Kim Edward

Sentencing for multiple sexual offences against children, including two counts of sexual interference, one count of sexual exploitation, four counts of making child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography.

The offender, in a position of trust as stepfather, sexually abused two stepdaughters over a period exceeding six years, commencing when the victims were 9 and 11 years of age.

The abuse escalated in severity and frequency and included video-recording of the sexual assaults.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, prioritizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives, and considered the significant aggravating factors including breach of trust, duration and frequency of offending, the creation of child sexual abuse material, and the severe impact on the victims.

A global sentence of 16 years imprisonment less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit was imposed, along with ancillary orders including lifetime SOIRA, DNA order, firearms prohibition, s. 161 order, and non-communication order.

Jordan Romaker was sentenced for possession of child pornography and voyeurism after pleading guilty to both charges.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 4.5 to 5.5 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of imprisonment or 2.5 to 3 years jail.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen and R. v. Pike, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for child pornography offences.

Aggravating factors included the large and sophisticated collection of child pornography depicting various forms of abuse, and the voyeurism offence committed while on release.

Mitigating factors included guilty pleas, no prior criminal record (for sentencing purposes), mental health challenges, and expressed remorse.

Collateral consequences related to the offender's mother's care were considered but did not outweigh the need for a proportionate sentence.

The court imposed a total sentence of 4 years imprisonment (3.5 years for child pornography and 6 months consecutive for voyeurism), along with ancillary orders including DNA, a s. 161 prohibition, and SOIRA registration.

The applicant was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury.

Following the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Chouhan regarding the prospective application of the abolition of peremptory challenges, the applicant brought a motion for a mistrial, arguing the jury was improperly constituted.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, holding that it was functus officio as the jury had already rendered its verdict and been discharged.

The court concluded that the case did not fall into the recognized exceptions allowing post-verdict changes, and the applicant's proper remedy was to appeal.

Four accused were charged with first degree murder in the death of the victim, who was shot in the chest on November 30, 2013.

One accused conceded committal.

The remaining three accused contested committal.

The Crown's theory was that the accused, motivated by prior animus, planned and deliberately ambushed and murdered the victim with the assistance of an accused who possessed a firearm.

The court examined extensive surveillance video evidence, cell phone records, and witness testimony to determine whether sufficient evidence existed for committal on first degree murder charges.

The court found that the evidence, largely circumstantial, supported inferences that the three accused collectively planned and deliberately executed the murder and committed to the enterprise without resiling from it.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for first degree murder arising from a fatal beating that left the victim incapacitated on railway tracks where he was subsequently struck by a train.

They argued the evidence supported, at most, manslaughter or second degree murder.

The court held that the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and that there was some evidence capable of supporting each essential element of first degree murder.

Evidence existed from which a jury could infer intent to cause bodily harm likely to cause death and recklessness, as well as planning and deliberation in leaving the victim incapacitated on the tracks.

The evidence could also support constructive first degree murder based on unlawful confinement.