ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. A.S., 2026 ONSC 3423

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-834

DATE: 2026-06-19

B E T W E E N:

His Majesty the King

Applicant

K. Regimbal, for the Crown

• and -

A.S.

Respondent

K. Edward, for A.S.

HEARD: April 1, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

By court order made pursuant to subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, information that may identify persons described in this decision as the complainant may not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any manner. This decision complies with this restriction so that it can be published.

M. Bordin, J.

Overview

1On May 27, 2025, the jury convicted A.S. of one count of sexual assault, one count of sexual assault with a weapon, an anal plug, and one count of sexual assault with a weapon, a rope, pursuant to ss. 271 and 271(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

2At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, I heard submissions from the Crown and A.S. regarding the facts necessary for sentencing, in particular, the number of times the assaults occurred for each count. I delivered my bottom-line findings regarding the number of incidents at the sentencing hearing and advised that my reasons would follow, together with my reasons on the appropriate sentence.

3I will first address the reasons for my findings of fact before turning to the appropriate sentence.

Position of Parties and Law on Findings of Fact

4As summarized by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. S.P., 2024 ONCA 211, to sentence an accused after a jury trial, the court must determine the facts necessary for sentencing.

5The Crown submits that the jury must have accepted B.S.’s evidence and the theory of the Crown as put to the jury. The Crown’s position is that I should find that there were multiple instances of anal sex, use of the anal plug and use of the rope.

6A.S. acknowledges the jury must have rejected his evidence with respect to the sexual assaults. He submits he can be found to have been reckless or wilfully blind to the lack of consent, but that he testified that once he was told B.S. did not consent, he ceased the activity.

7Given that there were allegations of numerous incidents for each of the counts on which A.S. was convicted, the Crown and A.S. agree that the jury was not required to be unanimous on which of the alleged incidents were proven beyond a reasonable doubt to ground a conviction on each count.

8The Crown also seeks a finding that an aggravating feature is that A.S. engaged in controlling and abusive behaviour toward B.S. during their relationship. The Crown made brief submissions on this issue. A.S. did not.

9I must first identify any relevant factual determinations the jury has made by examining what facts were essential to the jury’s verdicts: R. v. Aragon, 2022 ONCA 244, at para. 106. I am bound by the express and implied factual implications of a jury’s verdict. I must accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict: See S.P. para. 37. In addition, I may find other relevant facts disclosed by the evidence at trial: R. v. Nelson, 2014 ONCA 853, at para. 56.

10As explained in R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, at paras. 16-18, the facts I find must be consistent with the jury’s verdict. I may supplement the jury’s findings insofar as it is necessary for sentencing purposes. However, I may not go beyond what is required to address the sentencing issues or attempt to reconstruct the jury’s reasoning process. I am not to follow the jury’s path to conviction, speculate about how the jury reached its verdict, or to reconstruct the logical process of the jury in finding facts: S.P. paras. 44-46. I may not attribute a single set of factual findings to the jury unless it is clear that the jury must have unanimously found those facts. Where any ambiguity exists, I am to consider the evidence and make my own independent findings of fact consistent with the evidence and the jury’s findings: see also S.P. paras. 41, 44-46.

11The law does not require me to take the view of the evidence most favourable to the offender: S.P. paras. 38.

12I may also turn my mind to the relevant factors that go to the believability of B.S.’s evidence. S.P. para. 51.

Factual findings and circumstances of the offence

13The offences occurred between January 2015 and March 17, 2022. A.S. and B.S. were living together during that time in a common-law relationship. They had one child together. The child has medical issues. The offences occurred in their home.

14Count 1, sexual assault, relates to the allegations of forced, non-consensual anal sex. B.S. testified about the first time anal sex occurred and about anal sex after a shower. She also testified, without details, that there were other instances of anal sex. The jury must have found that at least one of these incidents was non-consensual.

