COURT FILE NOS.: CR-18-30000084-0000
CR-21-30000456-0000
DATE: 20211013
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
her majesty the queen
- and -
S.H.(J.)T.
M. Mandel, for the Crown
F. Davoudi, for Mr. S.H.(J.)T.
HEARD: August 20 and October 5, 2021
M. FORESTELL J.
PUBLICATION BAN:
AN ORDER HAS BEEN MADE UNDER S. 486.4(2.1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE, THAT ANY INFORMATION THAT COULD IDENTIFY THE VICTIM SHALL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN ANY DOCUMENT OR BROADCAST IN ANY WAY
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Overview
[1] On August 20, 2021 S.H.(J.)T. entered a guilty plea to the offence criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The sentencing in this case proceeded on October 5, 2021 and I reserved my decision on sentencing until today.
Circumstances of the Offence
[2] The facts underlying the offence were admitted by Mr. S.H.(J.)T. and may be summarized as follows. Mr S.H.(J.)T. was in a common-law relationship with J.L. for approximately seven years. Ms. J.L. gave birth to three children during the relationship. L.1 is the biological child of Mr. S.H.(J.)T. and was born in 2012. L.2 was born in 2013. She was not the biological child of Mr. S.H.(J.)T.. L.2 died at the age of three months after being placed for a nap face down in her crib with blankets and soft objects by Mr. S.H.(J.)T..
[3] After L.2’s death, Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was formally counselled and educated by representatives from the Children’s Aid Society (the “CAS”) about the dangers of placing infants face down for sleep and about unsafe sleeping conditions including having blankets and soft items in the sleeping area.
[4] Ms. J.L.’s third child, L.L., was born in 2016.
[5] On May 4, 2016, L.L. was alone in a room with Mr. S.H.(J.)T.. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. placed L.L. face down in a bassinet on a queen size fleece blanket that had been folded over several times. When Ms. J.L. went into the room in the morning, she found that L.L. did not appear to be breathing. A call to 911 was made and L.L. was found to be breathing very slowly and shallowly, almost imperceptibly. He was rushed to Sick Kids hospital. L.L. was not expected to survive but contrary to expectations, he did survive. However, he suffered serious irreversible brain damage as a result of oxygen deprivation.
[6] There was no pre-existing medical issue that would have caused L.L. to stop breathing. The brain damage was caused by the obstruction to his airway as a result of being placed face down on the blanket by Mr. S.H.(J.)T..
[7] Upon examination, L.L. was also found to have a fractured femur that had signs of healing. This type of fracture to the femur is caused by a significant amount of traction and sheering force.
[8] In statements to the police, Mr S.H.(J.)T. gave varying explanations as to what may have caused the injury to the femur. He suggested it was caused when he accidently dropped L.L. in the sink. He explained he was potty training L.L. at three months old by holding him above the kitchen sink. In the doctor’s opinion, this could not have been the mechanism of this type of injury. Mr S.H.(J.)T. was interviewed again by the police and provided a different explanation for the injury. He said that after dropping the child in the sink, he noticed a bump or bony protrusion on the child’s back. He knew he should take L.L. to the doctor to have this injury checked out but decided not to. He stated he decided to forcibly yank and twist the child’s legs hoping the protrusion on the back would go away. He said he heard the leg snap but did nothing to get help for L.L..
[9] L.L. turned five years-old on […], 2021. He is a ward of the CAS. Following admission to hospital on May 5, 2016, he experienced repeated seizures and was intubated. He suffered widespread dysfunction of the area of the brain responsible for motor and other cognitive functions. He now has cerebral palsy, is visually impaired and non-verbal. He feeds through a tube in his stomach. As a result of the brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation, L.L. will require care for the rest of his life.
Circumstances of Mr. S.H.(J.)T.
