured driver's estate, argued the plaintiff was entitled to coverage because he did not know the vehicle was stolen.

The court held that under section 1.8.2 of the Standard Ontario Automobile Policy, coverage is excluded for the automobile insured by the policy if it is operated without the owner's consent, regardless of the passenger's knowledge.

The motion was granted and the action against the insurer was dismissed.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The total delay was 36 months and eight days.

The court deducted three months and 18 days for defence-caused delay, and three months and four days as a discrete exceptional event due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court declined to deduct delay caused by federal agencies vetting disclosure.

The remaining net delay was 29.5 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, facing 51 fraud-related charges from three different police agencies, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the first charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 43 months.

After deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay was 34 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the case was 'particularly complex' and found that the delay was presumptively unreasonable.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was imposed.

The applicant, a key organizer of the Freedom Convoy, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after a Justice of the Peace ordered her detention on secondary and tertiary grounds following an alleged breach of her release conditions.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by conflating the reverse onus at a bail hearing with the onus at trial, misinterpreting the release condition, and failing to consider material changes in circumstances.

Conducting a hearing de novo, the court concluded that the applicant did not pose a substantial risk to public safety and that her detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was granted and judicial interim release was ordered.

The applicant sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

The respondent vendor refused to close the transaction after realizing that the contract stipulated HST was 'included in' the purchase price, meaning she would net less than anticipated.

The respondent argued there was a lack of consensus ad idem and unilateral mistake.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the contract language unambiguous and the mistake to be the respondent's own error in judgment.

The court granted specific performance, holding that the property was unique in the context of a hot real estate market and damages would be inadequate.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, and breach offences arising from allegations by a former intimate partner.

He argued that the trial judge failed to consider corroborative defence evidence, failed to address material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, conflated the treatment of accused and non-accused witnesses, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly applied the governing credibility principles, including the W.(D.) framework, gave adequate reasons, and reasonably rejected the appellant's evidence as neither credible nor reliable.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence, no reversible credibility error, and no unfairness in the scrutiny applied.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to amend her Statement of Defence and Crossclaim to allege that the plaintiff credit union and its former employee participated in a fraudulent mortgage transaction.

The court dismissed the motion to amend the pleadings regarding the employee and the credit union, finding that the defendant knew of the employee's involvement years prior.

The proposed amendments constituted a new cause of action that was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Minor amendments elaborating on the existing fraud pleadings against the co-defendant were permitted.

R.O., a 14-year-old at the time of the offence, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of 14-year-old Devan Selvey.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the senseless nature of the crime and R.O.'s flight, and mitigating factors, such as his guilty plea and significant personal challenges.

Applying the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) principles, particularly diminished moral culpability and rehabilitation, the court accepted a joint submission for the maximum youth sentence: a seven-year Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order, comprising four years in custody (with 24 months credit for pre-sentence custody) and three years under conditional supervision, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and no-contact order.

The plaintiff in a civil defamation action sought an order under Rule 30.10 for the production of the complete and unredacted Crown brief relating to his ongoing criminal prosecution for sexual assault.

The Attorney General opposed the motion, arguing that disclosure could compromise the integrity of the ongoing criminal proceedings and risk witness taint.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the public interest in protecting the ongoing criminal prosecution outweighed the plaintiff's need for the documents at the early stage of the civil action.

The motion was adjourned sine die until the completion of the criminal proceedings.

The plaintiffs sued their insurer and its adjuster following a fire loss, seeking additional compensation beyond what was awarded in a statutory appraisal process.

The defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the claims related to the appraised building and valuable papers losses, and to strike the claims against the adjuster personally.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions, holding that an umpire's appraisal decision under the Insurance Act is final and binding absent judicial review, and that the adjuster could not be held personally liable as he acted entirely within the scope of his employment.