15B.S. testified that A.S. asked if she was interested in having anal sex, and she immediately said no, she was against it and that she was not interested. She said that the first time it happened, A.S. flipped her on her stomach and asked if she was ready to try anal sex. She said no, she did not want to do it, but he put his penis in her anus and continued with anal sex. B.S. said she cried and said “stop”, but A.S. did not stop.

16B.S. described another specific incident of anal sex when she got out of the shower and told A.S., “Ouch, it hurts, please stop,” and he responded it will be fine, you’re ok. She said he continued having anal sex with her for about 15 minutes. A.S. denied that this incident of anal sex ever happened.

17A.S. testified that one time during sex, he asked B.S. if she was ok with trying anal sex, and she agreed, but that on his first attempt to penetrate her, she asked him to stop, and he stopped all sexual activity. A.S. testified that he never tried anal sex again. However, in cross-examination, he agreed that it happened more than once, that it was a couple of times. He then said that it had occurred with his penis once, but with toys twice during the relationship. This is contradicted by his evidence in chief that they used an anal plug once, and his statement to the police that he never used an anal plug with B.S. This undermined his credibility with respect to his evidence about anal sex and use of the anal plug.

18With respect to other alleged incidents of anal sex, B.S.’s evidence was inconsistent and lacked any details.

19I find B.S.’s evidence as to the two specific incidents of anal sex is credible and supported by A.S.’s admission that it happened a couple of times. Bearing in mind that I may not go beyond what is required to deal with the sentencing issues or attempt to reconstruct the logical process of the jury, I find there were two incidents of non-consensual anal sex, namely, the first time it happened and the shower incident. I find there are insufficient details and evidence to assess how many, if any, additional incidents there were of anal sex.

20Count 2, sexual assault with a weapon, relates to the use of a rope during sex. Specifically, when the rope was used on B.S.’s breasts in such a way that it caused her pain and discomfort, and she asked to have it removed, but it was not.

21B.S. consented to the rope being used during sex. However, B.S. testified that she did not consent to the rope being too tight. She testified that A.S. tightened the rope to the point that her breasts lost circulation and turned purple. She would tell him that the rope hurt, and she needed it off. She said that he would continue to manipulate her breasts until he was done and would not take the rope off immediately, but would laugh or giggle. He would tell her she was fine and would be all right. Eventually, he would take the rope off. She said the rope left marks.

22B.S. testified that she told A.S. a few times that she did not want to use the rope and that it hurt her breasts. She testified in chief that after she told him that she did not want to use the rope anymore, it was never used on her again. She said that the rope was used during her pregnancy and stopped just before their son was born on September 23, 2015.

23A.S. testified that he tied B.S.’s breasts about 5 times during sex. He said that he had never seen any sign of injury around B.S.’s breasts.

24Having found A.S. guilty, the jury found at least one occasion in which the rope was used on her breasts when B.S. asked to have it removed because it was too tight. On B.S.’s evidence, she told A.S. a few times that she did not want to use the rope and that it hurt her breasts. On A.S.’s evidence, the rope was used on B.S.’s breasts about 5 times. I find that A.S. left the rope on B.S.’s breasts after she withdrew her consent on five occasions.

25The jury found A.S. guilty of Count 3, sexual assault with a weapon, a butt or anal plug.

26B.S. testified that when he first showed her the anal plug, she did not want to use it. She said that A.S. told her to relax, that he was going to use it on her, that it would be ok, that it would only hurt for a little bit, and that she would let him do it if she loved him. B.S. testified that after the introduction and use of the anal plug, she told A.S. she did not like it and to stop using it on her, but he continued to use it on her.

27B.S. testified that A.S. used the anal plug on her a few times. She described a time when A.S. took out the anal plug, and she said no, rolled over, and prevented him from using it. In cross-examination, she agreed that sometimes he tried to use the anal plug on her, but was not successful because she said no. B.S. testified that she told him not to use it on her, and he never used it again. She also testified that its use stopped when their relationship came to an end, which was March 17, 2022. She also testified that he used it on her every other time they would make love. She said that it was about twice a month. This went on for 2-4 months. B.S. testified that A.S. would use the butt plug on her as often as he could try. She testified that at times her anus bled from the butt plug.