[10] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was 37 years-old at the time of the offence and 42 years-old at the time of sentencing. He had no criminal record at the time of the offence. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. informed the Court in his remarks to the Court before sentencing that he came to Canada from Vietnam when he was young. His father was lost at sea on the way from Vietnam. He was raised by his mother. His sister, M.T., provided a letter in support of Mr. S.H.(J.)T. indicating that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. took on a “fatherly role” towards her. As an adult, she lived with Mr. S.H.(J.)T. for a period of time and observed him to be an attentive and loving father.
[11] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. has two children from a previous relationship who are now 19 and 22 years of age. Both sons provided letters of support for their father. They both indicate that he is a loving and supportive father who has never harmed them.
[12] Ms. J.L., the mother of L.L., also wrote a letter in support of Mr. S.H.(J.)T.. She writes that she wishes him well and has no concerns about Mr. S.H.(J.)T. contacting their son L.1. Ms. J.L., in her letter, says that she believes that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. has always done his best to be a good father.
[13] I have also received and considered three letters from friends of Mr. S.H.(J.)T. from work and from the community. They all describe him as a someone who is a hard worker and who wishes to provide for his family.
Pre-Sentence Custody
[14] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. spent 22 days in custody after his arrest on May 31, 2016 and before his release on a strict house arrest bail on June 21, 2016. His bail was varied on June 8, 2017 to allow him to leave the residence without a surety for work.
[15] On September 24, 2018, the house arrest was changed to a curfew. The bail still required Mr. S.H.(J.)T. to live with his surety, E.S., at a specific address.
[16] It was discovered in November of 2019 that neither Mr. E.S. nor Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was residing at the address specified in the release order. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. could not be located and subsequently failed to attend Superior Court on February 25, 2020.
[17] He was arrested on March 15, 2020 and then released on house arrest bail with new sureties on April 30, 2020. He spent 46 days in custody before his release. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. pleaded guilty to the breach and the fail to appear on March 23, 2021. He received a conditional discharge, but the judge took into account the 46 days of presentence custody.
[18] On March 2, 2021, Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s house arrest condition was varied to permit him to be out of his residence without his surety between 4:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. every day for employment as a bread delivery driver and between 1:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. for employment as a mover. He was required to provide written notification to the officer in charge of the case by email of his hours for work as a mover.
[19] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was arrested for further breaches of his bail on July 16, 2021 when he was found near Napanee, Ontario having advertised for a rideshare to drive some customers (not sureties) to Montreal.
[20] He subsequently pleaded guilty to those breaches using 35 days of his presentence custody on that plea. It is not disputed that this leaves 54 days[^1] of his most recent presentence custody to be credited on the sentence that I will impose.
Positions of the Parties
[21] The Crown argues that a sentence of two years less a day is appropriate. The Crown’s position is that any mitigation for harsh conditions of detention is already reflected in the proposed sentence of two years less a day. The Crown also takes the position that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. is entitled to little credit for strict bail because of his repeated breaches of his bail. To the extent that such credit is warranted, it is also reflected in the lenient sentence of two years less a day. The only credit to be deducted should be the statutory 1.5 to 1. The Crown also submits that 46 days of Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s pre-sentence custody was already used in a guilty plea on March 23, 2021. The days were not formally credited because Mr. S.H.(J.)T. received a conditional discharge, but the sentencing judge clearly indicated that she was granting a conditional discharge because of the 46 days of custody.
[22] Counsel for Mr. S.H.(J.)T. submits that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. should receive a sentence of nine months’ incarceration before credit for his actual time in presentence custody and for strict bail and for harsh conditions of presentence custody. He also submits that the 46 days from 2020 were not formally credited on the conditional discharge and should now be credited on the sentence to be imposed on the charge before this Court.
Issues
[23] The issues that I must determine are the following:
(1) Has the 46 days of presentence custody from 2020 already been taken into account or is it properly deducted from the sentence that I will impose?
(2) Should Mr. S.H.(J.)T. receive consideration for harsh presentence conditions due to COVID 19 as a deduction from the sentence or as a mitigating circumstance?
