Melissa Mandel

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of impaired driving.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that his medication, Effexor, could explain some signs of impairment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding Effexor, as there was no expert evidence to support its effects on impairment-like symptoms, and speculated on its impact.

The trial judge also erred in applying the test for impaired driving by not considering alcohol as a contributing factor.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was committed for trial on charges including manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after providing cocaine laced with heroin to two women, resulting in one death and one coma.

The accused brought a certiorari application to quash the committals, arguing there was no evidence he intended to traffic heroin specifically, nor evidence of objective foresight of bodily harm.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that the mens rea for trafficking does not require knowledge of the specific drug, and there was sufficient evidence of objective fault given the inherent dangers of street drugs and circumstantial evidence of the accused's knowledge.

The appellant, Marti Mayrhofer-Lima, appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal focused on alleged Charter breaches (sections 7, 10(a), 10(b), 8, and 9) and the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient reasons.

The Crown had conceded breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b), but the trial judge rejected these concessions without notifying counsel or allowing submissions on the pivotal case of R. v. Bush.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in not accepting the Crown's concession regarding the section 10(b) breach and in failing to provide counsel an opportunity to make submissions on R. v. Bush, which was central to the rejection of the section 9 concession.

These errors were deemed reversible, as they impacted the appellant's strategic decisions at trial.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle and subsequently blew over the legal limit.

At trial, she was convicted of having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired, failing to rebut the presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly assessed her credibility against a reasonable person standard.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and no material error was made.

The appellant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 after failing a roadside screening test and providing breath samples of 125mg and 100mg.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing whether the police officer had an objective basis for the demand given the potential presence of mouth alcohol, and that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons regarding care and control.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the objective standard, made credibility findings entitled to deference, and that the path to conviction was clear because the Crown relied on the appellant's admission of driving prior to being found in the driveway.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including assault, sexual assault, and break and enter against his wife, applied to sever the pre-2014 assault and sexual assault counts from the 2014 break and enter counts.

The court applied the criteria from R. v. Last and found a factual nexus between the charges, as the earlier offences provided context for the later ones.

The court concluded that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial and dismissed the application for severance.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two accused for trial on charges of attempted murder, aggravated assault, careless use of firearm, weapons dangerous, and unauthorized possession of firearm arising from a shooting incident outside a nightclub in Scarborough.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of identification evidence.

The court found that while identification evidence was frail and contained material inconsistencies, it was sufficient to warrant committal for trial on the low threshold applicable at the preliminary inquiry stage.

The court distinguished between cases of weak identification, which may still warrant committal, and cases where identification is so contradictory as to not constitute identification at all.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into a roadside screening device and obstructing a peace officer by failing to provide identification.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the roadside demand was made within the "forthwith" requirement despite a six-minute delay, as the delay was necessitated by articulated safety concerns and the accused's obstructive behaviour.

The arrest, though technically charged under the wrong provision, was supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was found guilty of operation impaired following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including violations of ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and critically, s. 7 security rights.

The accused was left in a urine-soaked state for approximately 10 hours in custody without being offered a change of clothing, blanket, or early release.

Police officers made demeaning remarks about his condition.

The court determined that the accused's dignity and composure during the breathalyzer process were fundamentally compromised by the wilful indifference of persons in authority.

Applying the test from R. v. Babos, the court found that the egregious Charter violation reflected an endemic institutional attitude toward detainees that could not be adequately remedied by alternative sanctions, particularly given mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.

The court concluded that a stay of proceedings was warranted to maintain the integrity of the justice system.

The offender was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and threatening damage to property following an altercation with a close friend.

The victim suffered a broken orbital bone.

The Crown sought 9 to 12 months incarceration, while the defence sought a non-custodial or intermittent sentence, noting the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and potential immigration consequences as a permanent resident.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence (65 days net after pre-sentence credit) and one year of probation, balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender's strong rehabilitative prospects and the victim's desire for reconciliation.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two accused for trial on charges arising from a hostage-taking incident at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

Stanton David was charged with three counts of hostage taking, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

Alpha Water was charged with three counts of hostage taking and one count of placing a trap with intent to cause bodily harm.

The Crown also sought committal on two counts of mischief for Water.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused for trial on the hostage-taking charges and committed Water on the mischief charges, but discharged Water on the trap charge due to insufficient evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.

A sixteen-year-old was charged with seven offences relating to the unlawful possession of a loaded firearm found in a vehicle.

The Crown alleged the accused possessed the firearm either directly, constructively, or jointly, and alternatively that he was an occupant in a vehicle knowing there was a firearm.

The court found that while the accused may have known of the firearm's existence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had both knowledge and control of the weapon.

The firearm was not visible or accessible to the accused in the rear seat, and his presence in the vehicle and subsequent flight could be explained by circumstances other than knowledge of the gun.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicant sought costs after successfully responding to a motion to vary a preservation order relating to property subject to civil forfeiture proceedings.

The applicant requested reimbursement of disbursements only.

The court granted the request and ordered payment of the disbursements.

The total amount awarded was $2,669.69.

The moving parties sought a variation of preservation orders issued under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 to permit access to preserved assets to pay personal debts and living expenses.

The Attorney General opposed the request in the context of ongoing forfeiture proceedings concerning property alleged to be proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity.

The court held that the Act contains no provision permitting living expenses to be paid from preserved assets and that the alleged financial difficulties were not new facts arising after the orders were made.

Evidence also suggested that the moving parties had failed to comply with existing preservation orders and had continued discretionary spending.

The motion to vary the preservation orders was dismissed.