28A.S. testified that they used the anal plug once, and B.S. did not like it, so they stopped using it, and he never used it on her again. However, in cross-examination, he said they used the anal plug twice. He told the police that he never used an anal plug with B.S.

29Having found A.S. guilty on this count, the jury accepted that there was at least one occasion that he used the anal plug on B.S. without her consent. Considering the different accounts given by B.S. on the frequency of the use of the anal plug and A.S.’s evidence that it was used twice, I conclude that the anal plug was used twice without B.S.’s consent. I am not able to conclude that there were any other incidents of the use of the anal plug without her consent.

30I turn now to the Crown’s request to find that A.S. engaged in controlling and abusive behaviour toward B.S. during their relationship.

31There was evidence from both B.S. and A.S. that the police attended their residence.

32B.S. testified that A.S. would tell her she was a bad mother, a “no-good” person, a bitch. He would make her feel bad if she did not do something right. He would yell and scream at her. She said that he would not allow her to renew her medications. She testified that she was unable to go out, visit her family, or have friends, and that she pretty much had to stay home. B.S. had a cell phone but said that she did not have one the whole time. She testified that she was not allowed to call family on her cell phone and that A.S. would scroll through her phone.

33B.S. admitted that she had gone through A.S.’s cell phone and had access to the home phone. She also testified that she worked throughout most of their relationship, including at a call center and at Dollarama and that she took the bus to work.

34A.S. testified that B.S. had a cellphone at all times. He said that he did not look through her phone. He denies forbidding her friends to visit. He said B.S. went to her friend’s house many times. He agreed he did not get along very well with her family and had verbal altercations with her sisters. A.S. testified that he did not forbid B.S. from visiting her parents. He agreed that her family only visited twice. He testified that he took her to get her medications.

35B.S. had her own account into which her money from work, ODSP, and the baby bonus was deposited. She had a bank card. She said she took out money for herself, but just on rare occasions. She testified that A.S. would take her to the bank to withdraw her paycheck and he would decide what to do with the money. She agreed that A.S. used his bank card to buy the groceries.

36A.S. denied controlling the money. He said they struggled financially, and the money went to their son’s needs, their needs, and bills. He agreed he would take B.S. to the bank to withdraw money. He denies that she gave him money, though he sometimes took out $20 or $30 to give to her.

37B.S. testified that A.S. had issues and conflicts with their son’s doctors. She said he was difficult with their son’s doctors and refused surgery for her son which had been recommended by a doctor. She testified that A.S. had yelled and caused her family doctor to terminate her care. In cross-examination, B.S. agreed that he drove her to prenatal doctor’s visits, and they attended parenting classes together.

38A.S. gave detailed evidence about his involvement in their son’s medical conditions and treatment, and the joint decision made for their son not to have further surgery. He acknowledged that he sometimes attended appointments with B.S. and spoke to her doctors, and that he had issues with how the doctors were treating her mental health issues. He had an argument with her doctor over the issue.

39B.S. said that A.S. would threaten to take their son away from her. He denies this. He testified that she threatened to take their son from the house in 2016 and did not let him see their son if he left the house to go to work. B.S. denies saying this.

40B.S. acknowledged she suffers from borderline personality disorder and that she experienced wildly unstable moods, bursts of intense anger, inconsistent self-image and fear of abandonment during the relationship.

41In chief, B.S. described two suicide attempts, one involving pills and one involving scissors. She testified that she was in the bedroom with scissors and was going to harm herself. She said A.S. saw her and intervened. He jumped on top of her, causing her to fall off the bed and hit her face on some pop bottles, resulting in black eyes. She agreed that he lunged at her and took the scissors from her.

42B.S. also testified in chief about an incident in which she had pills and told A.S. that she was going to take them, but said she didn’t really mean it. He jumped on her, and they fell to the floor, with A.S. on top of her. In cross-examination, she agreed that he jumped on her to take the pills from her. She said she gave him the pills; he got up, and she ran outside.