(3) Should Mr. S.H.(J.)T. receive credit for strict bail conditions?
(4) What is the appropriate sentence to be imposed for this offence and this offender?
Issue #1: Has the 46 days of presentence custody from 2020 already been taken into account or is it properly deducted from the sentence that I will impose?
[24] Section 719(2) of the Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (the “Criminal Code”) permits a court, in determining the sentence to be imposed on a person, to take into account any time spent in custody as a result of the offence. Sections 719(3.2) and (3.3) require the court to give reasons for the credit and to specify on the record and on the warrant of committal the amount of time in custody, the term of imprisonment that would have been imposed before credit was granted and the amount of time credited.
[25] In the case of Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s guilty plea to the charges of failing to comply and failing to appear, there was no formal credit noted on a warrant of committal because Mr. S.H.(J.)T. received a conditional discharge.
[26] It is, however, very clear on the record that the time spent in custody was one of the reasons that the Crown recommended a conditional discharge and it was a significant factor in the judge acceding to the joint position that a conditional discharge was an appropriate disposition. The sentencing judge, in very brief reasons, said, “In all the circumstances, 46 real days in custody at any period of time, let alone during the pandemic is a significant consequence of, of you missing your trial date. So I am certainly content to grant you a conditional discharge.”
[27] The reasons, while brief, make it clear that the sentencing judge took into account not only the specific number of days that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. spent in custody but also the conditions of that detention. It would be wrong for the same time to be credited on the charge before me either as part of the statutory credit or as credit for harsh conditions.
Issue #2: Should Mr. S.H.(J.)T. receive consideration for harsh presentence conditions as a deduction from the sentence or as a mitigating circumstance?
[28] In the recent case of R. v. Marshall,[^2] Doherty J.A. clarified the approach to be taken in reducing a sentence because of harsh conditions in presentence custody, writing at paras. 52 and 53:
52 The ‘Duncan’ credit is not a deduction from the otherwise appropriate sentence, but is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence. Particularly punitive pretrial incarceration conditions can be a mitigating factor to be taken into account with the other mitigating and aggravating factors in arriving at the appropriate sentence from which the ‘Summers’ credit will be deducted. Because the ‘Duncan" credit is one of the mitigating factors to be taken into account, it cannot justify the imposition of a sentence which is inappropriate, having regard to all of the relevant mitigating or aggravating factors.
53 Often times, a specific number of days or months are given as ‘Duncan’ credit. While this quantification is not necessarily inappropriate, it may skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence. By quantifying the ‘Duncan’ credit, only one of presumably several relevant factors, there is a risk the ‘Duncan’ credit will be improperly treated as a deduction from the appropriate sentence in the same way as the ‘Summers’ credit. If treated in that way, the ‘Duncan’ credit can take on an unwarranted significance in fixing the ultimate sentence imposed: R. v. J.B. (2004), 2004 CanLII 39056 (ON CA), 187 O.A.C. 307 (C.A.). Arguably, that is what happened in this case, where on the trial judge's calculations, the ‘Duncan’ credit devoured three-quarters of what the trial judge had deemed to be the appropriate sentence but for pretrial custody.[^3]
[29] The direction from the Court of Appeal in Marshall is clear and I conclude that consideration for any harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody must be taken into account in arriving at the sentence to be imposed and should not be credited by deducting time from the otherwise appropriate sentence.
[30] I have received records from Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s incarceration at the Quinte Detention Centre where Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was held since his arrest on July 16th with the exception of a 19-day period of quarantine at the Central East Correctional Centre. On five days during his time at the Quinte Detention Centre, outdoor yard was cancelled but institutional programming continued. There was one day of lockdown at the Central East Correctional Centre.
[31] There were considerably more lockdown days during Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s detention at the Toronto South Detention Centre (the “TSDC”) from March 15, 2020 until April 30, 2020. However, for the reasons I have already articulated, I am satisfied, that the time spent in custody at the TSDC was already considered on sentence when Mr. S.H.(J.)T. received a conditional discharge on March 23, 2021. I have not considered the time at the TSDC in my consideration of the harsh conditions of presentence custody.
[32] In this case, there is no evidence before me of any unusually harsh conditions of presentence custody. The cancellation of yard on five days is not excessive and one lockdown day in 19 days is not unduly harsh. As Hill J. noted in R. v. Tulloch:[^4]
Temporary overcrowding and sporadic lockdowns are simply a reality of remand facilities. Again, the causes for both are many and can be quite legitimate. A lockdown may result from a lawful labour disruption, a security threat within an institution, a medical quarantine, et cetera…. What does become a concern is systemic causation and acceptance of such phenomenon.
[33] The records before me do not support the conclusion that there was systemic causation and acceptance of lockdowns or yard cancellation.
[34] I accept, however, that Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s incarceration during the COVID 19 pandemic made his presentence detention more onerous because of the increased risks of contracting the virus in a congregate setting. I have considered this as a mitigating factor.
Issue #3: Should Mr. S.H.(J.)T. receive credit for strict bail conditions?
[35] The proper approach to credit for stringent bail conditions was articulated by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Downes,[^5] at para. 37:
In summary, credit for pre-trial bail conditions should be approached in the following manner:
-- Time spent on stringent pre-sentence bail conditions, especially house arrest, is a relevant mitigating factor.
-- As such, the trial judge must consider the time spent on bail under house arrest in determining the length of sentence.
-- The failure of the trial judge to explain why time spent on bail under house arrest has not been taken into account is an error in principle.
-- The amount of credit to be given for time spent on bail under house arrest is within the discretion of the trial judge and there is no formula that the judge is required to apply.
-- The amount of credit will depend upon a number of factors including, the length of time spent on bail under house arrest; the stringency of the conditions; the impact on the offender's liberty; the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity.
-- Where the offender asks the trial judge to take pre-sentence bail conditions into account, the offender should supply the judge with information as to the impact of the conditions. If there is a dispute as to the impact of the conditions, the onus is on the offender to establish those facts on a balance of probabilities in accordance with s. 724(3) of the Criminal Code. [page 333]
[36] There is a dispute in this case as to the impact of bail conditions on Mr. S.H.(J.)T.. The onus is on Mr. S.H.(J.)T. to establish the impact of the conditions on a balance of probabilities.
[37] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was on bail for a lengthy period of time. For some portion of that time, he was on a strict house arrest bail. Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s bail was varied to allow him to work. It is apparent from the letters from his sons that he was able to spend time with his sons and to assist them in their businesses while on bail.
[38] The only direct evidence of any impact on Mr. S.H.(J.)T. from the bail conditions is the letter of M.T. in which she describes the hardship of Mr. S.H.(J.)T. not being permitted to see her children. Although M.T. writes of the hardship of six years of her brother being separated from her children, the condition that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. not communicate with children under the age of 16 was only in place until September 24, 2018 or just over two years.
[39] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. had a condition on his bail that he not communicate with his son L.1. While I might have inferred hardship from such a condition in other circumstances, such an inference is not supported in this case. The letter from L.1’s mother, J.L., indicates that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. “talks to L.1 on a daily basis and writes and sends him drawings as well”. I cannot infer that Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s relationship with his son L.1 has been impacted by his bail conditions.
[40] Finally, I have considered that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. breached his bail in 2019 by not living at the designated address with his surety. This was an ongoing breach until he was located and arrested in March of 2020. He again was in breach of his bail in 2021 when he was out of his residence without his surety and on his way out of the jurisdiction.
[41] Because of the absence of any evidence of impact and the admitted repeated breaches of his bail, I have concluded that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. should not receive any credit in mitigation of sentence for pre-trial bail conditions.
Issue #4: What is the appropriate sentence to be imposed for this offence and this offender?