43A.S. testified that B.S. had multiple suicide attempts. He described the incident involving the pills as occurring in the dining room and being preceded by B.S. handing him a note, following him into the house and punching him, and ending up with them both on the floor and B.S. biting him in the arm. In cross-examination, he agreed that his description to the police of the arm-biting incident did not reference pills. He said this is because there have been multiple occasions or events with the pills.

44With respect to the scissors and pills incident, A.S. said that B.S. threatened to harm herself while on the bed. He lunged at her to prevent her from harming herself. She fell off the edge of the bed onto the bottles and got a black eye.

45Finding that A.S. engaged in controlling and abusive behaviour toward B.S. during their relationship was not essential to the jury’s verdict. As an aggravating factor, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There were credibility issues with the evidence of both B.S. and A.S. on this issue. The relationship was clearly volatile and unstable. However, on the conflicting evidence, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that A.S. engaged in controlling and abusive behaviour.

Position of the parties on sentence

46The Crown seeks incarceration of 7 to 8 years and the following ancillary orders:

a. a DNA order for a primary designated offence;

b. a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (“SOIRA”) order pursuant to ss. 490.012(3) and 490.013(5);

c. a weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109; and

d. an order prohibiting A.S. from communicating with B.S. and her immediate family directly or indirectly, during the custodial period of the sentence, pursuant to s. 743.21(1).

47A.S. seeks a sentence of incarceration of 3.5 to 4 years. He took no position on the ancillary orders sought by the Crown.

Victim Impact statements and community impact statements

48I heard, read, and considered victim impact statements from B.S. and her sisters, K. and J. I have disabused myself of any matters in the statements which are not the proper subject of a victim impact statement.

49B.S. described the daily and lasting impact the offences have had on her and how they overwhelm her. She disclosed the PTSD, anxiety and fear, and her reaction to stimuli that trigger her stress and anxiety. She discussed the impact on her son. B.S. relives the memories and is awakened in terror at night. She fears she may not be able to fully trust anyone again or return to a normal life.

50B.S.’s two sisters have been very supportive of her. Their description of the impact of the offences on B.S. is consistent with B.S.’s report of the significant impact on her and her son.

Circumstances of the Offender

51I have received a presentence report dated December 1, 2025, (“PSR”). A.S. is now 39 years old. He was between 28 and 35 years old at the time of the offences.

52B.S. and A.S.’s son lives with B.S. A.S. has supervised parenting time every other weekend. He has been in a common-law relationship for the last two years. His partner’s 10-year-old son lives with them in A.S.’s father’s house.

53The PSR contains information which suggests that A.S.’s self-perception and reporting do not always align with what others report. Some of what A.S. reports could not be independently corroborated.

54A.S.’s formative years were unremarkable. According to A.S., he had a positive relationship with his parents. His mother passed away in 2023. He says he has a positive relationship with his father. He says he had good relationships with his mother, sister, and extended family. This was somewhat contradicted by his father, grandmother, and aunt.

55A.S. struggled at school, says he had ADHD, and he failed at least one grade during elementary school. He completed grade 8 at 15 years old. He experienced some bullying at school.

56A.S. worked at various jobs until about 2016, was unemployed until 2019, then worked again, but has been unemployed since his arrest on these counts. He is now a dependent on his partner’s disability support. He asserts this provides more money than social assistance.

57A.S. believes he suffers from anxiety and depression and is awaiting his family doctor’s referral to a mental health clinic. A.S. does not drink but uses cannabis twice a day, which he says is for anxiety and nausea. He does not have a prescription for cannabis.

58Collateral sources describe A.S.’s expressions of anger as intimidating and often in response to situations where his demands are not met. A.S. enrolled in a group anger management program following his arrest for these counts, but he has only completed two of 10 sessions as of the PSR. He identified transportation as a barrier.