[42] In considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Mr. S.H.(J.)T. I have considered the general purposes, principles, and objectives of sentencing, set out in the Criminal Code. The fundamental principle of sentencing set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code requires that the sentence be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
[43] Section 718 of the Criminal Code identifies the objectives of sentencing, including denunciation, specific and general deterrence, separation of the offender from society and the rehabilitation of the offender.
[44] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. is a first offender and the principle of restraint means that I must impose the minimum period of imprisonment necessary to achieve the relevant sentencing objectives, particularly when sentencing a first offender to imprisonment.[^6]
[45] In addition to the general principles and objectives of sentencing, there are specific sections of the Criminal Code that apply in this case because of the age and vulnerability of the victim and his relationship to Mr. S.H.(J.)T.. Those are the following:
•718.01. When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.
•718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years,
(iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim,
(iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation[.]
[46] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was in a position of trust as the parent and guardian of L.L.. This is an extremely aggravating circumstance. As the Court of Appeal wrote in R. v. R. W.:[^7]
- …Few, if any, other relationships in society will attract more rigorous scrutiny by the courts in their application of the law in order to protect against the abuse and exploitation of vulnerable persons by those to whom their care and protection have been entrusted.
15 ParL.L.ent has recognized the fundamental importance of such trust relationships in the sentencing process by providing in s. 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 that the abuse of a position of trust or authority by an accused in relation to a victim is an aggravating factor that must be taken into account by a sentencing judge.
16 As well, this court has long emphasized that the imposition of substantial sentences is essential to meet the purposes of sentencing in order to protect defenceless children from mistreatment by their parents or other caregivers: R. v. Naglik (1991), 1991 CanLII 2702 (ON CA), 65 C.C.C. (3d) 272 (Ont. C.A.), reversed on other grounds, 1993 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 122 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Cudmore (1972), 1972 CanLII 493 (ON CA), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 536 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Cooper (1985), 9 O.A.C. 389 (Ont. C.A.) and R. v. S. (M.K.) (1989), 32 O.A.C. 319 (Ont. C.A.).
[47] A further aggravating factor in this case is that this was not an isolated instance of harmful conduct. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. was responsible not only for the catastrophic injuries to L.L. that resulted from L.L. being placed face down on the thick blanket, but he was also responsible for fracturing L.L.’s femur. The injury to the femur was not deliberate, but Mr. S.H.(J.)T. admitted that he heard the leg crack when he twisted it and he failed to seek medical attention for L.L. after the fracture.
[48] The impact of this offence on the victim has been literally life-altering. Before this offence, L.L. was a healthy child who should have had a full life ahead of him. He is now permanently disabled.
[49] There are mitigating factors. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. is a first offender. He had no criminal record at the time of the offence. He has entered a guilty plea, and this is indicative of remorse.
[50] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. has a good relationship with his older sons. He has been employed and financially supports his family.
[51] As I have already described, Mr. S.H.(J.)T. spent 47 days in presentence custody during the COVID 19 pandemic, a circumstance that I accept caused hardship beyond the usual hardship of presentence custody. In addition, he will serve his sentence during COVID and this will result in more onerous conditions of imprisonment.
[52] The caselaw makes it clear that the paramount objectives in sentencing for cases like this involving a breach of trust and a vulnerable victim are denunciation and deterrence. Rehabilitation is also a sentencing objective in cases involving parents.
[53] There are few cases similar to the one before me. In R. v. M.D.,[^8] Pelletier J. of this Court imposed a global sentence of 12 months’ incarceration on the mother of a three month-old child who was neglected and malnourished. As a result of the neglect, when apprehended by child welfare the child had developmental and emotional delays. He progressed significantly after being apprehended and was expected to fully overcome his delays. The accused was suffering from a major depression at the time of the offence.
[54] In R. v. Carle,[^9] the British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced a 12-month sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm to four months’ time served in the case of a 20 year-old father of a three month-old baby who shook the baby when he became frustrated with the infant’s crying. The offender in that case had expressed remorse and had made efforts to take courses to improve his parenting.