Principles of Sentencing

59Section 718 sets out the fundamental purpose of sentencing which is “to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society”: R. v. J.W., 2025 SCC 16, at para. 40. This fundamental purpose is to be given effect by “imposing just sanctions” in accordance with the sentencing objectives set out in s. 718(a) to (f): denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders to protect society, rehabilitation, reparation, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgement of the harm caused to the victim and to the community: J.W., at para. 40.

60Section 718.1 provides that the fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality, which has been recognized as a central tenet of sentencing. It requires that every sentence be proportionate not only to the gravity of the offence but also to the degree of responsibility of the offender: J.W., at para. 41.

61Proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching the goal of sentencing in every case, of a fair, fit and principled sentence: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 10. Proportionality ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, which is closely tied to the objective of denunciation: J.W., at para. 41. It ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender: J.W. at para. 43.

62Sections 718.2 to 718.21 set out a non-exhaustive list of secondary principles to assist in giving effect to proportionality. These include consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the principles of parity and totality, and the requirement to consider all available sanctions that are reasonable in the circumstances: J.W., at para. 44.

63Sentencing is an individualized exercise: Parranto, at para. 38. Individualization is central to the assessment of proportionality in that it demands focus upon the individual circumstances of each offender: R. v. A.J.K., 2022 ONCA 487, at para. 82.

64I must also consider the principle of restraint codified in ss. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Code. To the extent reasonably possible, a sentence is to be tailored to the circumstances of the accused and give appropriate consideration to rehabilitation.

65Parity is an expression of proportionality: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 32. It is a tool that helps calibrate proportionate sentences; it is about treating similar offenders who commit similar offences in similar circumstances in a similar way: A.J.K., at para. 81. Parity is secondary to proportionality: Parranto, at para. 38.

66Denunciation and deterrence are the overarching objectives of sentencing in sexual assault: see, for example, AJK, para. 83.

67In short, sentencing is a fact-dependent and individualized process arrived at through the application of the fundamental purpose of sentencing, its objectives, and the governing principles.

Gravity of Offence and Degree of Responsibility

68The offences are serious, and A.S.’s moral blameworthiness is high.

69All sexual assaults are serious acts of violence. They reflect the wrongful exploitation of the victim whose personal autonomy, sexual integrity, and dignity are harmfully impacted while being treated as nothing more than an object. Whether intimate partners or strangers, victims of sexual violence suffer profound emotional and physical harm and their lives, as well as those of their loved ones, can be forever altered: A.J.K., at para. 74.

70An act of sexual violence perpetrated on a stranger to the accused is not necessarily worse than a similar act of sexual violence perpetrated on an intimate or former intimate partner: A.J.K., at para. 73.

71Each of these offences is a serious act of sexual assault. Each of the offences constitutes a very serious affront to B.S.’s personal autonomy, sexual integrity, and dignity. The offences inflicted physical and psychological pain.

72The moral blameworthiness of an offender in a sex assault is high. Knowing that B.S. did not consent to anal sex, use of the anal plug, or continued use of the rope, A.S. persisted and repeated the acts.

Aggravating factors

73I turn now to the aggravating factors. Pursuant to s. 718.201, a court that imposes a sentence in respect of an offence that involved the abuse of an intimate partner shall consider the increased vulnerability of female persons who are victims.

74B.S. and A.S. were intimate partners at the time of the offences. Each of the offences occurred during their seven-year cohabitation. Pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(ii) the fact that A.S., in committing the offences, abused his intimate partner is a statutory aggravating factor. A pre-existing relationship between the accused and complainant places them in a position of trust that can only be seen as an aggravating factor on sentencing: A.J.K., at para. 76.

75There are multiple offences, and each relates to two or more assaults.

76The impact on B.S. and on her immediate family is substantial.

77This is not A.S.’s first criminal conviction. The Crown submits that A.S.’s record for previous convictions in April 2010 for mischief under $5,000 and unauthorized possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon, for which he received a small fine and a 10-year weapons prohibition order, are aggravating. The record is dated and unrelated. The weapons offence relates to possession of a prohibited or restricted weapon, not its use. The prior record is minimally aggravating.