[55] In R. v. Andrzejewski,[^10] the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a sentence that was the equivalent of three years for criminal negligence causing bodily harm where the offender who was in a parental role in relation to the victim accidentally shot the 10-year-old victim in the head, causing what the Court described as “terrible and grievous and permanent disabilities of a most serious kind”. The Court described the three-year sentence as being at the very highest end of the range or beyond. The Court upheld the sentence in large part because of the lengthy record of the offender.
[56] I find that the permanent and serious injuries to the victim in this case take this case out of the lower range of sentence.
[57] Unlike the offender in M.D., Mr. S.H.(J.)T. has no mental illness or disability that would explain his actions in disregarding the advice and counselling by the CAS.
[58] While I accept that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. has shown remorse by his guilty plea, there is no indication that he has any real insight into his actions. Mr. S.H.(J.)T.’s comments to the Court focused on the hardship to himself and his older children. Mr. S.H.(J.)T. said nothing about the impact of his conduct on L.L..
[59] While rehabilitation remains a valid sentencing objective, Mr S.H.(J.)T.’s prospects for rehabilitation appear poor. There is nothing that would support the conclusion that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. would treat an infant in his care differently than he treated L.L..
[60] I find that because of the gravity of this offence and its profound impact on the vulnerable victim, a high reformatory sentence is required. A sentence of 9 months as recommended by counsel for Mr. S.H.(J.)T. would not be adequate to achieve the objectives of denunciation and general and specific deterrence.
[61] Having considered, in mitigation, the impact of COVID on presentence custody and on the sentence to be served, I impose a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment before credit for presentence custody.
[62] Mr. S.H.(J.)T. has served 76 actual days of custody which will be credited at 1.5 to 1 as 114 days. This leaves 433 days left to serve.
[63] The period of imprisonment will be followed by a three-year period of probation. In addition to the statutory conditions, Mr. S.H.(J.)T. will report to a probation officer as directed, but no less than once per month. He shall take such counselling as recommended by the probation officer. He shall sign releases to allow the probation officer to monitor his progress in counselling. He shall have no contact with his son L.1 except in accordance with an order of the Family Court and in the direct and continuous company of another adult (over 18 years of age) who has been fully advised of this probation order and with the prior written permission of his probation officer. He shall have no contact with J.L. except with her written revocable consent. He shall have no contact with L.L..
[64] This is a secondary designated offence and given the circumstances, I am satisfied that a DNA order should be made.
[65] There will also be a s. 109 order for 10 years.
[66] There will also be an order under s.743.21 that Mr. S.H.(J.)T. have no contact with L.L. while serving his sentence of imprisonment.
___________________________
M. Forestell J.
Released: October 13, 2021
COURT FILE NOS.: CR-18-30000084-0000
CR-21-30000456-0000
DATE: 20211013
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
her majesty the queen
- and -
S.H.(J.)T.
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
Forestell J.
Released: October 13, 2021
[^1]: 47 days to October 5th 2021 and a further 7 days to today
[^2]: 2021 ONCA 344
[^3]: This is an apparent change in approach from previous decisions of the Court of Appeal although there is no direct discussion of the change in the judgment in Marshall. See, for example, R. v. Marong, 2020 ONCA 598 at para. 14 where the Court allowed the appeal from sentence, writing: “... Leave to appeal sentence is granted. We allow the sentence appeal to the extent of granting 75 days additional credit to the sentence currently being served. For clarity, the global sentence is one of 48 months less credit for 21 months pre-trial custody and 75 days for presentence custody conditions. Otherwise, we would not interfere with the sentence.”
[^4]: 2014 ONSC 6120 at paras. 27 and 28
[^5]: 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 555
[^6]: R. v. Priest (1996), 1996 CanLII 1381 (ON CA), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 294-295
[^7]: 2004 CarswellOnt 4498 at paras. 14-16
[^8]: 2013 ONSC 6997
[^9]: 2001 BCCA 492
[^10]: 1998 CarswellBC 1400