Mitigating factors

78A.S. did not point out any mitigating factors. Apart from his lack of a related current criminal record, I do not see any. The PSR is not flattering. There is no impact on employment. Collateral consequences on family are nominal.

79The PSR reports that A.S. states that he has some mental health challenges. Mental health challenges may serve as a mitigating factor and lower the offender’s moral blameworthiness when there is a causal connection between the mental health challenges and the offences at issue: R. v. Perry, 2025 ONCA 241, at para. 27; R. v. Lojovic, 2025 ONCA 319, at paras. 47-50. There is little cogent evidence of mental illness and no evidence that any mental health issues are causally connected to the offences or played any role in the offences.

80“A genuine expression of remorse can constitute an important mitigating consideration at the time of sentencing”: R. v. Reeve, 2020 ONCA 381, 151 O.R. (3d) 65, at para. 11. However, there has been no expression of remorse.

81An offender cannot be punished for a lack of remorse: Reeve, at para. 12. However, absence of remorse is a relevant factor in sentencing with respect to rehabilitation and specific deterrence, as it may indicate a lack of insight into, and a failure to accept responsibility for the crimes committed, and demonstrate a substantial likelihood of future dangerousness: R. v. Shah, 2017 ONCA 872, at para. 8.

82There is no evidence of insight, signs that A.S. has come to realize the gravity of his conduct, has achieved a change in attitude, or has imposed some self-discipline that significantly reduces the likelihood of further offending or enhances the prospects of rehabilitation.

83Counsel advise that A.S. has not served any time in pre-trial custody on these offences.

Sentence Imposed

84The offence of sexual assault in these circumstances carries a maximum sentence of 10 years of imprisonment pursuant to s. 271(a) of the Code. The offence of sexual assault with a weapon in these circumstances carries a maximum sentence of 14 years of imprisonment pursuant to s. 271(2)(b) of the Code.

85The Court of Appeal for Ontario has reinforced a three to five year range for a sexual assault of a non-intimate partner involving forced oral, vaginal, or anal penetration: AJK, at para. 68. Absent some highly mitigating factor, the forced penetration of another person will typically attract a sentence of at least three years in the penitentiary. Three to five years is just a range, a quantitative sentencing tool designed to assist busy trial judges with where to start. There will be circumstances where a departure from the range, either above or below the range, is entirely appropriate: AJK, at. para. 77. While added violence may justify a sentence at the higher end of the three to five year range, the offence need not involve any additional physical violence beyond that inherent in a non-consensual penetrative sexual assault to fall within the range: R. v. Ranatunga, 2025 ONCA 557, at para. 36.

86The Court of Appeal has noted that the sexual assault of an intimate or former intimate partner can attract a greater sentence: AJK, at. para. 76.

87There is no magic to citing the correct range of sentencing; the task is to arrive at a fit sentence through the employment of proper sentencing principles: A.J.K., at para. 78. The goal is always to impose a fair, fit, and principled sanction; proportionality is key to this determination, focusing as it does on the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: A.J.K., at para. 80.

88The Crown relies on several cases to support its position on the period of incarceration. A.S. does not dispute the principles and law outlined in the cases but distinguishes them on their facts. A.S. did not present any cases to the court.

89The Crown relies principally on R. v. Wardlaw, 2023 ONSC 649, to support its request for 7 to 8 years of incarceration. Mr. Wardlaw was convicted of 11 offences; six of those offences were acts of sexual assault. Four of the sexual assaults involved forced vaginal intercourse, while a fifth involved anal intercourse. Mr. Wardlaw was sentenced to 7 years total, with all sentences served concurrently and sentences of 7 years on each of the six sexual assault convictions.

90The Crown also relies on AJK, where the offender received a sentence of five years for forced vaginal penetration with choking and a physical assault causing physical injuries in the context of a dating relationship.

91The Crown’s cases included R. v. M.S.A., 2022 ONSC 6818, in which the offender received four years for sexually assaulting his wife on seven occasions and one count of assault. There were mitigating circumstances in that case, as well as collateral consequences for the offender’s children.

92Sexual assaults must be denounced, and sentences must deter both the offender and others from committing sexual assault. There is no doubt that sexual assault of intimate partners is a scourge in our society. It leaves lasting scars on the victim and can have wide-ranging impacts on families. A significant penitentiary sentence is required.

93The offences are serious, A.S.’s moral blameworthiness is high. The offences had a significant impact on B.S. There are significant aggravating factors and little to no mitigating features or collateral consequences.

94Neither party made any submissions regarding the appropriate sentence for each offence, whether the offences should be served concurrently or consecutively, or the totality principle, leaving it to the court to determine these matters.

95Pursuant to s. 718.3(4)(b), I am to consider directing that the terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time for more than one offence be served consecutively, including when the offences do not arise out of the same event or series of events. The principles governing sentencing for multiple offences require imposing a fit and proportionate sentence for each separate offence and enable sentencing judges to make those sentences run concurrently if the offences arise out of the same circumstances: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, at paras. 52-53.

96Consecutive sentences are warranted where offences reflect distinct wrongs: R. v. Al-Enzi, 2025 ONCA 485, at para. 8, citing R. v. Stuckless, 2019 ONCA 504, 146 O.R. (3d) 752, at paras. 77-78, 80, leave to appeal requested but application for leave discontinued, [2020] S.C.C.A. No. 93. The general rule is that offences that are so closely linked to each other as to constitute a single criminal adventure may, but are not required to, receive concurrent sentences, while all other offences are to receive consecutive sentences: Friesen, at para. 155.

97Each of the three offences was committed against the same person, B.S., during their relationship. In that sense, they arise out of the same series of events. Although they constitute distinct events, they are all sexual assaults and are invasions of the same legally protected interests.

98Having regard to the cases, the relevant objectives and principles of sentencing that I have reviewed, and the facts outlined in these reasons, I find that a total sentence of 6 years on each count, to be served concurrently, is appropriate.

Ancillary orders

99The Crown seeks a lifetime SOIRA order. A.S. did not oppose the making of a SOIRA order.

100The offences are, pursuant to s. 490.011(1) primary offences and therefore designated offences. A.S.’s prior convictions are not designated offences.

101Section 490.012(3) applies to the SOIRA order sought by the Crown. Neither of the conditions in s. 490.012(3)(a) or (b) have been made out. Therefore, the court must issue a SOIRA order.

102Pursuant to s. 490.013(3) a SOIRA order applies for life if:

(a) in the same proceeding, the person has been convicted of two or more designated offences in connection with which an order under any of subsections 490.012(1) to (3) may be made; and

(b) the court is satisfied that those offences demonstrate, or form part of, a pattern of behaviour showing that the person presents an increased risk of reoffending by committing a crime of a sexual nature.

103I am satisfied that both s. 490.013(3)(a) and 3(b) apply. A.S. has been convicted of three designated offences in the same proceeding. Further, those offences demonstrate a pattern of behaviour which, coupled with the lack of insight into his behaviour, lack of remorse, and lack of rehabilitative steps taken, demonstrates that he presents an increased risk of reoffending by committing a crime of a sexual nature.

104Accordingly, a lifetime SOIRA order is imposed.

105A lifetime weapons prohibition pursuant to s. 109 is appropriate and is ordered, as is a DNA order for a primary designated offence.

106There shall also be an order prohibiting A.S. from communicating with B.S. and her sisters, parents and family as set out in the order, directly or indirectly, during the custodial period of the sentence pursuant to s. 743.21(1), except through his counsel or B.S.’s counsel with respect to the family court proceedings.

M. Bordin J.

Released: June 19, 2026

CITATION: R. v. A.S., 2026 ONSC 3423